Ageism in the NHS and the Human Rights Act 1998: An Ethical and Legal Enquiry

2002 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nesbitt ◽  
Sayers

AbstractIn the United Kingdom, the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force on 2 October 2000. This Act has implications for the National Health Service, that are speculative and to date largely untested in the Courts. The area considered here, is the way in which the Act may impact on age discrimination as it relates to provision of health care. Ageist policy and decision-making is analysed in conjunction with the Human Rights Act and Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.The rationality of ageism and the justifications used to support its practice are challenged. The equal right to life-saving treatment of elderly patients is defended as inviolable, unless offset by other reasonable considerations, which as argued should not be age per se.

Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] UKHL 4, House of Lords. The case considered whether the Secretary of State could restrict the editorial decisions of broadcasters as regards the way in which messages from spokespersons for proscribed organizations were broadcast. The United Kingdom was a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) when the case was heard, but the case also predates the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. There is discussion of the legal position of the ECHR under the common law in the United Kingdom, and the concept of proportionality in United Kingdom’s domestic jurisprudence. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Behrad Baharlo ◽  
Daniele Bryden ◽  
Stephen J Brett

The right to liberty and security of the person is protected by Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights which has been incorporated into the Human Rights Act 1998. The 2014 Supreme Court judgment in the case commonly known as Cheshire West provided for an ‘acid test’ to be employed in establishing a deprivation of liberty. This ‘acid test’ of ‘continuous supervision and not free to leave’ led to concerns that patients lacking capacity being treated on an Intensive Care Unit could be at risk of a ‘deprivation of liberty’, if this authority was applicable to this setting. This article revisits the aftermath of Cheshire West before describing the recent legal developments around deprivation of liberty pertaining to intensive care by summarising the recent Ferreira judgments which appear for now to answer the question as to the applicability of Cheshire West in life-saving treatment.


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 317-368
Author(s):  
Karen Morrow

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (ECHR) regime has, in the absence of specific coverage of environmental rights, developed a “creative” approach in its jurisprudence in this area, pressing a variety of other rights, notably: Article 6 (the right to a fair hearing); Article 8 (the right to privacy and family life); and Article 1 to the First Protocol of the ECHR (the right to enjoyment of property) into service. This creativity has achieved much in according indirect protection to individuals in this regard, but has also placed additional pressure on the already congested Convention system. The entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) made long-held rights under the ECHR directly accessible in domestic law in the United Kingdom. This naturally spawned a wave of litigation. One of the most prominently litigated areas concerned the pursuit of a variety of environment-based rights claims. In the intervening decade, the application of the ECHR to environmental claims in the UK courts has generated somewhat mixed results. This is in part a result of the “patchwork” approach that has developed toward environmental claims within the Convention regime itself, but it is also a product of the nature of the relationship between the ECHR and domestic law and the content and ethos of both regimes. This article will conclude by briefly considering the on-going role of the ECHR regime in environmental cases in light of subsequent developments in this area of law, notably under the Aarhus Convention.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter is concerned with how freedoms and liberties might be protected in the UK. It begins with an attempt to distinguish between human rights and civil liberties, whilst recognizing that this is by no means a straightforward task. It then covers political and social or economic rights, the traditional means of protecting civil liberties in the UK, the European Convention on Human Rights, the incorporation of the Convention into English law, and judicial deference/discretionary areas of judgment. The Human Rights Act 1998 is reviewed from a protection of rights perspective. Finally, the question of a Bill of Rights for the UK is considered.


2004 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosamund Scott

AbstractFollowing the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 in English law, there was speculation as to whether the English legal position that the fetus has no right to life is compatible with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Vo v. France provides an opportunity to reflect on the current English and ECtHR approaches to the fetus. The problems of finding a fetal right to life, which Vo sidesteps, are noted. At the same time, the "all or nothingness" of rights language is not without difficulties and troubled the judges in Vo. In particular, the idea that the fetus has no right to life gives the impression that neither English nor ECHR law values the fetus. In this light, we find English and ECtHR judges trying to express a concern for the fetus which does not undermine a pregnant woman's legal interests. This article considers these issues and highlights the importance, in a highly genetic age, of developing ways of valuing the fetus without invoking the language of rights and thus without affecting the current legal balance of interests in the maternal-fetal relationship. The idea of valuing the fetus in this way is briefly explored with particular reference to aspects of selective abortion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 232-267
Author(s):  
Steve Foster

The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in October 2000, its purpose to allow victims of alleged violations of rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) to pursue a remedy in the domestic courts. Thus, central to the Act’s purpose is to enable the access of the rights and remedies already provided by the machinery of the European Convention, subject only to those provisions of the Act which seek to retain the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. The purpose of this article is to study the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to cases brought against the United Kingdom in order to examine the United Kingdom’s record under the Convention and, hopefully, of identifying common themes of human rights violations for which the United Kingdom has consistently been held responsible, and for which they may remain vulnerable to challenge in the future. At this stage it will be submitted that the European Convention has exposed the limitations of human rights protection in domestic law, and that on many occasions both the courts and Parliament have failed to adopt the necessary jurisprudence of the European Court in their respective roles. Finally, in the light of that evidence the article will examine the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 in order to assess the likely impact of that Act on the protection of rights and liberties in the United Kingdom.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, European Court of Human Rights. This case concerned whether interrogation techniques employed by the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1975 amounted to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. More generally, the case note considers the differences between absolute, limited, and qualified rights. The case predates the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


2020 ◽  
pp. 255-292
Author(s):  
Steve Wilson ◽  
Helen Rutherford ◽  
Tony Storey ◽  
Natalie Wortley ◽  
Birju Kotecha

This chapter considers the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its relationship to the English legal system. The focus in the chapter is on key provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998—the Act that incorporated the Convention into UK law. In the earlier part of the chapter there is coverage of sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Act. These provisions concern the duties placed on the courts to take into account judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, to interpret domestic legislation so as to comply with rights under the Convention, and finally to issue a declaration of incompatibility when domestic legislation does not comply with rights under the Convention. Using examples from the case law, the chapter assesses how the courts balance their constitutional role to respect the supremacy of Parliament, with the duties provided in the Act to respect rights under the Convention. There is also an analysis of s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which makes it unlawful for a public authority to act incompatibly with Convention rights. The analysis includes the contested question of what precisely constitutes a ‘public authority’, particularly when a private body is carrying out a public function.


2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-492
Author(s):  
S.I. Strong

OXFORD University Press has initiated a new series on the European Convention on Human Rights and, in light of recent world events, could not have found a more timely first instalment than Evans’s book on freedom of religion. However, the choice of topics is sound even when one sets aside the current interest in the interplay between law and religion. First, as noted in the general editor’s preface, there is a “considerable body of literature” on the Convention, “including many works providing an overview of the Strasbourg system and its jurisprudence. Less common are studies like Dr. Evans’s book concerned with the interpretation and application of individual provisions” (p. vii). Second, “[i]t is particularly apt that the present volume should appear at a time when, as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998, courts in the United Kingdom are for the first time being called upon to take account of the European Convention. In a multicultural society religious freedom is plainly fundamental and lawyers, judges and others with responsibilities in this area will find Dr. Evans’s book extremely useful” (pp. viii–viii).


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-230
Author(s):  
Paul Daly

IT is trite law that good reasons must be given to justify infringements of fundamental rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, as incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. But what reasons can one count as good reasons? In Re Brewster's Application [2017] UKSC 8; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 519, the United Kingdom Supreme Court addressed the question of how much deference courts should afford to post hoc rationalisations of decisions challenged for non-compliance with the Convention. The answer given by Lord Kerr, with whom Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lord Reed and Lord Dyson agreed, is interesting in its own terms and may have implications outside the confines of the Convention.


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