15 Investment Treaty Dispute Settlement

Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter focuses on investment treaty dispute settlement, examining the nature of conflicts between investors and states and the various means provided by treaties to resolve them. In general, investor–state disputes governed by treaties occur because a host state has taken a ‘measure’ that allegedly violates that state's treaty commitments on the treatment it has promised to accord to investments protected by that treaty. Before the advent of investment treaties, investors basically had three methods to seek resolution of their disputes with host states: (a) direct negotiation with host state governments; (b) domestic courts in the host country; and (c) diplomatic protection by their home states. In order to establish a stable, rule-based system for international investment, treaties provide means to resolve disputes about the interpretation and application of treaty provisions. Most investment treaties provide four separate dispute settlement methods: (1) consultations and negotiations between contracting states; (2) arbitration between contracting states; (3) consultations and negotiations between covered investors and host governments; and (4) investor–state arbitration.

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-177
Author(s):  
Joshua Karton

Abstract This article explores the sources, nature, and implications of an arbitrator’s duty to decide according to the governing law in investor-state arbitrations. It advances a contractarian conception of arbitral authority in investor-state arbitration, whereby the agreement of the states parties to the investment treaty is the source of both the arbitrator’s power to make decisions and the primary constraint on that power: the duty to apply the law. It argues that the choice of law provisions in investment treaties have a constitutional character for arbitral tribunals, such that a failure to apply the chosen law constitutes an excess of the tribunal’s powers which, if manifest, justifies annulment or non-enforcement of the award. The article concludes by considering the implications of this contractarian theory of arbitral powers and duties for arbitrators, disputing parties, and states seeking to reassert control over the investor-state dispute settlement system.


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 223-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mavluda Sattorova

Prior to the rise of international investment treaties and institutionalization of investor–state arbitration, the protection of foreign investors from mistreatment in the host state courts was the preserve of customary international law, which prohibited a denial of justice and provided for diplomatic protection as a principal means of dispute settlement. In contrast, contemporary international investment law offers a whole array of legal standards that can be invoked in seeking redress for the acts of national courts before international arbitral tribunals. In addition to relying on the customary prohibition of denial of justice, investors can challenge judicial conduct under the treaty standards on expropriation, fair and equitable treatment and, in some cases, the obligation to ensure effective means of asserting claims. Although the multiplicity of standards available to aggrieved investors can be regarded as an inalienable part of an effective regime for the protection of foreign investment, it also gives rise to a number of fundamental problems relating to the application of procedural mechanisms designed to control the review of the conduct of national judiciary by international courts and tribunals. Focusing on arbitral cases in which claims of a denial of justice were brought under the rubric of ‘a judicial expropriation’ and ‘a failure to provide effective means of asserting claims’, this article seeks to ascertain when investor claims relating to the administration of justice in the host state courts become amenable to arbitral scrutiny. It argues that, by providing a variety of standards under which the acts of judiciary can be challenged, investment treaty law allows investors to circumvent procedural barriers and thus muddles the boundaries demarcating the scope of international review of national judicial conduct.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-42
Author(s):  
Michał Pyka

This contribution deals with the question of the legal character of investment treaty claims, brought to international investment arbitration, when alleged breaches of investment treaty obligations towards an investor occurred after the entry into force of an investment treaty but before the making of an investment by an investor. The analysis of the existing legal framework allows for the conclusion that the said acts of a host state are generally excluded from the scope of investment treaty protection. An arbitral tribunal neither has jurisdiction over these acts nor is it allowed to apply substantive treaty provisions thereto. This conclusion stems from the principle of intertemporal law and numerous provisions of investment treaties constituting the implementation or modification of this principle. Nevertheless, an arbitral tribunal is not fully deprived of the possibility of considering the acts of a host state preceding the making of an investmentand undertaken before any activity of the future investor took place. It can consider them as evidence of the intent of a host state, acts creating legitimate expectations of an investor or acts constituting elements of what is termed a continuing act.


Author(s):  
Prabhash Ranjan

Many countries have started contesting international investment treaties that allow foreign corporations to sue sovereign states for alleged treaty breaches at international arbitration forums. This contestation has taken the form of either countries terminating their investment treaties or walking out of the investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) system. India has also jumped on the contestation bandwagon. As a consequence of being sued by more than 20 foreign investors, India terminated close to 60 investment treaties and adopted a new Model bilateral investment treaty (BIT) purportedly to balance investment protection with the host state’s right to regulate. This book critically studies India’s approach towards BITs by tracing the origin, evolution, and the current state of play. The book does so by locating it in India’s economic policy in general and policy towards foreign investment in particular. India’s approach towards BITs and India’s policy towards foreign investment were consistent with each other in the periods of economic nationalism (1947 to 1990) and economic liberalism (1991 to 2010). However, post 2010; India’s approach to BITs has become protectionist while India’s foreign investment policy continues to be liberal. In order to balance investment protection with the state’s right to regulate, India needs to evolve its BIT practice based on the twin framework of international rule of law and embedded liberalism.


Author(s):  
Rebecca E. Khan

AbstractHost states are not the only sovereign parties that an investment dispute can impact. The sovereign interests of an investor’s home state are also potentially affected by an investment claim initiated by a national against an investment treaty partner, and more mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that the home state has access to the arbitration proceedings. This chapter argues for non-disputing state party participation as a matter of right in investment treaty arbitration cases. Whether or not the home state of the investor is informed of and allowed to participate in an investment dispute has largely been left to the discretion of arbitral tribunals; arbitration rules and jurisprudence have regarded the home state no differently than non-governmental third parties seeking to participate in the arbitration as amici curiae. From the perspective of increased transparency in the investor-state dispute settlement system, this chapter posits that non-disputing state parties must be accorded an elevated status in investor-state arbitration, with the following rights: first, to be formally notified at the outset about an investment treaty dispute; second, to have access to the documents of the arbitration case; and, third, to make written submissions with respect to the interpretation of the international investment agreement invoked in the claim. The analysis begins by identifying the sovereign interests of the home state that come into play in an investment treaty arbitration. The perils of diplomatic protection are examined in this chapter, to provide the perspective from which to delimit the parameters for non-disputing state party participation. A survey of arbitration rules and jurisprudence outlines the level of participation thus far accorded to home states in investment treaty arbitration.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 843-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Berger

China is becoming one of the key stakeholders in the international investment regime. It is, however, still unclear what role China can play in the ongoing reform of the international investment regime. Starting from this overall focus, this article analyses the most recent period of China’s international investment policy-making. Mapping the contents of investment treaties signed since 2008 it argues that China undertook a partial ‘NAFTA-ization’. Whilst China has adopted a number of clauses invented by the NAFTA countries, it introduced these clauses in an incoherent fashion. Looking at the drivers of this peculiar policy, this article argues that China’s investment treaty-making practice is largely inspired by its partner countries. As a result of this particular negotiation policy, Beijing’s approach to international investment rule-making is inconsistent. This belies the argument that China can make a significant contribution to reforming the international investment regime.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-334
Author(s):  
Javier García Olmedo

AbstractThe legitimacy crisis confronting the international investment regime has called for reforms to eliminate the asymmetric and troubled nature of investment treaties. These instruments grant extensive investor protections without offering reciprocal safeguards for host States wishing to preserve regulatory space. This article argues that any reform designed to redress imbalances in the existing regime should first aim at narrowing the personal jurisdiction of investment tribunals. Problematically, access to most investment treaties depends on broad nationality requirements, which have enabled investors to use corporations or passports of convenience to obtain treaty protection. This practice exacerbates the unbalanced relationship between host States and investors. It increases host States’ exposure to investment treaty claims and allows investors to circumvent newer, more State-oriented investment treaties. Using as an example the novel anti-nationality planning approach embraced in the 2019 Dutch Model BIT, this article suggests effective treaty mechanisms that States can adopt to restrict the range of investors that are entitled to claim.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 890-917 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sufian Jusoh ◽  
Muhammad Faliq Abd Razak ◽  
Mohamad Azim Mazlan

Abstract Malaysia is an important destination for foreign direct investment and has signed more than 70 investment guarantee agreements. Most allow investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and Malaysia has been subject to three claims, including two fully argued cases: Philippe Gruslin and Malaysian Historical Salvor. Yet Malaysian companies have also utilised ISDS provisions: in MTD Equity Bhd v Chile, Telekom Malaysia v Ghana, and Ekran Berhad v China (the first-ever ISDS claim against China). These cases provide lessons for Malaysia in becoming better prepared to negotiate newer generations of investment treaties, and to defend further potential cases. Malaysia has not reacted negatively to investment treaties despite the cases filed against the country. In fact, in light of its evolving interests Malaysia has become more of a rule-maker in international investment law rather than a rule-taker. Malaysia thereby continues to liberalise its investment regime and provide better transparency – the best defence against claims.


Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter considers the investment treaty devices of exceptions, modifications, and terminations. A state can encounter tensions between its perceived national interests and its requested or ratified treaty obligations in the negotiation and implementation of treaties. It has three basic devices to mediate these tensions. The first, which is employed as part of the negotiating process, is to create specific exceptions in the treaty to assure a host state sufficient latitude of action for the future. The other two, which are invoked after the investment treaty enters into effect, are for a state to modify the treaty provisions by agreement with other contracting parties or to terminate participation in the treaty and thus end its international investment obligations.


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