The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule: Blurring the Line Between Rule and Exception

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Liz Heffernan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Exclusionary Rule ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

The admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal proceedings has generated controversy throughout the common law world. In the United States, there has been renewed debate in recent years over the propriety of the judicially-created exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. When defining the scope and purpose of the rule, the US Supreme Court has placed ever increasing emphasis on the likely deterrent effect which suppressing evidence will exert on law enforcement. This article explores the consequent restriction of the exclusionary rule evinced in the contemporary case law including United States v Herring in which the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the so-called "good faith" exception. In conclusion it offers reflection from the perspective of another common law country, Ireland, where the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence has been the subject of debate.

Insult of Public Officials

2021 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Structural Differences

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.

Six Notions of ‘Political’ and the United States Supreme Court

1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Hodder-Williams
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political System ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

Six different notions of ‘political’ are commonly used in discussions of the US Supreme Court. All six are familiar, but the distinctions among them are seldom carefully drawn. The six are: (1) purely definitional, in the sense that the Supreme Court, as an appellate court of last resort inevitably authoritatively allocates values; (2) empirical, in the sense that litigants use the Court to try to achieve their political purposes; (3) influence seeking, in the sense that the justices have a natural desire to prevail in arguments within the court; (4) prudential, in the sense that the justices frequently consider the probable consequences of their decisions; (5) policy-oriented, in the – usually pejorative – sense that justices are said to use the Court and the law as a cover for pursuing their own policy and other goals; and (6) systemic, in the sense that the Court's decisions frequently, as a matter of fact, have consequences for other parts of the American political system. These six notions are considered in the context of recent abortion decisions.

US Supreme Court, Medellín v. Texas: More than an Assiduous Building Inspector?

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN KING GAMBLE ◽  
CHRISTINE M. GIULIANO
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Strong Reaction ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Case

AbstractThe US Supreme Court case of José Ernesto Medellín, Petitioner v. Texas, decided on 25 March 2008, has generally been seen as a US refusal to follow unambiguous treaty provisions. There has not been such a strong reaction to US behaviour relative to specific treaty obligations since the 1992 Alvarez-Machain case. The Supreme Court majority (six votes to three) held that ‘neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law’. The uncomfortable – and to many illogical – conclusion reached by the Court was that even though Avena is an ‘international law obligation on the part of the United States’, it is not binding law within the United States even in the light of an explicit presidential order. While the result may be disappointing, the case should be understood in the context of a legal system that (i) makes treaties part of ‘the supreme Law of the Land’; (ii) has developed a complicated concept of self-executing treaties; and (iii) can be hesitant to direct states (sub-national units) to follow presidential directives even on matters of foreign policy.

Protecting Free Exercise of Religion under the Indian and the United States Constitutions: the Doctrine of Essential Practices and the Centrality Test

ICL Journal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Khagesh Gautam
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Supreme Court Of India ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

AbstractFree Exercise of Religion is a protected constitutional right under the democratic constitutions of both the biggest democracy in the world ie India and the most powerful democracy in the world ie United States of America. Despite textual similarities in the free-exercise clauses of Constitutions of both of these democracies, there is a big difference in the standards of review whereby free exercise claims are judicially reviewed by their re­spective Supreme Courts. Whereas the US Supreme Court does not give much weight to the sincerity of the religious belief and employs the ‘religion-neutral’ test, the Supreme Court of India gives due weight to the sincerity of the religious belief and employs a ‘reli­gion-central’ test known in Indian free-exercise jurisprudence as the Doctrine of Essential Practices. However, a closer examination of judicial opinions on the point discloses that sincerity of religious belief is not entirely unimportant in US free-exercise jurisprudence but still is not given the kind of importance that it is given in India - a nation that is and has historically been religiously diverse.This paper closely examines the free-exercise jurisprudence as developed by the respec­tive Supreme Courts and argues that in view of the changing religious diversity in the United States perhaps time has come to re-examine the reluctance of the American courts to give its due weightage to the sincerity of religious belief while judicially reviewing free-exercise claims. Relying on several judicial opinions of the US Supreme Court and its sub­ordinate courts in the US and by demonstrating their factual and doctrinal equivalents in the Supreme Court of India, this paper argues that free-exercise clauses of both the US and Indian Constitutions protect not just the right to believe in whichever religion an indi­vidual chooses but also acts in pursuit of religion. The belief-act distinction - an idea at the core of much of US free-exercise jurisprudence is not what is truly protected by the free-exercise clause. What is protected indeed are the acts done in pursuance of religious belief. A line has to be drawn between the acts that are sincerely done in pursuance of religion and those that are not. This line has to be drawn by the Courts on a case to case basis. And that is where US free-exercise jurisprudence would be well assisted in examining Indian free-exercise jurisprudence on the point.

scholarly journals The Legacy of Korematsu: A Story of Confinement and Vindication, As Told through Archival Documents

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Michael Maitland
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Japanese Americans ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Archival Documents ◽  
Franklin Roosevelt ◽  
Japanese Ancestry

In February 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066 authorizing the exclusion of certain citizens from the west coast of the United States. That order began a cascade of other measures that culminated in the displacement and internment of approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans and people of Japanese ancestry. Fred Korematsu, a native-born citizen of the United States and resident of California challenged the legality of the order in a series of cases and appeals that eventually ascended to the US Supreme Court. In the culmination of those disputes, Korematsu v. United States (hereinafter “Korematsu I”), the Supreme Court upheld his conviction.

Law Clerks and Their Influence at the US Supreme Court: Comments on Recent Works by Peppers and Ward

2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (03) ◽  
pp. 741-757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Systematic Research ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Law Clerks

There has been a fair amount of recent scholarly attention to the role and influence of law clerks at the Supreme Court of the United States. This new wave of systematic research began when Todd C. Peppers (2006) published Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerk at almost exactly the same time as Artemus Ward and David L. Weiden's (2006) Sorcerers' Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court. Then Peppers and Ward (2012) teamed up to produce an edited volume, In Chambers: Stories of Supreme Court Law Clerks and Their Justices, in which each chapter focuses on the relationship of a specific justice and his or her clerks. Together these three works raise interesting questions about how one properly studies the role and power of law clerks at the US Supreme Court. How does one measure the influence of these temporary assistants to the justices? Should sociolegal scholars trust them to help us understand the approaches and behavior of the justices today or in the past or do they have an unrealistic and inflated view of their own contributions? This essay offers a broad overview of what scholars and journalists currently know about the role of clerks at the Supreme Court.

scholarly journals Polarization and the Judiciary

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard L. Hasen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Selection Mechanisms ◽  
Federal Judges

The increased polarization in the United States among the political branches and citizenry affects the selection, work, perception, and relative power of state and federal judges, including justices of the US Supreme Court. Polarization in the United States over the last few decades matters to the American judicial system in at least four ways. First, polarization affects judicial selection, whether the selection method is (sometimes partisan-based) elections or appointment by political actors. In times of greater polarization, governors and presidents who nominate judges, legislators who confirm judges, and voters who vote on judicial candidates are more apt to support or oppose judges on the basis of partisan affiliation or cues. Second, driven in part by selection mechanisms, polarization may be reflected in the decisions that judges make, especially on issues that divide people politically, such as abortion, guns, or affirmative action. The Supreme Court, for example, often divides along party and ideological lines in the most prominent and highly contested cases. Those ideological lines now overlap with party as we enter a period in which all the Court liberals have been appointed by Democratic presidents and all the Court conservatives have been appointed by Republican presidents. Third, increasingly polarized judicial decisions appear to be causing the public to view judges and judicial decision making (at least on the US Supreme Court) through a more partisan lens. Fourth, polarization may affect the separation of powers, by empowering courts against polarized legislative bodies sometimes paralyzed by gridlock. The review concludes by considering how increased polarization may interact with the judiciary and judicial branch going forward and by suggesting areas for future research.

‘The consequences will be with us for decades’: The politicization and polarization of the #MeToo and Time’s Up movements in the United States

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-271
Author(s):  
Elizabeth R. Earle
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Party ◽  
The United States ◽  
Race And Class ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Media

This study examines the recent developments in the #MeToo and Time’s Up Movements in the United States and how these developments have been portrayed in the US media. Through examining examples of US media, this article shows the media’s portrayal of the movement as politicized and polarized changed and developed after the appointment of Brett Kavanaugh to the US Supreme Court. The article argues that after Kavanaugh’s appointment, the media began to downplay the tensions of race and class in the #MeToo movement. Instead of focusing on tensions of race and class, the media shifted to focus on the polarization of #MeToo along political party lines.

Conclusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Elliott Young
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Century ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Indefinite Detention ◽  
Us Constitution ◽  
Immigrant Detention ◽  
Constitutional Protections

Although the Supreme Court limited detention for non-citizens in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Zadvydas [2000] and Martinez [2005]), its most recent decisions indicate that under certain circumstances non-citizens can be held indefinitely behind bars with no possibility of even a bond hearing. In practice, non-citizens deemed excludable from the United States are like the forever prisoners of Guantanamo, exposed to massive state power with few constitutional protections. Khalid Qassim is one of the forty Guantanamo detainees held for more than eighteen years to date with no charges and no trial. Although Guantanamo prisoners are not voluntary immigrants, they share with immigrants a lack of protection by the US Constitution and a vulnerability to indefinite detention. Immigrant detention today is part of a carceral landscape in the United States that includes more than 2 million citizens behind bars.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document