Norms of Self-Determination: Thinking Sovereignty Through

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 195-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Scott

This essay is an exploration of the contemporary normative conditions of thinking about the problem of sovereignty. Specifically it is a consideration of some aspects of the way in which the problem of Third World sovereignty has been taken up and argued out in international relations theory and international law on the legal-political terrain of self-determination. The essay traces the transformation of the norm of self-determination as an anti-colonial standard to its post-Cold War re-composition as a norm of democratic governance.

Author(s):  
Robert Vitalis

We now know that the ‘birth of the discipline’ of international relations in the United States is a story about empire. The foundations of early international relations theory are set in not just international law and historical sociology but evolutionary biology and racial anthropology. The problem is the way in which scholars today deal with the place of race in the thought of John Hobson, Paul Reinsch, and virtually all other social scientists of the era. The strand of thought that still resonates in our own time about empire, states, and the like is raised up and depicted as the scientific or theoretical core in the scholars’ work, while the strand that involves now archaic racial constructs is downgraded and treated instead as mere ‘language’, ‘metaphors’, and ‘prejudices’ of the era. To undo this error and recover in full the ideas of early international relations theorists it is necessary to bring the work of historians of conservative and reform Darwinism to bear on the first specialists and foundational texts in international relations.


1990 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley Hoffmann ◽  
Robert O. Keohane ◽  
John J. Mearsheimer

Author(s):  
Jonathan Cristol

International relations (IR) theory is difficult to define. It is often taught as a theory that seeks both to explain past state behavior and to predict future state behavior. However, even that definition is contested by many theorists. Traditional IR theories can generally be categorized by their focus either on humans, states, or on the state system as the primary source of conflict. Any bibliography of international relations theory is bound to create controversy among its readers. Why did the author choose one theory and not the other? Why did the author choose one source and not the other? Indeed, a wide variety of permutations would be perfectly valid to provide the researcher with an adequate annotated bibliography, so why were these particular entries chosen? This article identifies Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism as the three major branches of IR theory. These three branches have replaced the earlier realism-idealism dichotomy. The “English School” could be considered part of any of the aforementioned three branches, and its placement in the IR theory world is the subject of some debate. It has therefore been given its own section and is not included in any of the other sections. Critical IR theory and Feminist IR theory are often considered part of constructivism; however, there is much debate over whether they constitute their own branches, and so they are included in this article (as well as in their own entries in the OBO series), though the sources are somewhat different. Post–Cold War IR Theory is given its own heading because there are a number of theories that were proposed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War that are still widely taught and discussed in the field. Perhaps the most controversial inclusion is that of Neoconservatism. Though it is quite possible to mount a case for it to be considered a theory of US foreign policy, it is theoretically distinct from other IR theories (the belief in bandwagoning instead of balancing). The final three sections are included to show how political theory has influenced IR theory, and how history and foreign policy have influenced IR theory (and vice versa). The included sections and citations represent both the mainstream of IR theory and those nonmainstream theories that have just started to break into the mainstream of IR theory. This article provides a starting point for both the beginning and the serious scholar of international relations theory.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
LINUS HAGSTRÖM

This article demonstrates that ubiquitous references to ‘power’ in English-language foreign policy discourse can be understood in the light of the inclination in international relations theory to place power on a par with capability. It makes two claims: that such a concept of power is ill-fitted for foreign policy analysis; and that much clarity would be gained by following the Japanese example of terminological pluralism and thus abandoning ‘power’ as a catch-all term. Foreign policy analysis would benefit from adopting a concept that takes power to reside in specific relationships. Its adoption would moreover dissolve a power paradox associated with the analysis of Japan's post-Cold War foreign policy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-214
Author(s):  
Enrico Milano

The recent referenda held in Catalonia and Kurdish Iraq have reignited the debate over referenda, self-determination and unilateral secession and over the role of international law as a legal framework capable of governing and channelling those dramatic changes towards desired ends. The debate has been ever present in the Post Cold War period, considering that the number of states has increased from just over 150 to 196, with many of the new states emerging from non-consensual processes of separation. The present article assesses the general international legal framework applicable to secession, including the scope and content of principles such as territorial integrity, self-determination and uti possidetis and tests whether and to what extent the two recent separatist claims in Catalonia and Kurdistan fit into that framework. The lessons drawn are that international law is increasingly relevant to the regulation of secession and yet the practice related to the referendum in Catalonia highlights international law’s subsidiary regulatory function and the fact that, indeed, even in the twenty-first century, international law may, in some cases, remain neutral in secession attempts.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 199-200
Author(s):  
James Gathii

In the lead essay in this symposium, Professor Erika de Wet contends that notwithstanding all of the post-Cold War enthusiasm for a right to democratic governance and the non-recognition of governments resulting from coups and unconstitutional changes of government, a customary international law norm on the nonrecognition of governments established anti-democratically has not emerged. De Wet’s position, primarily based on state practice in Africa, is vigorously debated by six commentators.Jure Vidmar agrees with de Wet that the representative legitimacy of governments still lies primarily in effective control over the territory of the state. Vidmar, in his contribution, examines recent collective practice when neither the incumbent government nor the insurgents control the territory exclusively, arguing that in such cases states may apply human rights considerations. Like de Wet, however, Vidmar regards state practice as ambivalent and unamenable to ideal-type distinctions between coups (against a democratically legitimate government) and regime changes (to a democratically legitimate government).


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijayashri Sripati

AbstractThis essay analyzes how Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) insights have illuminated some but not all themes relevant to understanding post-Cold War internationalised constitution-making processes such as those of Afghanistan and Iraq and the United Nation's (UN) constitutional support therein. It argues that the UN's constitutional support has evolved into an established practice and that the need to interrogate the very idea of the internationalisation of constitution-making, – essentially a domestic process – places the legitimacy of, and the explanations offered for such support into question. It concludes that given its historic opposition to and commitment to end the exploitative relations between the Western powers and the Third World and all contemporary colonial forms in the Third World, TWAIL is the best optic through which the UN's constitutional support in general and its role in the constitution-making process of Afghanistan, in particular, may be examined. For only then can the broader historical and ideological aspects and colonial continuities fundamentally significant to understanding internationalised constitution-making processes and the UN's role therein be uncovered.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document