scholarly journals Evaluating an International Investment Court for International Investment Disputes Under European Union’s Proposal

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 74
Author(s):  
Ahmed Arafa ◽  
Dexiang Guo
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
International Community ◽  
Protection System ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

Berserk resentment of the existing framework regulating the international investment protection system and the operating of investment tribunals have direct to a prevalent perception that there is an immediate need for reform. This is especially pronounced having to do with Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), where there is an overall perception that it is not anything but an unfair and unbiased arbitration system available to decide disputes between states and foreign investors. Therefore, ISDS has been obtained a reputation for being non-transparent, one-sided, and contradictory in all decisions made by ISDS tribunals. The European Union (EU) has responded to this need, by proposing an international investment court; in this research, an attempt is making to look at this court, according to the European Union’s proposal. Moreover, the research explores the potential in creating this international investment court since a system can be drastically altered. However, some criticism can be addressed by international investment courts. However, specific steps can be taken to improve the international community’s investor-state dispute settlement system by re-valuating all the objectives and goals to solve international investment disputes.

EUROPEAN UNION IN WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Trade Conflicts ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Descriptive Method

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.

scholarly journals Russia–Tariff Treatment: Identifying Systematic Violations of WTO Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-312
Author(s):  
KARA M. REYNOLDS ◽  
BORIS RIGOD
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
General Measure ◽  
Systematic Treatment ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
The Eu

AbstractIn October 2014, the European Union requested consultations with Russia under the WTO's dispute settlement system regarding Russia's tariff treatment of various agricultural and manufacturing products. Although most of the measures challenged by the EU were individual tariff lines, the final measure in its complaint was a ‘more general measure’ referred to as the systematic duty variation. A WTO Dispute Panel eventually ruled that the EU failed to establish the systematic nature of the duty treatment afforded by Russia to certain products. In this paper, we explore the Dispute Panel's ruling, as well as how claims of systematic non-compliance are treated in other legal settings. We conclude by exploring whether future WTO Panels should instead consider statistical evidence of systematic treatment to promote compliance.

scholarly journals THE QUESTION ON THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NEW INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katarina Brockova
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Current System ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Practical Implementation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Investment Agreements

The system of resolving international investment disputes has been subjected to intense criticism from the professional and lay public in recent decades. The lack of transparency, predictability, coherence of arbitration awards and legitimacy of the investment arbitration system has led to an increase in efforts to reform the existing system. The European Union is not only one of the most vocal critics of the current system, but also one of its most active reformers. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Union has acquired exclusive competence in the realm of foreign direct investment as part of the common commercial policy. From that moment on, the European Commission began negotiating free trade agreements, many of which also include investment chapters. The most important ones are the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement concluded between the European Union and Canada (2016), Agreement on Investment between the European Union and Singapore (2018), Agreement on Investment between the European Union and Vietnam (2019), as well as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment between the European Union and People’s Republic of China, which has been agreed in principle at the end of 2020, even though the agreement has not yet been formally signed. In these treaties the European Union seeks to push for reform steps leading to the adjustment of the system for resolving international investment disputes in that they introduce a new system of investment courts that will gradually lead to the establishment of the multilateral investment court with the option of appeal at an appellate instance. This would undoubtedly increase the credibility, legitimacy and transparency of the entire system of internatnional investment dispute settlement. This paper aims to summarize, on the basis of an analysis of the relevant provisions of the trade and investment agreements concluded by the European Union over the last decade, the practical progress made by the European Union in reforming the international investment dispute settlement system. Since none of these treaties has become fully effective yet due to the lacking ratification of all EU member states, it will take several more years before we see full practical implementation of the discussed provisions.

Three Salient Issues of the New Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Griller
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Free Trade Agreements ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
National Courts ◽  
System P ◽  
Critical Account ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
The Relationship

The author argues that the mega-regionals are incorporating WTO standards on the removal of technical barriers to trade (TBT), but do not go much further. Consequently, domestic policies on consumer or environmental protection are inevitably affected. However, in this regard, the mega-regionals would not result in a substantive change. By contrast, the relationship between the removal of TBT and investment protection standards is qualified as poorly balanced, unclear, and creating fresh problems. This includes the possibility that damages might be awarded even in cases where the party to the agreement has correctly used its ‘right to regulate’. Moreover, a critical account of the investor-state dispute settlement system foreseen is offered. It is presented as unnecessarily complex, and creating unbalanced advantages for investors. The better alternative would be integrating national courts into the system.

Judicial Lawmaking by Judicial Restraint? The Potential of Balancing in International Economic Law

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1141-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Kleinlein
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Judicial Lawmaking ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

In the framework of this project, both the WTO dispute settlement system and international investment tribunals are portrayed as core actors in judicial lawmaking. By weaving international trade law and investment law on the roughly timbered looms of imperfect treaty law, they have proven to be successful creators of the fabrics of a world trade order and of investment protection standards, respectively. Such effective lawmaking, on the part of particular “regimes,” has the potential to increase the fragmentation of international law. Consequently, international judicial institutions are not only spotted as originators of fragmentation, but—as interpreters of international law—also as addressees of strategies in response presented in the 2006 Report of the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation. It is the Study Group's comforting message that a considerable part of the difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law can be overcome by recourse to a “coherent legal-professional technique.” The Fragmentation Report highlights that conflict resolution and interpretation cannot be distinguished: “[w]hether there is a conflict and what can be done with prima facie conflicts depends on the way the relevant rules are interpreted.” According to the Report, coherence can be established by interpreting legal norms with due regard to their normative environment.

scholarly journals How to Resolve Disputes Arising from Brexit

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-320
Author(s):  
Jed Odermatt
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
International Organization ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Dispute ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Sensitive Issues

The question of how disputes arising from Brexit are to be resolved, and by which body, is one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations on the uk’s withdrawal from the European Union and the envisaged future relationship between the uk and the eu. The legal issues related to withdrawal are further magnified in complexity due to the nature of the eu itself, which does not neatly fit into the category of a traditional international organization. The uk has repeatedly stated that it will not accept the continued role of the eu Court of Justice in the uk legal system after withdrawal. Any dispute settlement system must also respect the constitutional requirements of the eu legal order, most notably, by not infringing on the autonomy of eu law. This article discusses some of the various models from international dispute settlement that could be used to inspire a dispute settlement system in the Brexit context. It discusses dispute settlement in the withdrawal agreement and the role of the Court of Justice during and after a transition period. It then discusses the challenges of designing a dispute settlement system for the future relationship agreement. While aspects of these various models could be replicated, there is no dispute settlement system that is fully appropriate to deal with the various complexities and challenges of Brexit. The paper proposes the establishment of a standing international tribunal to resolve disputes arising from Brexit.

scholarly journals Implications of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) for Investment Flows Between the European Union and the USA

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Janina Witkowska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Free Trade Area ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
Transatlantic Trade ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Trade And Investment ◽  
The Eu

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a controversial subject, but at the same time it is perceived to be the most comprehensive international agreement on free trade and investment protection. Among the topics that evoke criticism on the part of different social groups is the investor‑state dispute‑settlement (ISDS), as well as its legal consequences for the EU Member states. A less discussed issue is the potential implications of the agreement on the state of economic co‑operation between the European Union and the USA in the field of investment flows, with special reference to foreign direct investment (FDI). The aim of this paper is to present the discussion related to the ISDS and examine some of the economic, political and legal implications of TTIP provisions for FDI flows between the EU and the USA. The proposals of the European Commission to change the investment protection system might be treated as an attempt to make the system of arbitrage more transparent and convincing to societies, and safer for states. The effects of the TTIP agreement for FDI between both partners might be dependent on the scale of trade creation and diversion effects, and the mirror effects of investment creation and diversion under a free trade area.

scholarly journals United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China: never ending zeroing in the WTO?

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
DUKGEUN AHN ◽  
PATRICK MESSERLIN
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Whole Process ◽  
Regulatory Processes ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Government ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

AbstractDespite many legal rulings to clarify the WTO inconsistency of zeroing practices, in practically all aspects of antidumping proceedings, the United States declined to categorically rectify the illegal antidumping duties based on zeroing calculation methods. This dispute is merely example of a number of disputes where the US government had to exhaust the whole process for proper implementation of the WTO rulings under its domestic legal system. The US approach is starkly contrasted with the position taken by the European Union that categorically terminates zeroing practices pursuant to the WTO rulings. While the WTO system indeed recognizes individual Member's peculiar regulatory systems and policies during implementation phases, the current situation in which WTO Members must individually resort to the dispute settlement system in order to rectify the US zeroing practices raises a serious concern regarding the legitimacy and integrity of the WTO dispute settlement system. Maybe it is time for WTO Members to agree on better implementation mechanisms before more Members try to develop overly burdensome and complicated regulatory processes for compliance.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document