Towards International Mechanisms for Resolving Investment Disputes in Qatar

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Salim Yaacoub
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Social Stability ◽  
Foreign Direct Investments ◽  
Capital Investments ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Online Dispute Resolution ◽  
Labour Dispute ◽  
Strategic Location ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

Abstract In addition to possessing one of the largest proven gas reserves worldwide, Qatar benefits from a strategic location between the East and West, forming an attractive destination for foreign direct investments. Law No. 1/2019 regulating non-Qatari capital investments provides investors with greater political and social stability along with a full range of benefits. The most significant among these benefits is the freedom offered by the legislator to resolve any dispute by choosing any type of settlement dispute. Hence, Article 16 of Law No. 1/2019 states that ‘unless it is a labour dispute, the non-Qatari Investor may agree to settle any dispute between them and others through arbitration or any other means of settling disputes in accordance with the law’. This article will discuss and analyse the other means of dispute settlement mechanism compatible with Qatar, especially when online dispute resolution has become more significant in the era of COVID-19.

The Legitimate Regulatory Distinction Test: Incomplete and Inadequate for the Particular Purposes of the TBT Agreement

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
JASON HOUSTON-MCMILLAN
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Technical Barriers To Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Special Circumstances ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

AbstractPrior to 2011, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade had been somewhat neglected as a dispute-settlement mechanism, due in part to the lack of previous interpretation of the Agreement by WTO DSB Panels. In 2012, the Appellate Body adjudicated on three TBT disputes:US–Clove Cigarettes, US–Tuna II, andUS–COOL, aiming to officially interpret and clarify Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement by creating a distinct test for a measure's consistency with these Articles. This paper explores the relevant decisions of both the Panel and Appellate Body in the three disputes which led to the creation of the ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ test. The substance behind this phrase, placed in context, is dissected along with the associated idea of ‘even-handedness’. The test attempts to simplify future interpretations regarding what will constitute unjustifiable discrimination, but at the cost of the necessary distinction between the GATT and the TBT Agreement being blurred. The result is a test which is incomplete and which fails to take account of the special circumstances surrounding the TBT Agreement.

EUROPEAN UNION IN WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Trade Conflicts ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Descriptive Method

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.

“Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the wto: National Security as an Issue of Competence

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 424-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes L. Schloemann ◽  
Stefan Ohlhoff
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Significant Shift ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
International Trade Law ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The 1994 Uruguay Round revision of the dispute settlement mechanism under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) has made it a forum both for traditional trade issues and for interests ranging from environmental protection to national security. The limits of GATT jurisdiction have become important issues of dispute settlement within the WTO, especially as the emergence of the WTO and its rule-based, quasi-obligatory dispute settlement system has spurred a significant shift toward legalism. Constitutional structures are developing much faster in international trade law than in any other area of international law and, in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, are integrating ever more aspects of economic relations among states. Within the WTO regime the dispute settlement mechanism established by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) plays a prominent role in enforcing its rules and reconciling a wide array of the members’ interests. The limits of the reach of the dispute settlement mechanism, given its obligatory character, are, to a certain degree, the limits of the constitutionalization of the organization as a whole.

scholarly journals Can WTO Member States Rely on Citizen Concerns to Prevent Corporations from Importing Goods Made from Child Labour?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleydis Nissen
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Child Labour ◽  
Global Supply Chains ◽  
Corporate Accountability ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
The World ◽  
Import Restrictions ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

There has been a polarised debate on the desirability of import restrictions to increase corporate accountability for child labour that occurs in global supply chains. Some scholars have indicated that states in favour of imposing import restrictions could sidestep this debate relying upon the perceptions that people in the importing market might have. They have based this argument on the case law of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (WTO DSM). The attitude-behaviour gap has, however, been largely overlooked in their analyses. This behavioural phenomenon provides an explanation as to why there is an inconsistency between what people value or believe and what they actually do. This essay revisits the WTO DSM's case law in order to determine whether such values or beliefs might justify import restrictions. On balance, this essay finds that the WTO DSM has not sufficiently taken the attitude-behaviour gap into account in its interpretation of Article III(4) and Article XX(a) 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

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