On What Does Rationality Hinge?

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 246-257
Author(s):  
Yuval Avnur
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Specific Material ◽  
Main Components

The two main components of Coliva’s view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Moderatism, a belief about specific material objects is perceptually justified iff, absent defeaters, one has the appropriate course of experience and it is assumed that there is an external world. I grant Moderatism and instead focus on Extended Rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational to believe evidentially warranted propositions and to accept those unwarrantable assumptions that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible and are therefore constitutive of ordinary evidential warrants. I suggest that, even though Extended Rationality might be true, it cannot do the work that Coliva wants it to do. Although my objections do not show that it is false, they can serve to clarify what sorts of problem a theory of justification or rationality could possibly address. This provides an alternative to Coliva’s view of the skeptical problem and the question, on what does rationality hinge?

The Non-existence of the External World

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-80
Author(s):  
Jan Westerhoff
Keyword(s):  
Main Part ◽  
External World ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter begins with an investigation of the reasons for the presumed certainty of the existence of the external, mind-independent world around us, and considers a selection of arguments directed against the existence of such an external world. I begin by arguing that we do not need to postulate an external world in order to justify the illusion–reality distinction, or to explain the coherence, intersubjectivity, and efficacy of our perception. The second main part of the chapter focuses on the discussion of different theories of perception (naïve realism, disjunctivism, representationalism) and the ontologies they involve, arguing that ultimately a kind of brain-based representationalism (referred to as irrealism) works best as a theory of perception but that this, somewhat surprisingly, also undermines the justification of a mind-independent world of material objects.

From ‘Fetish’ to ‘Aura’: The Charisma of Objects?

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-190
Author(s):  
Martin Radermacher
Keyword(s):  
Material Objects ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
History Of Religions ◽  
History Of ◽  
Specific Material ◽  
Methodological Considerations ◽  
Material Artifacts

In the history of religions, material artifacts have often played an important role as mediations of the ‘sacred.’ They were and are worshipped, venerated, and sometimes destroyed for their assumed supernatural powers. The article reviews theoretical concepts that engage with the charismatic capacities of objects (‘fetish,’ ‘cultic image,’ and ‘aura’) and discusses literature about ‘charismatic objects.’ It deals with the question of what kind of charisma objects may have and suggests that the term ‘charisma,’ when defined in a specific way, is a useful concept to describe and compare specific material objects from different religious traditions. These conceptual and methodological considerations are illustrated by a brief discussion of Christian relic veneration.

Hunting Buffalo in Oklahoma

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Tarango
Keyword(s):  
Native American ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Visual Aesthetics ◽  
History Of ◽  
Specific Material

This chapter examines the visual aesthetics of three Native American casinos in Oklahoma to explore how the Cherokee, Quapaw, and Choctaw grapple with their public identities and choose to portray their cultures. The chapter argues that by including specific material objects, visuals, pictures, and design in their casinos, each tribe publicly creates its own identity, one that is rooted in the history of removal as well as the adoption of Oklahoma as a new homeland.

scholarly journals Why Wittgenstein Doesn’t Refute Skepticism

Discurso ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raquel Albieri Krempel
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Truth Value

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein formulates several criticisms against skepticism about our knowledge of the external world. My goal is to show that Wittgenstein does not here offer a convincing answer to the skeptical problem. First, I will present a strong version of the problem, understanding it as a paradoxical argument. In the second part, I will introduce and raise problems for two pragmatic responses against skepticism that appear in On Certainty. Finally, I will present some of Wittgenstein’s logical criticisms against skepticism, which may initially be considered strong, because they seem to refute some skeptical assumptions. They concern Wittgenstein’s ideas that it is logically impossible to doubt and to be mistaken about Moorean propositions, and that these propositions don’t have a truth-value. But even these, I intend to show, do not really challenge skepticism, for they are not well grounded.

scholarly journals A view through a window: Social relations, material objects and locality

2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 224-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shirin Hirsch ◽  
Andrew Smith
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Analysis ◽  
Social Relations ◽  
Local Area ◽  
The Other ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Class Inequality ◽  
Material Feature ◽  
Public World ◽  
Specific Material ◽  
The One

In this article the authors ask what it would mean to think sociologically about the window as a specific material and symbolic object. Drawing on qualitative analysis of a series of comparative interviews with residents in three different streets in a diverse local area of Glasgow, they explore what the use and experience of windows tells us about their respondents’ very different relationships to the places where they live. On the one hand, the window, as a material feature of the home, helps us grasp the lived reality of class inequality and how such inequality shapes people’s day-to-day experience. On the other hand, windows are symbolically charged objects, existing at the border of the domestic and public world. For this reason, they feature in important ways in local debates over the appearance, ownership and conservation of the built environment. The article explores these struggles, and shows what they reveal about the construction of belonging in the neighbourhood, a process which is both classed and racialised at one and the same time.

scholarly journals The Indeterminacy of Translation: Fifty Years Later

Disputatio ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (32) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen L. White
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Stimulus Meaning ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Epistemological Skepticism

Abstract The paper considers the Quinean heritage of the argument for the indeterminacy of translation. Beyond analyzing Quine’s notion of stimulus meaning, the paper discusses two Kripkean argument’s against the Quinean claim that dispositions can provide the basis for an account of meaning: the Normativity Argument and the Finiteness Argument. An analogy between Kripke’s arguments and Hume’s argument for epistemological skepticism about the external world will be drawn. The paper shows that the answer to Kripke’s rule-following skepticism is analogous to the answer to Humean skepticism: our use of concepts is more basic than, and presupposed by, the statement of the skeptical problem itself.

scholarly journals Contemporary Approaches to the Problem of Cartesian Skepticism. Open Lecture: Does the External World Exist? Part I. Solving or Dissolving the Skeptical Problem

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-194
Author(s):  
Igor E. Pris
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Cartesian Skepticism ◽  
Traditional Epistemology ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Successful Approach ◽  
Frame Work ◽  
Hinge Proposition

We consider some newcontemporary approaches to solving or dissolving the problem of skepticism regarding the existence of the external world, in particular, disjunctivism, Duncan Pritchard’s biscopic approach and Timothy Williamson’s knowledge first approach. We argue that resolving the skepticalproblem within the framework of epistemological disjunctivism is problematic because it does not take into account the Wittgenstein's notion of a hinge proposition. In fact, a successful approach to the skepticalproblem requires a revision of the metaphysical premises of traditional epistemology, namely the adoption of a non-metaphysical Wittgenstein’s realism. The recently proposed by D. Pritchard within the frame-work of his “biscopic” approach dissolving of the skeptical problem asa pseudo-problem just combines Wittgenstein’s hinge epistemology and epistemological disjunctivism.

External-World Skepticism in Classical India: The Case of Vasubandhu

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 147-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Mills
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Final Conclusion ◽  
Indian Tradition ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
External World Skepticism

The Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu (c. 400 ce) has seldom been considered in conjunction with the problem of external-world skepticism despite the fact that his text, Twenty Verses, presents arguments from ignorance based on dreams. In this article, an epistemological phenomenalist interpretation of Vasubandhu is supported in opposition to a metaphysical idealist interpretation. On either interpretation, Vasubandhu gives an invitation to the problem of external-world skepticism, although his final conclusion is closer to skepticism on the epistemological phenomenalist interpretation. The article ends with reflections on what light Vasubandhu might shed on the issue of whether skepticism is a natural problem in epistemology as well as why, despite Vasubandhu, the skeptical problem was not a central issue in the later Indian tradition.

scholarly journals Religion and the Order of Nature

1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 290-295
Author(s):  
Professor Nasr Arif
Keyword(s):  
Academic Research ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
External World ◽  
Quantitative Approach ◽  
Environmental Crisis ◽  
Spiritual Needs ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Religion And Spirituality ◽  
The World ◽  
The University

Even by his own exceptional standards, this new book by Seyyed HosseinNasr is a remarkable work destined to be a classic in the field of religious studiesof nature. Professor Nasr brings together a breath-taking depth of knowledgein a single volume-he covers the fields of metaphysics and comparative religion,traditional cosmology and modem philosophies of nature, as well as thehistory of science and the rise of secularism and humanism. The book is especiallyrelevant to this issue, which is dedicated to economics as applied ethics,for Professor Nasr argues that the environmental crisis is an external reflectionof modem man’s spiritual crisis. While others naively believe that a more cleveruse of technology will avert the impending environmental calamity, ProfessorNasr demonstrates that what really needs to be addressed and remedied is modemman’s misguided search for the infinite in a finite world. Rather than satisfyinghis yearning through religion and spirituality which leads to the Infinite,modern man pursues material objects in an external world divorced from itsspiritual significance as a sign of God. The result is internal dissatisfaction, givingrise to insatiable appetites and the environmental crisis. While ProfessorNasr documents this work with a wealth of data and detail, the reader is neverallowed to lose sight of the essential. As one of his admiring readers noted, “Thebook has the form of academic research but the substance of metaphysicalinsight; the penetrating acuity of the logician is combined with the spiritual sensibilityof the contemplative.”For Professor Nasr, the contemplative appreciation of the world of nature isessential to avert an environmental catastrophe and does not detract from objectivescience, rather it is a fulfillment of it. Indeed, the intelligence is objective tothe extent that it accurately registers, not only that which is, but also all that is.In this sense, true objectivity requires one to know things as they are in divinis,corresponding to the hadith of the Prophet in which he asks God to show usthings as they really are. Objectivity does not consist in denying the qualitativedimension of nature as symbols leading man to God, and taking its quantitativedimension to be the only reality. Professor Nasr relates this incomprehension ofthe spiritual significance of nature to the environmental crisis and denial ofman’s spiritual needs. He points out that this quantitative approach is to take apart to be the whole, and is evidence of partiality rather than objectivity. Forthose who recognize that the current environmental crisis cannot be understood,much less solved, without a wider spiritual approach, Professor Nasr’s book willbe both enlightening and a source of consolation.Based on his 1994 Cadbury Lectures delivered at the University ofBirmingham, England, this book complements an earlier classic, Knowledgeand the Sacred. Whereas his earlier book focused on the desacralization ofknowledge in the modem West, his new book is concerned with the desacralizationof nature. At the root of both errors is an attitude which creates an internalworld of reason cut off from both the intellect and Revelation, and an externalworld cut off from its spiritual significance as a sign from God ...

scholarly journals Degrees of Certainty and Sensitive Knowledge

Locke Studies ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 99-109
Author(s):  
Samuel Rickless
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
External World ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Doxastic State ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Sensitive Knowledge ◽  
Genuine Knowledge

In recent work, I have argued that what Locke calls ‘sensitive knowledge’ is not really knowledge, according to his own definition. Knowledge, as Locke defines it, is the perception of an agreement or disagreement between two ideas (E, IV.ii.15: 538). However, on Locke’s theory, sensitive knowledge, which is supposed to be knowledge via sensation of the existence of material objects outside the mind, is really better understood as a kind of assurance (i.e.,1 assent or belief based on the highest degree of probability). On this reconstruction, assurance, as Locke describes it, is a kind of doxastic state that is incompatible with reasonable doubt, but compatible with extreme hyperbolic skeptical doubt. But assurance, as Locke avers, falls short of knowledge, for it is a kind of non-factive presumption, rather than a kind of factive perception, of ideational agreement or disagreement. Locke, I claim, calls assurance of the existence of external material objects ‘sensitive knowledge’ because assurance and knowledge are indistinguishable in their practical effects: assurance, no less than knowledge, leads to action without hesitation, given the absence of reasonable doubt that there is an external world to act in. My conception of Lockean sensitive knowledge as a kind of assurance that falls short of genuine knowledge has recently been criticized in the pages of this journal by David Soles (2014). My aim here is to answer Soles’s criticisms.

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