scholarly journals Contemporary Approaches to the Problem of Cartesian Skepticism. Open Lecture: Does the External World Exist? Part I. Solving or Dissolving the Skeptical Problem

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-194
Author(s):  
Igor E. Pris
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Cartesian Skepticism ◽  
Traditional Epistemology ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Successful Approach ◽  
Frame Work ◽  
Hinge Proposition

We consider some newcontemporary approaches to solving or dissolving the problem of skepticism regarding the existence of the external world, in particular, disjunctivism, Duncan Pritchard’s biscopic approach and Timothy Williamson’s knowledge first approach. We argue that resolving the skepticalproblem within the framework of epistemological disjunctivism is problematic because it does not take into account the Wittgenstein's notion of a hinge proposition. In fact, a successful approach to the skepticalproblem requires a revision of the metaphysical premises of traditional epistemology, namely the adoption of a non-metaphysical Wittgenstein’s realism. The recently proposed by D. Pritchard within the frame-work of his “biscopic” approach dissolving of the skeptical problem asa pseudo-problem just combines Wittgenstein’s hinge epistemology and epistemological disjunctivism.

Whose Dream Is It Anyway?

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 263-287
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
External World ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Second Line ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
First Line ◽  
Standard Type ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Cartesian Skepticism

I start with two basic lines of response to Cartesian skepticism about the ‘external world’: in the first, which is characteristic of Analytic philosophers to this day, the focus is on the meaning of ‘know’—what it ‘refers’ to, its ‘semantics’ and its ‘pragmatics’; in the second, which characterizes Continental responses to Descartes, the focus is on the philosophizing or meditating subject, and its relation to its body and world. I argue that the first approach is hopeless: if the Cartesian worry that I could be dreaming right now so much as makes sense, the proposal that—under some theory of knowledge (or of ‘knowledge’)—my belief that I am sitting in front of the computer right now may still be (or truly count as) a piece of knowledge, would rightfully seem to the skeptic to be playing with words and missing the point. I then argue that the practice of Ordinary Language Philosophy, which has mostly been linked to the first line of response to Cartesian skepticism, may be seen as actually belonging with the second line of response; and I show how a form of what may be called “Existentialist Ordinary Language Philosophy” can be used to reveal the nonsensicality of the Cartesian skeptical worry. My argument takes its cue from Thompson Clarke’s insight—an insight that Clarke himself has not pursued far or accurately enough—that our concept of Dream is not a concept of the “standard type.”

scholarly journals Realism and Knowledge First. Interview with Timothy Williamson

2022 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 175-204
Author(s):  
I. E. Pris
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Traditional Epistemology ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Ill Posed ◽  
The Right ◽  
Metaphysical Realist ◽  
First Interview ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The renowned British philosopher Timothy Williamson talks about his philosophical views and main lines of research. Williamson is a metaphysical realist in a broad sense. Fir him there are true or false answers to questions about all aspects of reality. Classical logic is a universal true theory. Knowledge-first epistemology is an alternative to the traditional belief-first epistemology. The former takes the concept of knowledge as a basic concept, explaining other epistemic concepts, including belief, in its terms, whereas the latter does the opposite. Knowledge, not truth, is the fundamental epistemic good. The Gettier problem and the skeptical problem that arise within traditional epistemology are ill posed and therefore cannot be solved. Hybrid epistemological theories do not satisfy the principles of simplicity and beauty and are refuted by counter-examples. Epistemic contextualism is problematic, and relativism violates the semantics of the phenomena being explained. Knowledge does not entail knowledge about knowledge. Knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori is superficial, and there are no analytical truths. The concept of qualia is unhelpful for solving the problems related to consciousness. The so-called “hard problem” of consciousness points to an area of conceptual confusions in which we do not know how to reason properly. Speculative metaphysics is quite a respectable enterprise. But progress in metaphysics is not automatic; it requires the right methodology.

Heidegger’s Reading of Descartes’ Dualism

1998 ◽  
pp. 57-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Kadir Çüçen
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Traditional Epistemology ◽  
The World ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Technological Orientation

The problem of traditional epistemology is the relation of subject to external world. The distinction between subject and object makes possible the distinction between the knower and what is known. Starting with Descartes, the subject is a thinking thing that is not extended, and the object is an extended thing which does not think. Heidegger rejects this distinction between subject and object by arguing that there is no subject distinct from the external world of things because Dasein is essentially Being-in-the-world. Heidegger challenges the Cartesian legacy in epistemology in two ways. First, there is the modern tendency toward subjectivism and individualism that started with Descartes' discovery of the 'cogito.' Second, there is the technological orientation of the modern world that originated in the Cartesian understanding of the mathematical and external physical world.

On What Does Rationality Hinge?

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 246-257
Author(s):  
Yuval Avnur
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Specific Material ◽  
Main Components

The two main components of Coliva’s view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Moderatism, a belief about specific material objects is perceptually justified iff, absent defeaters, one has the appropriate course of experience and it is assumed that there is an external world. I grant Moderatism and instead focus on Extended Rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational to believe evidentially warranted propositions and to accept those unwarrantable assumptions that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible and are therefore constitutive of ordinary evidential warrants. I suggest that, even though Extended Rationality might be true, it cannot do the work that Coliva wants it to do. Although my objections do not show that it is false, they can serve to clarify what sorts of problem a theory of justification or rationality could possibly address. This provides an alternative to Coliva’s view of the skeptical problem and the question, on what does rationality hinge?

scholarly journals Why Wittgenstein Doesn’t Refute Skepticism

Discurso ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raquel Albieri Krempel
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Truth Value

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein formulates several criticisms against skepticism about our knowledge of the external world. My goal is to show that Wittgenstein does not here offer a convincing answer to the skeptical problem. First, I will present a strong version of the problem, understanding it as a paradoxical argument. In the second part, I will introduce and raise problems for two pragmatic responses against skepticism that appear in On Certainty. Finally, I will present some of Wittgenstein’s logical criticisms against skepticism, which may initially be considered strong, because they seem to refute some skeptical assumptions. They concern Wittgenstein’s ideas that it is logically impossible to doubt and to be mistaken about Moorean propositions, and that these propositions don’t have a truth-value. But even these, I intend to show, do not really challenge skepticism, for they are not well grounded.

scholarly journals The Indeterminacy of Translation: Fifty Years Later

Disputatio ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (32) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen L. White
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Stimulus Meaning ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Epistemological Skepticism

Abstract The paper considers the Quinean heritage of the argument for the indeterminacy of translation. Beyond analyzing Quine’s notion of stimulus meaning, the paper discusses two Kripkean argument’s against the Quinean claim that dispositions can provide the basis for an account of meaning: the Normativity Argument and the Finiteness Argument. An analogy between Kripke’s arguments and Hume’s argument for epistemological skepticism about the external world will be drawn. The paper shows that the answer to Kripke’s rule-following skepticism is analogous to the answer to Humean skepticism: our use of concepts is more basic than, and presupposed by, the statement of the skeptical problem itself.

Introduction: Hinge Epistemology

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 73-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Coliva ◽  
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Hinge Epistemology

This introduction gives a summary of the content of the special issue Hinge Epistemology, grouping the papers in three sections: (1) more exegetical accounts of Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge certainties and their bearing on a theory of justification and knowledge as well as on the topic of external world scepticism; (2) papers critical of the very notion of hinge certainty; and (3) papers that apply the notion to various areas of epistemology and compare Wittgenstein’s views to those of other philosophers.

Knowledge without “Experience”

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Michael Williams
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Central Theme ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Cartesian Skepticism ◽  
The World

Genia Schönbaumsfeld argues that Cartesian skepticism is an illusion induced by the “Cartesian Picture” of perceptual knowledge, in which knowledge of the “external world” depends on an inference from how things subjectively seem to one to how they actually are. To show its incoherence, she draws on the work of John McDowell, which she sees as elaborating a central theme from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I argue that Cartesian skepticism is not an illusion, as Schönbaumsfeld understands ‘illusion’, and that McDowell’s account of perceptual knowledge is both untenable and incompatible with Wittgenstein’s ideas about knowledge. Schönbaumsfeld thinks that, to understand how perception can engender knowledge of the world, we need a non-Cartesian account of perceptual reasons. Wittgenstein offers a much more radical break with the Cartesian Picture: an account of knowledge without ‘experience’.

External-World Skepticism in Classical India: The Case of Vasubandhu

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 147-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Mills
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Final Conclusion ◽  
Indian Tradition ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
External World Skepticism

The Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu (c. 400 ce) has seldom been considered in conjunction with the problem of external-world skepticism despite the fact that his text, Twenty Verses, presents arguments from ignorance based on dreams. In this article, an epistemological phenomenalist interpretation of Vasubandhu is supported in opposition to a metaphysical idealist interpretation. On either interpretation, Vasubandhu gives an invitation to the problem of external-world skepticism, although his final conclusion is closer to skepticism on the epistemological phenomenalist interpretation. The article ends with reflections on what light Vasubandhu might shed on the issue of whether skepticism is a natural problem in epistemology as well as why, despite Vasubandhu, the skeptical problem was not a central issue in the later Indian tradition.

World in Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Logue
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
External World ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Relational View ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
External World Skepticism

I will begin this paper by sketching a view according to which perceptual phenomenal character is “extended”, in the sense of literally incorporating mind-independent entities in the subject’s environment (a view also known as Naïve Realism or the Relational View). I will then argue that this metaphysical thesis about perceptual phenomenal character affords a novel version of epistemological disjunctivism (a view that is elaborated and defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard). I will conclude by comparing the resulting view with other versions of epistemological disjunctivism, and arguing that the version I have offered provides the most satisfying response to external world skepticism.

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