The Concept of Member State Liability for Violation of Community Law and Its Sbortcomings An Analysis of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice on this Matter

1998 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-46
Author(s):  
HERIBERT FRANZ KÖCK ◽  
MARGIT HINTERSTEININGER
2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Lock

The article explores the limits of the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction by addressing two main issues: firstly, whether there are exceptions to that exclusivity, such as the application of the CILFIT case law or the exclusion of Community law from the dispute. Secondly, it asks whether other international courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction over a case. The article commences by briefly discussing the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction as it was established in Opinion 1/91 and the Mox Plant-Case and draws conclusions from this case law. It then addresses the above-mentioned points and comes to the conclusion that there are generally no exceptions to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction and that the only option open to Member States is to exclude Community law from a dispute (and even that option is subject to limitations). Furthermore, after exploring several routes advanced in the academic discussion, the article comes to the conclusion that other courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction and as a consequence declare the case inadmissible.


1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Angela Ward

IN Case C-188/95 Fantask A/S and Others v. Industriministeriet (Erhvervsministeriet) [1997] E.C.R. I-6783 the European Court of Justice provided further guidance on the interpretation of Council Directive 69/335 EEC of 17 July 1969 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital (O.J. English Special Edition 1969 (II), p. 412), as most recently amended by Council Directive 85/303/EEC of 10 June 1985 (O.J. 1985 L 156, p. 23), and elaborated its case law concerning Member State remedies and procedural rules. More particularly, it was held that a national rule which would have allowed Danish authorities to escape the duty to refund charges levied in breach of the Directive on the ground of “excusable error” rendered Community law impossible in practice or excessively difficult to enforce (Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. San Giorgio [1983] E.C.R. 3595), while a five-year time limit for bringing proceedings under Danish law was upheld as a reasonable limitation period (cf. Case C-208/90 Emmott v. Minister for Social Welfare and the Attorney General [1991] EC.R. I-4269).


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 571-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Slater

Food law in the European Community is a touchy subject. One of the big ongoing debates in this area centres on the question of what names we call our foodstuffs by. In an internal market where local supermarket shelves are stocked with products coming from all around the EC and beyond, how can we be sure that the contents of the packets conform to our connotations of the name on the label? For example, if it says “chocolate” on the label, how can we be sure that it really is “chocolate” within our understanding of the word? The question of what names can or should go on labels is, sadly, very complicated. This article therefore intends to look at only one aspect of this problem: when a Member State is allowed to insist that the name of an imported “generic” product be changed. We will begin by briefly looking at the case law and one of the major pieces of legislation in this area – the Labelling Directive – before going on to discuss application of the law to the recent Chocolate Cases, handed down by the European Court of Justice (hereafter the “Court”) at the beginning of this year. This discussion will give some (hopefully) interesting insights into the way in which primary law, as interpreted by the Court, and secondary legislation interact and into the balancing of consumer protection and free trade performed by the Court.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-185
Author(s):  
Christine Boch ◽  
Robert Lane

Unless the law is enforced, it cannot command respect. Securing proper observance and protection of Community rights has long been recognized to be a fundamental challenge for the Community. The burden falls principally to the national courts, guided by the European Court of Justice. However, the guidance offered appears at times at variance with itself. It seems in particular that, in some instances, the obligation of result laid down in directives simply cannot be achieved. This article looks at the case law on remedies developed by the European Court, seeks to identify inconsistencies therein and suggests how they might be cured.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 287-302
Author(s):  
Paolisa Nebbia

As a general principle of Community law elaborated by the European Court of Justice (hereinafter, ECJ or ‘the Court’), effectiveness ‘requires the effective protection of Community rights and, more generally, the effective enforcement of Community law in national courts’: its origins—it has been argued—‘lie in the interpretative techniques of the Court which, even at an early stage, favoured a liberalised construction of the Treaty provisions so as to ensure their effet utile’. In fact, the roots of the principle of effectiveness can be found in the seminal case of Van Gend en Loos, which, without expressly naming that principle, provided the conceptual tools that have moulded its construction throughout the Community case law.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

Chapter 2 summarizes research in political science on the ECJ as a political actor. Discussions about the Court have for a long time focused on the question of ‘judicial activism’ versus member-state control of the Court. The support of the EU’s legal community, the Commission, the litigation of private actors, and member-state courts has been important for the Court’s development of case law. It is argued that current analyses have overlooked the importance of ‘over-constitutionalization’, in light of the Treaty’s detailed policy aims. Case law shares the Treaty’s constitutional status. Its detailed policy prescriptions cannot be overruled. In addition, a Court that pays attention to member states’ preferences will have a significant impact on policy if its rulings establish policy requirements derived from the constitution.


1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 925-941 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona Smith ◽  
Lorna Woods

When the European Court of Justice gave judgment in Francovich it was hailed as a triumph, not necessarily for its erudite reasoning, but because it allowed an individual to claim damages from a member State for its failure to comply with Community law obligations, thus providing a method of redress where previously none existed. Although the scope of the remedy was unclear and appeared superficially limited to the facts of the case, it represents the final element necessary to establish a coherent doctrine for the effective protection of an individual's Community law rights.


1998 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Garrett ◽  
R. Daniel Kelemen ◽  
Heiner Schulz

We develop a game theoretic model of the conditions under which the European Court of Justice can be expected to take “adverse judgments” against European Union member governments and when the governments are likely to abide by these decisions. The model generates three hypotheses. First, the greater the clarity of EU case law precedent, the lesser the likelihood that the Court will tailor its decisions to the anticipated reactions of member governments. Second, the greater the domestic costs of an ECJ ruling to a litigant government, the lesser the likelihood that the litigant government will abide by it (and hence the lesser the likelihood that the Court will make such a ruling). Third, the greater the activism of the ECJ and the larger the number of member governments adversely affected by it, the greater the likelihood that responses by litigant governments will move from individual noncompliance to coordinated retaliation through new legislation or treaty revisions. These hypotheses are tested against three broad lines of case law central to ECJ jurisprudence: bans on agricultural imports, application of principles of equal treatment of the sexes to occupational pensions, and state liability for violation of EU law. The empirical analysis supports our view that though influenced by legal precedent, the ECJ also takes into account the anticipated reactions of member governments.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 456-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaos Lavranos

It is uncommon for a provision of the EC Treaty to remain all but unnoticed for fifty years by both legal literature and the case-law of the European Court of Justice. However, that is what happened to Article 292 EC, which states that ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.’ This provision can be taken to mean that if a dispute arises between European Union member states involving Community law, they shall bring the dispute exclusively before the European Court of Justice.


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