Analysing the Irish Supreme Court judgement of Sweeney v Governor of Loughan House Open Centre and Others in the light of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-55
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Foreign Nationals ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
English Law

The majority of Irish nationals transferred from abroad to serve their sentences in Ireland are transferred from the United Kingdom. Likewise, the majority of foreign nationals transferred from Ireland to serve their sentences in their countries of nationality are transferred to the United Kingdom. This means that the United Kingdom is Ireland’s major prisoner receiving and sending country. In July 2014 the Supreme Court of Ireland held that an offender who had been sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment in the United Kingdom and transferred to serve his sentence in Ireland must be released after serving in Ireland the custodial sentence he would have served had he not been transferred to serve his sentence in Ireland. To reach this conclusion, the Supreme Court referred to the Transfer of Sentenced Persons Act, the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons Act and to the relevant English law. This article highlights the implications of this judgement for the transfer of offenders between Ireland and the United Kingdom in particular and other countries in general. In order to put the discussion in context, the article first deals with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the transfer of offenders.

scholarly journals ABORTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: REFLECTIONS FROM THE UK SUPREME COURT

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-494
Author(s):  
Bríd Ní Ghráinne ◽  
Aisling McMahon
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk

AbstractOn 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSCt) issued its decision on, inter alia, whether Northern Ireland's near-total abortion ban was compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This article critically assesses the UKSC's treatment of international law in this case. It argues that the UKSCt was justified in finding that Northern Ireland's ban on abortion in cases of rape, incest, and FFA was a violation of Article 8, but that the majority erred in its assessment of Article 3 ECHR and of the relevance of international law more generally.

To Discriminate in Order to Fight Discrimination

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dolores Morondo Taramundi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
The Other ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Main Technique ◽  
Antidiscrimination Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Paradoxical Results ◽  
Conflicts Of Rights

This chapter analyses arguments regarding conflicts of rights in the field of antidiscrimination law, which is a troublesome and less studied area of the growing literature on conflicts of rights. Through discussion of Ladele and McFarlane v. The United Kingdom, a case before the European Court of Human Rights, the chapter examines how the construction of this kind of controversy in terms of ‘competing rights’ or ‘conflicts of rights’ seems to produce paradoxical results. Assessment of these apparent difficulties leads the discussion in two different directions. On the one hand, some troubles come to light regarding the use of the conflict of rights frame itself in the field of antidiscrimination law, particularly in relation to the main technique (‘balancing of rights’) to solve them. On the other hand, some serious consequences of the conflict of rights frame on the development of the antidiscrimination theory of the ECtHR are unearthed.

scholarly journals The Limits of Arbitration Law in Addressing Cultural Diversity: The Example of Ismaili Arbitration in the United Kingdom

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
Sandrine Brachotte
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Cultural Studies ◽  
Cultural Diversity ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The Other ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Arbitration Clause ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Employment Equality

This article studies religious arbitration from the perspective of global legal pluralism, which embraces both normative plurality and cultural diversity. In this context, the article considers that UK arbitration law regulates both commercial and religious arbitration while relying on a monist conception of arbitration. It further identifies two intertwined issues regarding cultural diversity, which find their source in this monist conception. Firstly, through the study of Jivraj v. Hashwani ([2011] UKSC 40), this article shows that the governance of religious arbitration may generate a conflict between arbitration law and equality law, the avoidance of which can require sacrificing the objectives of one or the other branch of law. The Jivraj case concerned an Ismaili arbitration clause, requiring that all arbitrators be Ismaili—a clause valid under arbitration law but potentially not under employment-equality law. To avoid such conflict, the Supreme Court reduced the scope of employment-equality law, thereby excluding self-employed persons. Secondly, based on cultural studies of law, this article shows that the conception of arbitration underlying UK arbitration law is ill-suited to make sense of Ismaili arbitration. In view of these two issues, this article argues that UK arbitration law acknowledges normative multiplicity but fails to embrace the cultural diversity entangled therewith.

scholarly journals Insurance related problems in bareboat charter agreements

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Albano Gilabert Gascón
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Insurance Contract ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn 2017, the majority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court held in its judgment in the Gard Marine and Energy v China National Chartering (The Ocean Victory) case that, in bareboat charters under the ‘BARECON 89’ form, if both the owner and the charterer are jointly insured under a hull policy, the damages caused to the vessel by the charterer cannot be claimed by the insurer by way of subrogation after indemnifying the owner. The interpretation of the charter party leads to the conclusion that the liability between the parties is excluded. Faced with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) adopted a new standard bareboat charter agreement only a few months later, the ‘BARECON 2017’ form, which amends, among other clauses, the one related to insurance. The present paper analyses (i) the new wording of the clause mentioned above and (ii) its incidence on the relationship between the parties of both the charter agreement and the insurance contract and its consequences for possible third parties. Despite BIMCO’s attempt to change the solution adopted by the Supreme Court and his willingness to allow the insurer to claim in subrogation against the person who causes the loss, the consequences, as it will be seen, do not differ much in practice when the wrongdoer is the co-insured charterer. On the contrary, when the loss is caused by a time charter or a sub-charter, in principle, there will be no impediment for the insurer to sue him.

Insult of Public Officials

2021 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Structural Differences

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.

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