The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights - Knight Errant or Slot Machine Automation?

1988 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-46
Author(s):  
Justice Michael Kirby
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights

AbstractIn this paper, the author deals with the "role" of judges in "advancing" human rights. He cautions that the needs of different countries will vary. He starts with a reference to the recent failure of Judge Robert Bork to secure confirmation to the Supreme Court of the United States. Bork had been a long time proponent of judicial restraint in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, urging that protection of human rights should normally be left to the democratically accountable branches of government - the executive and the legislature. After reviewing the theoretical and practical arguments for and against judicial restraint, the author states his own conclusions. These are that, especially where there is a constitutional charter of rights and particularly in common law countries, judges have an inescapable function in developing the law. Their decisions necessarily advance their view of human rights. In human rights cases, they may nowadays receive assistance from international statements of human rights and the jurisprudence developing around such statements. The author appeals for an international approach but acknowledges that this will be difficult for lawyers, traditionally jurisdiction bound. But he warns that there are limits to the activism of the judiciary in controversial human rights cases. Judges themselves do well to recognise these limits both for their legitimacy and their effectiveness. An important modern challenge to the judiciary is that of resolving this dilemma between the pressures for restraint and the urgency of action.

Insult of Public Officials

2021 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Structural Differences

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.

scholarly journals Evoluzione della giurisprudenza costituzionale statunitense in materia d’aborto (II)

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Persano
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Single Case ◽  
The United States ◽  
Planned Parenthood ◽  
Abortion Debate ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

Negli Stati Uniti il dibattito sull’aborto è sempre un tema molto caldo. Questo saggio, diviso in due parti (la prima parte è stata pubblicata sul precedente numero della rivista) prova a ripercorrere l’evoluzione della giurisprudenza costituzionale statunitense in materia d’aborto, evidenziando i cambiamenti che ciascuna decisione ha apportato al quadro giuridico precedente. In questa seconda parte, la dissertazione sui singoli casi giurisprudenziali decisi dalla Suprema Corte prosegue con il caso Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Esso è stato una vera occasione mancata nella storia dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, perchè venne sfiorata la overrule di Roe v. Wade. Ciononostante, venne sostanzialmente confermato l’impianto delle decisioni precedenti, in considerazione del fatto che una decisione contraria all’aborto avrebbe spiazzato un popolo che per decenni aveva organizzato la propria vita in funzione anche della possibilità di abortire. Con questa decisione si distinse la gravidanza in due periodi: quello della pre-viabilità, in cui la donna era completamente libera di abortire in accordo col medico; quello della post-viabilità, in cui gli Stati avrebbero potuto legiferare, pur dovendo consentire l’aborto nel caso di pericolo per la vita o la salute della madre. Inoltre il diritto d’aborto venne radicato nella libertà riconosciuta nel XIV Emendamento della Costituzione. Nel successivo caso Stenberg v. Carhart fu oggetto di giudizio l’aborto a nascita parziale: una legge del Nebraska aveva bandito questa pratica, ma la legge fu annullata dalla Corte Suprema, nonostante il duro dissenso di ben quattro giudici, fra cui Anthony Kennedy. Successivamente a questa decisione, il Congresso prese l’iniziativa di emanare il Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. Questa legge fu impugnata in via d’azione davanti alla Corte Suprema e ne scaturì la sentenza Gonzalez v. Carhart. In questa decisione la Corte fece un passo indietro rispetto a Stenberg, affermò la legittimità del bando, sostenne che l’aborto a nascita parziale non è mai necessario per tutelare la vita della donna e che Stenberg era fondato su convinzioni erronee sul punto. Il saggio si conclude con delle interessanti considerazioni in merito ai possibili sviluppi futuri circa il tema dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, auspica la “liberalizzazione del diritto alla vita” ed avanza una originale proposta, valida per tutti i Paesi in cui l’aborto è legalizzato. ---------- Abortion debate is always a hot subject in the United States. This essay, divided into two parts (the first part has been published on the previous issue of this review) tries to go along the development of U.S. constitutional caselaw about abortion, pointing out the change that each judgement caused to the previous law framework. In this second part, the dissertation about U.S. Supreme Court single case-law goes on by Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It was a real missed occasion in the abortion affair in the United States, because it was on the verge of overruling Roe v. Wade. However, the framework of the previous cases was substantially confirmed, considering that a decision against abortion would place out people who for a long time organized their own life in connection to the right of abortion. By this judgement, pregnancy was divided into two periods: pre-viability, when woman was completely free to have an abortion in agreement with her doctor; post-viability, when States could restrict abortion, except for woman life or health risks. Moreover, abortion right was founded on liberty, acknowledged by XIV Amendement. In the following case Gonzalez v. Carhart, partial-birth abortion was judged: a statute of Nebraska banned this activity, but it was stroked down by Supreme Court, despite of the dissenting opinion of four judges (Anthony Kennedy was one of them). After this judgement, the Congress wanted to issue Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. This statute was pre-enforcement challenged to the Supreme Court, and Gonzalez v. Carhart was poured. In this judgment, the Court drew back Stenberg, it stated the ban was legitimate, partial-birth abortion never is necessary to safeguard woman health, and Stenberg was founded on wrong beliefs on this matter. This essay concludes with interesting considerations about possible developments about abortion affair in the United States, wishes “liberty of right to life” and proposes a solution for all the countries where abortion is legal.

The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule: Blurring the Line Between Rule and Exception

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Liz Heffernan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Exclusionary Rule ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

The admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal proceedings has generated controversy throughout the common law world. In the United States, there has been renewed debate in recent years over the propriety of the judicially-created exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. When defining the scope and purpose of the rule, the US Supreme Court has placed ever increasing emphasis on the likely deterrent effect which suppressing evidence will exert on law enforcement. This article explores the consequent restriction of the exclusionary rule evinced in the contemporary case law including United States v Herring in which the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the so-called "good faith" exception. In conclusion it offers reflection from the perspective of another common law country, Ireland, where the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence has been the subject of debate.

Ten Death and Transfiguration: How the Ninth Amendment Got Filed in the Wrong Place

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lash Kurt T
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Ninth Amendment ◽  
Wrong Place

This chapter discusses how the transfigured Ninth Amendment, although used in support of a broad conception of individual freedom, has become a far smaller provision than that envisioned by its framers and has been rendered altogether unenforceable as an independent provision in the Bill of Rights. It describes how the Ninth Amendment has played an important role in matters involving the Supreme Court of the United States.

Reviving Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 858-863 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vivian Grosswald Curran ◽  
David Sloss
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Foreign Countries ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Death Knell ◽  
Alien Tort Statute

In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court held that “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the [Alien Tort Statute (ATS)], and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.” The Court preserved the possibility that claims arising from conduct outside the United States might be actionable under the ATS “where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States ... with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” However, the Court’s decision apparently sounds the death knell for “foreign-cubed” human rights claims under the ATS—that is, cases in which foreign defendants committed human rights abuses against foreign plaintiffs in foreign countries.

The Janus face of imprisonment: Contrasting judicial conceptions of imprisonment purposes in the European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of the United States

2020 ◽  
pp. 174889582091196
Author(s):  
Netanel Dagan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Moral Concept ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court

This article considers how the Supreme Court of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights apply, interpret and frame abstract imprisonment purposes, and how they view their relevance to prison conditions, while discussing the constitutionality of prison conditions. The article argues that the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights view, conceptualise and interpret the purposes of imprisonment differently. Regarding the purposes of retribution and rehabilitation specifically, the analysis presented in the article exposes a ‘Janus face’, meaning that each purpose can, and is, interpreted in two different, and almost contrasting ways. The article offers three themes regarding the conceptualisation of imprisonment purposes by the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights: First, the relationship between the purposes of sentencing and imprisonment along the penal continuum, and the role of rehabilitation in a prison regime: should sentencing purposes be relatively static during their implementation in prison, meaning that retributive-oriented sentencing purposes should be pursued (Supreme Court), or should they conversely progress with the passage of time, from retribution to resocialisation as the primary purpose of imprisonment (European Court of Human Rights). Second, the meaning of retributivism in regard to prison conditions: should prisoners pay a debt to society by suffering in restrictive prison conditions (Supreme Court), or is retributivism achieved by atonement and by finding ways to compensate or repair harms caused by crime (European Court of Human Rights). Third, the way in which prison rehabilitation is framed and understood: should prison rehabilitation be seen as a risk management tool aimed purely at lowering recidivism (Supreme Court), or as a moral concept grounded in a prisoner’s ability to change his life and belief in personal responsibility for one’s actions (European Court of Human Rights). Possible theoretical implications and general policy implications are considered in the article.

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