Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 283-303
Author(s):  
Olle Risberg ◽  
Folke Tersman

Abstract A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlying concern is that if moral truths have the nature that realists believe, it is hard to see how we could know what they are. This objection may be called the “argument from skepticism” against moral realism. Realists have primarily responded to this argument by presenting accounts of how we could acquire knowledge of moral truths that are consistent with realist assumptions about their nature. Less time has been spent, however, on the question of why it would be a problem for moral realism if it leads to skepticism in the first place, and on the related question of which skeptical conclusions it would be problematic for realists to simply accept. This paper considers several answers to these questions, thereby distinguishing a number of versions of the argument from skepticism, and discusses their prospects.

Author(s):  
Jaco W. Gericke

Philosophical approaches to ancient Israelite religion are rare, as is metaethical reflection on the Hebrew Bible. Nevertheless, many biblical scholars and philosophers of religion tend to take it for granted that the biblical metaethical assumptions about the relation between divinity and morality involve a pre-philosophical version of Divine Command Theory by default. In this paper the author challenges the popular consensus with several arguments demonstrating the presence of moral realism in the text. It is furthermore suggested that the popular consensus came about as a result of prima facie assessments informed by anachronistic metatheistic assumptions about what the Hebrew Bible assumed to be essential in the deity–morality relation. The study concludes with the observation that in the texts where Divine Command Theory is absent from the underlying moral epistemology the Euthyphro Dilemma disappears as a false dichotomy.


2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric HAGER
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Ashley Floyd Kuntz

Abstract Student protests have developed on campuses throughout the country in response to controversial speakers. Overwhelmingly, these protests have been framed as conflicts over the right to free speech and the importance of free inquiry on college campuses. This essay reframes conflicts like these as moral disagreements over the role of individuals and institutions in producing and disseminating knowledge that supports or undermines justice within a pluralistic, democratic society. Using the specific case of Charles Murray’s visit to Middlebury College in spring 2017 and drawing insight from social moral epistemology, the essay aims to clarify the moral concerns at stake in clashes over controversial speakers and to identify possibilities to advance the moral aims of institutions of higher education in response to such events.


Author(s):  
Henk W. de Regt

This chapter introduces the theme of the book: scientific understanding. Science is arguably the most successful product of the human desire for understanding. Reflection on the nature of scientific understanding is an important and exciting project for philosophers of science, as well as for scientists and interested laypeople. As a first illustration of this, the chapter sketches an episode from the history of science in which discussions about understanding played a crucial role: the genesis of quantum mechanics in the 1920s, and the heated debates about the intelligibility of this theory and the related question of whether it can provide understanding. This case shows that standards of intelligibility of scientists can vary strongly. Furthermore, the chapter outlines and defends the way in which this study approaches its subject, differing essentially from mainstream philosophical discussions of explanatory understanding. It concludes with an overview of the contents of the book.


Author(s):  
Billy Dunaway

This book develops and defends a framework for moral realism. It defends the idea that moral properties are metaphysically elite, or privileged parts of reality. It argues that realists can hold that this makes them highly eligible as the referents for our moral terms, an application of a thesis sometimes called reference magnetism. And it elaborates on these theses by introducing some natural claims about how we can know about morality, by having beliefs that are free from a kind of risk of error. This package of theses in metaphysics, meta-semantics, and epistemology is motivated with a view to an explanation of possible moral disagreements. Many writers have emphasized the scope of moral disagreement, and have given compelling examples of possible users of moral language who appear to be genuinely disagreeing, rather than talking past one another, with their use of moral language. What has gone unnoticed is that there are limits to these possible disagreements, and not all possible users of moral language are naturally interpreted as capable of genuine disagreement. The realist view developed in this book can explain both the extent of, and the limits to, moral disagreement, and thereby has explanatory power that counts significantly in its favor.


This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume explore topics including the nature of reasons, the tenability of moral realism, moral explanation and grounding, and a variety of epistemological challenges.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher M. Milroy ◽  
Charis Kepron

Sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) has been used as a cause of death for over four decades. It has allowed deaths of infants to be registered as natural. Within this group of deaths, a certain number have been recognized to be homicides from inflicted smothering rather than being natural or accidental deaths. Research has been conducted using confidential inquires to determine how frequent homicide is in cases called SIDS. This paper traces the history of quoted rates of homicide. Early work suggested the figure was between 2-10% of all SIDS cases, though other workers have suggested figures as high as 20-40%. With the fall in the rate of infant deaths following the “Back to Sleep” campaigns, these figures have been reevaluated. If the higher figures were correct that 20-40% of SIDS were homicides, the fall in infant deaths would be expected to be less than it has been. Current data suggests a much lower figure than 10% of current cases, with much lower overall rates of infant deaths. As well as 10% of SIDS cases having been stated to be homicides, a related question is whether multiple deaths classified as SIDS are really homicides. The paper discusses the maxim that one death is a tragedy, two is suspicious, and three deaths indicate homicide. The paper also looks at court cases and the approach that has been made in prosecutions of sudden unexpected death in infancy as multiple murder.


1919 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 294-314
Author(s):  
James Bissett Pratt

The individual's attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny, which is religion, has always an essentially practical coloring. It involves a belief, to be sure, but this belief is never a matter of pure theory; it bears a reference, more or less explicit, to the fate of the individual's values. Hence in nearly every religion which history has studied or anthropology discovered, the question of the future in store for the individual believer has been one of prime importance. The content of this belief is a question for the theologian and the historian of religion; the psychologist, however, may be able to throw some light on the related question why people believe, or fail to believe, in immortality at all. What, in short, are the psychological sources from which this belief springs, and what are the leading types of this belief?


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