Spelling It Out−Convergence and Divergence in the Judicial Dialogue between cjeu and ECtHR

2019 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-458
Author(s):  
Amalie Frese ◽  
Henrik Palmer Olsen

In this article we investigate the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights as it manifests in explicit cross-references between the two Courts’ jurisprudence. The analysis detects cross-references, how they are used and indications of converge or divergence in the jurisprudence through their explicit citations and references. Our dataset consists of the entire corpus of judgments from both Courts from 2009 (when the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights came into force and until the end of 2016. On the basis of a content search for references to the other Court in both corpora we detect all their cross-references. We find that 1) the Courts’ use each other’s case law surprisingly little, but when they do, it is 2) primarily within the legal domains of criminal justice and immigration policies, and 3) displaying convergence towards the jurisprudence of the other Court.

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Giubboni

Critical-contextual analysis of case law of the European Court of Justice on employers’ contractual freedom – Fundamental right to be immunised against the alleged disproportional protection enjoyed by employees – Progressive ideological overthrow of the original constitutional assumptions of the founding treaties – Prominent example of ‘displacement of social Europe’ – Court of Justice’s case law on the relationship between freedom to conduct a business and labour law – Neoliberal understanding of the freedom of enterprise – Alternative interpretation of Article 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 210-246
Author(s):  
Louise HALLESKOV STORGAARD

AbstractThis article offers a perspective on how the objective of a strong and coherent European protection standard pursued by the fundamental rights amendments of the Lisbon Treaty can be achieved, as it proposes a discursive pluralistic framework to understand and guide the relationship between the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. It is argued that this framework – which is suggested as an alternative to the EU law approach to the Strasbourg system applied by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 and its Charter-based case law – has a firm doctrinal, case law and normative basis. The article ends by addressing three of the most pertinent challenges to European fundamental rights protection through the prism of the proposed framework.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-511
Author(s):  
Stephen Brittain

European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: relationship – Teleological method of interpretation of the European Court of Justice: meaning, justifications, and criticisms – Originalist method of interpretation: meaning, justifications, and criticisms – Original meaning of Article 52(3) of the Charter: text, drafting history, case law – Conclusion: case law of European Court of Human Rights not strictly binding on the Court of Justice of the European Union.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-115
Author(s):  
Márk Némedi

Abstract This paper analyses the case-law of the European Court of Justice on the substantive scope of ne bis in idem in transnational cases and evaluates the findings in light of the different concepts of legal interests inherent in the concept of crime as a material notion. I argue that the application of the interpretation of the ECJ to crimes against collective interests is insufficiently justified. As a result, the interpretation of ne bis in idem based on material facts appears only partially correct and a sense of distrust seems to be cemented between member states creating obstacles to a successful reform of the principle. Part one attempts to defend that the reasoning put forward by the court lacks relevance and evaluates how this affects mutual trust. Part two analyses this interpretation in the light of different forms of legal interest. Part three examines how later case-law has tried to explain the problematic interpretation of early cases and its relationship with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The article will conclude by summarising the findings which may put into perspective the more general challenges of cooperation in criminal matters within the EU.


Author(s):  
Berthold Rittberger

This chapter examines how the European Union acquired distinctive constitution-like features. It begins with a discussion of three routes to constitutionalization: the first is through changes in the EU's primary law; the second focuses on ‘in between’ constitutionalization; and the third leads directly to the European Court of Justice and its jurisprudence. The chapter proceeds by discussing two developments that have shaped the EU constitutional order almost since the beginning: the emergence of a body of EU law constituting a set of higher-order legal rules, and the consolidation of the constitutional principle of representative democracy. It explains how the supremacy and direct effect of EU law, as well as the EU court's concern with the protection of fundamental rights, helped transform the EU into a constitutional polity. It also considers how the extension of the legislative, budgetary, and other powers of the European Parliament animated the constitutional principle.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 409-420
Author(s):  
Anna Podolska

Abstract There are various forms of jurisdictional dialogue. In addition to drawing from the case law of another court or seeking direct assistance of such another court in passing the judgment, we can notice in practice situations when by issuing a verdict the courts are communicating with each other. The rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights regarding the free movement of judgments in the European Union and protection of fundamental rights are the example of such activities. Each of these bodies was interpreting separately the extent to which the mechanisms of recognising and executing the judgments may interfere with the level of protection of fundamental rights. A common conclusion concerns assigning the priority to protection of fundamental rights, while individual bodies were determining differently the standards of such protection. The analysed judgments can be construed as a communication between these bodies. Although no direct discussion takes place between these courts, this is still a form of interaction which affects the development of the case law and understanding of the boundaries of mutual recognition of judgments and protection of human rights within judicial proceedings.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Niblock ◽  
Anna Oehmichen

The present article examines the developments of extradition law in Europe, with a special focus on case law in England & Wales and Germany. It explores the effects that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union has had on extradition law within Europe, and how the tensions between mutual trust and fundamental rights protection in this area have been addressed by the two jurisdictions.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 199-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Grief

This is a critical analysis—in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law—of the judgment in R v MAFF, ex p First City Trading, or at least of that part of the judgment concerning the domestic reach of general principles of law. Laws J held that the legal status of the general principles ‘made’ by the ECJ is inferior to that of the principles enshrined in the Treaty, and that therefore the domestic reach of the former is narrower than that of the latter. In the years since the judgment was delivered, however, it does not appear to have been considered by the ECJ and there seems to have been little academic evaluation of its cogency and implications. One commentator considered that the distinction drawn by the judge seemed correct. Another was critical, asserting that ‘the distinction between principles based on Treaty provisions and general principles of law cannot be deduced from the case law of the Court of Justice’. The possible entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which recognises that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (and thus presumably the rights, freedoms and principles within it) has ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’, makes it appropriate to revisit the judgment and consider whether Laws J’s approach was correct.


Author(s):  
Thom Snijders ◽  
Stijn van Deursen

Abstract On 29 July 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgments in three eagerly awaited cases, Pelham, Spiegel Online and Funke Medien, which all relate to the relationship between copyright and (other) fundamental rights. Specifically, an issue arising in these cases is whether the EU copyright acquis allows for fundamental rights to be invoked as an autonomous ground for limiting a copyright, outside of the mechanisms incorporated in the Copyright Directive for that purpose. In its judgments, the Court rejects this possibility and instead locates the role for fundamental rights in the interpretation and implementation of the exceptions and limitations of the Directive. We argue that – while this may render satisfactory results in the great majority of cases – in exceptional cases the CJEU’s approach towards balancing copyrights and fundamental rights could be at odds with the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, which might reduce the legal certainty sought after by the CJEU. Lastly, we consider the implications of that potential tension for the judicial authorities and other actors within the domestic legal orders of the EU Member States.


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