No Solidarity without Loyalty: Why Do Member States Violate EU Migration and Asylum Law and What Can Be Done?

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-59
Author(s):  
Iris Goldner Lang
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
Albert Hirschman ◽  
Asylum Law ◽  
Inter State

Abstract The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it will display an ever-increasing phenomenon of Member States’ infringements of EU migration and asylum law as an instance of the violation of the principle of solidarity and discuss the reasons behind it. It will be suggested that EU inter-state solidarity is just as much about respecting EU law, as it is about helping each other, as the latter cannot subsist without the former. Second, the paper will consider whether the existing mechanisms of reducing the number of violations are sufficient and discuss the new mechanisms that are being developed—particularly the rule of law conditionality and other conditionality instruments. When addressing the reasons behind the frequent violations, the text will identify two groups of reasons, the first group being applicable to the whole of EU law, and the second one specifically to EU migration and asylum law. In this context, Member States’ violations will be construed as the process of political withdrawal or retrenchment from certain parts of the commonly adopted EU migration and asylum law. This will be explained by relying on the notion of “spillback” or disintegration (as opposed to further European integration based on the neofunctionalist concept of “spillover” effect into more policy areas) and on the concepts of “exit” and “voice” conceived by Albert Hirschman and developed further by Joseph Weiler in his seminal work “The Transformation of Europe”.

scholarly journals How Far Is It from Warsaw to Luxembourg and Karlsruhe: The Impact of the PSPP Judgment on Poland

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1104-1115
Author(s):  
Stanisław Biernat
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Impact

AbstractA concern was voiced in commentaries after the PSPP judgment that the BVerfG’s position regarding the refusal to apply in Germany the CJEU judgment as issued on an ultra vires basis might be used in EU Member States infringing the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary in particular. This issue is presented in relation to Poland. The article sets out the constitutional provisions which proclaim openness to European integration, as well as the union-friendly case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) until 2016. The CT jurisprudence at that time provided, however, for the possibility of refusing to apply EU law in exceptional situations, even though this never happened. Next, the article discusses endeavors of the new Polish authorities since the end of 2015 which drastically breach the rule of law in the field of the judiciary, as well as the measures taken by EU institutions to counteract these adverse phenomena. The Polish authorities argue that the competence to define the legal position of the judiciary has not been conferred on the Union and remains within the exclusive competence of the Member States. Such a stance was also taken by the politically dependent CT in April 2020. The PSPP judgment was therefore welcomed with joy by Polish politicians. There are major differences, however, between the rulings of the BVerfG and those of the Polish CT in its current composition, and the hopes pinned on the PSPP judgment by the Polish authorities are unfounded.

scholarly journals The Rule of Law and the Roll of the Dice. The Uncertain Future of Investor-State Arbitration in the EU

2021 ◽  
pp. 333-359
Author(s):  
Wojciech Sadowski
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Treaty Law ◽  
Energy Charter Treaty ◽  
Uncertain Future ◽  
The Eu

AbstractInvestment treaty law and EU law began to develop in the same era and share some important philosophical and axiological foundations. The pressure on the CEE countries to enter into numerous bilateral investment treaties in late 80s and early 90s, in the context of the EU accession aspirations of the former communist countries, was likely to result, eventually, in a conflict between EU law and investment treaty law. The conflict could have been managed in three different ways, yet the CJEU decided in Achmea to declare an undefined volume of intra-EU arbitrations to be incompatible with EU law. This important judgment, which delivered an outcome desired by the European Commission and a number of Member States, is based on questionable legal reasoning that creates high uncertainty in this area of law. The doubts include the scope of application of Achmea, which is now a highly debatable issue. The CJEU itself saw it necessary to limit the scope of Achmea by declaring in Opinion 1/17 (CETA) that the legal reasoning of Achmea did not apply to investment protection treaties with third countries. The Member States of the EU remain politically divided in their views as to whether Achmea applies to the Energy Charter Treaty. And while the problems with the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in certain Member States continue to grow, Achmea has left an important gap for which there is no substitute in the current architecture of the EU legal system.

scholarly journals A Matter of (A)Political Interpretation

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-106
Author(s):  
Davor Petrić
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Scholarship ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Border Dispute ◽  
The Status ◽  
Political Interpretation ◽  
The Eu

This contribution reflects on the EU law side of the story of Slovenia and Croatia’s border dispute. It discusses some of the key parts of the Advocate General’s opinion and the Court of Justice’s judgment in this case, including the issue of the scope of EU law, the status of international law in EU law, the interpretation of international law for the purposes of EU law adjudication, and the rule of law dimensions of the border dispute between the two neighbouring Member States. It also offers some general remarks on the nature of legal scholarship that can be read as a response to some of the academic commentary of this case.

scholarly journals EU Values Are Law, after All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Eu

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.

Non-arbitrariness, rule of law and the ‘margin of appreciation’: Comments on Andreas Follesdal

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-150
Author(s):  
GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Internal Organization ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Principle Of Legality

AbstractCan citizens’ interest in non-domination be satisfied by the principle of legality and the guarantee of non-arbitrariness? This comment argues that the rule of law requires an internal organization of law that entails an additional positive law, through conventions, common law, judicial precedents or constitutions, which the sovereign cannot legally override. In the supranational context, the rule of law requires an equilibrium of consideration and respect between different legalities by avoiding a legal monopoly of a supreme authority and fostering the interaction among orders based on content-dependent reasons. The same applies to the relations between the ECtHR and member states. The margin of appreciation, taken as a reminder of the complexities of international institutional relationships, embodies a non-domination caveat to consider (the reasons from) the ‘normativities’ of different orders. Nonetheless, as an argumentative tool of the Court, it allows for an often-disputed discretion. Accordingly, better refined guidelines and justifications are required.

scholarly journals Rights and Powers in the European Union: Towards a Charter that is Fully Applicable to the Member States?

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
Judicial Protection ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.

Russia and EU Countries: Partnership for Modernization

2013 ◽  
pp. 54-61
Author(s):  
T. Romanova ◽  
E. Pavlova
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
New Classification ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Normative Power ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The World ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Eu

The article examines how the normative power, which the EU puts forward as an ideological basis of its actions in the world, manifests itself in the national partnerships for modernization between Russia and EU member states. The authors demonstrate the influence of the EU’s normativity on its approach to modernization as well as the difference in the positions of its member countries. It is concluded that there is no unity in the EU’s approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the new classification of EU member states, which is based on their readiness to act in accordance with the Union’s concept of normative power, is offered.

scholarly journals The independence and impartiality of the hybrid CETA Investment Court System: Reflections in the aftermath of Opinion 1/17

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Fanou
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Court System ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access ◽  
The Eu

In its recent Opinion 1/17, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) examined the compatibility of an external judicial body, the Investment Court System (ICS) under the EU–Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), with EU law. At a time when judicial independence has arisen as one of the main challenges for the rule of law in the EU, this article discusses the Court’s findings in relation to the compatibility of the ICS with the right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal.

scholarly journals The Rule of Law Framework in the European Union: Its Rationale, Origins, Role and International Ramifications

2021 ◽  
pp. 305-331
Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Eu

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.

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