scholarly journals Crimes Against Humanity: Directing Attacks Against A Civilian Population

2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chile Eboe-Osuji
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Trial Chamber ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
Classic Theory ◽  
A Charge

AbstractIn international criminal law, to sustain a charge of crimes against humanity, the Prosecution must prove, among other elements, that the perpetrator was involved in an attack directed against a civilian population. In Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, the Special Court for Sierra Leone found that the Prosecution failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the civilian population was the 'primary object' of the attack and acquitted the accused on the counts of murder and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. The Appeals Chamber accepted this view. However, it reversed Trial Chamber I on the ground that the Prosecution evidence did establish that the civilian population had been the primary, as opposed to incidental, target of the attack. The author suggests that this is an error resulting from the undue jurisprudential pre-occupation with the meaning of 'primary' in relation to the notion of attack against a civilian population. Instead, the inquiry should focus on whether the civilian population was 'intentionally' targeted in the attack, notwithstanding that it may not have been the primary object of the attack. He submits that this approach would be consistent with the classic theory of mens rea in criminal law.

Crimes against Humanity

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beth van Schaack
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
International Crime ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Civilian Population

Crimes against humanity have both a colloquial and a legal existence. In daily parlance, the term is employed to condemn any number of atrocities that violate international human rights. As a legal construct, crimes against humanity encompass a constellation of acts made criminal under international law when they are committed within the context of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. In the domain of international criminal law, crimes against humanity are an increasingly useful component of any international prosecutor’s toolbox, because they can be charged in connection with acts of violence that do not implicate other international criminal prohibitions, such as the prohibitions against war crimes (which require a nexus to an armed conflict) and genocide (which protects only certain human groups and requires proof of a specific intent to destroy such a group). Although the concept of crimes against humanity has deep roots, crimes against humanity were first adjudicated—albeit with some controversy—in the criminal proceedings following the World War II period. The central challenge to defining crimes against humanity under international criminal law since then has been to come up with a formulation of the offense that reconciles the principle of sovereignty—which envisions an exclusive territorial domain in which states are free from outside scrutiny—with the idea that international law can, and indeed should, regulate certain acts committed entirely within the borders of a single state. Because many enumerated crimes against humanity are also crimes under domestic law (e.g., murder, assault, and rape), it was necessary to define crimes against humanity in a way that did not elevate every domestic crime to the status of an international crime, subject to international jurisdiction. Over the years, legal drafters have experimented with various elements in an effort to arrive at a workable penal definition. The definitional confusion plaguing the crime over its life span generated a considerable amount of legal scholarship. It was not until the UN Security Council promulgated the statutes of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—that a modern definition of the crime emerged. These definitions were further refined by the case law of the two tribunals and their progeny, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone. All these doctrinal developments were codified, with some additional modifications, in a consensus definition in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is now clear that the offense constitutes three essential elements: (1) the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and (2) the intentional commission of an enumerated act (such as an act of murder or torture) (3) by an individual with knowledge that his or her act would contribute to the larger attack. A renewed effort is now afoot to promulgate a multilateral treaty devoted to crimes against humanity based on the ICC definition and these central elements. Through this dynamic process of codification and interpretation, many—but not all—definitional issues left open in the postwar period have finally been resolved. Although their origins were somewhat shaky, crimes against humanity now have a firm place in the canon of international criminal law.

The First Trial of Former Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army: Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, and Isak Musliu

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-476
Author(s):  
PASCALE CHIFFLET
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Eyewitness Identification ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Trial Chamber ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
Joint Criminal Enterprise

In its Judgement issued on 30 November 2005 in Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Trial Chamber II of the ICTY found that an armed conflict existed in Kosovo between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Serbian forces as of the end of May 1998. It held, however, that the evidence did not establish that there was a widespread or systematic attack by the KLA directed against a civilian population at the relevant time. The first trial of former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army also gave rise to a number of significant developments in the ICTY's jurisprudence relating to issues of international criminal law and procedure, such as the treatment of hostile witnesses and of eyewitness identification evidence, as well as the proof of the existence of a joint criminal enterprise.

The Emerging Mental Incapacity Defense in International Criminal Law: Some Initial Questions of Implementation

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Krug
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Explicit Recognition ◽  
Affirmative Defenses ◽  
A Charge

The norms and mechanisms for international prosecution of humanitarian law and mass human rights violations have been refined in the 1990s to include affirmation of the principle that separate (or “affirmative”) defenses to individual liability are admissible in international criminal law. Explicit recognition of the availability and nature of separate defenses is found in the statute of the international criminal court (ICC). Indirect application is found to a very limited extent in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), but not in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Moreover, although the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has rejected the argument that duress is a complete defense under customary international law or general principles of law to a charge of crimes against humanity involving the taking of innocent lives, it has implicidy accepted that duress could be available in other circumstances.

On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-873 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLAUS KRESS
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Trial Chamber ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Republic

AbstractAt the beginning of the renaissance of international criminal law in the 1990s, the law on crimes against humanity was in a fragile state. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decisively contributed to the consolidation of customary international law on crimes against humanity and paved the way for its first comprehensive codification in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the same time, the ICTY in its early decisions already showed a certain inclination to broaden the scope of the application of the crime by downgrading its contextual requirement. More recently, this tendency culminated in the complete abandonment of the policy requirement. While this ‘progressive’ facet of the ICTY's jurisprudence largely took the form of obiter dicta, the Situation in the Republic of Kenya has confronted the ICC with the need to ‘get serious’ about the present state of the law. This has led to a controversy in Pre-Trial Chamber II about the concept of organization in Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute. While the majority essentially follows the path of the more recent case law of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone and supports a liberal interpretation, Judge Kaul prefers to confine the term to state-like organizations and generally calls for caution against too hasty an expansion of the realm of international criminal law stricto sensu. This comment agrees with the main thrust of the Dissenting Opinion and hopes that it will provoke a thorough debate.

Briefly Noted

2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-441
Keyword(s):  
Cote D'ivoire ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Côte D’Ivoire ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Trial Chamber ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
Electoral Violence

On January 15, 2019, the Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) acquitted Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé of all charges of crimes against humanity allegedly committed in the context of post-electoral violence in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 and 2011. The two were accused of four charges of crimes against humanity: murder, rape, other inhumane acts, and persecution. The majority found that the Prosecutor had not proven several elements of the crimes charged, namely a “common plan” meant to keep Gbagbo in power, including crimes against civilians “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy,” and patterns of violence that would have demonstrated a “policy to attack a civilian population.” The majority also found that the Prosecutor had not provided evidence proving that the defendants “knowingly or intentionally contributed to the commission of the alleged crimes or that their speeches constituted ordering, soliciting or inducing such crimes.” In dissent, Judge Herrera Carbuccia stated that she believed the majority used the wrong standard of review, that it should have been the beyond reasonable doubt standard, and “that there is evidence upon which a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict the accused.”

Eco-Struggles

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Gillett
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Environmental Harm ◽  
Jus Post Bellum

This chapter examines the provisions of international criminal law applicable to serious environmental harm, particularly during non-international armed conflicts ('NIAC'). After describing incidents of serious environmental harm arising in armed conflicts, the analysis surveys the provisions of international criminal law applicable to environmental harm during NIACs, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression. It then examines the basis for extending to NIACs the protection against military attacks causing excessive environmental harm (set out in Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute), which is currently only applicable in IACs. The examination of this possible amendment of the Rome Statute covers a broad range of instruments and laws forming part of international and national legal codes, all addressing grave environmental harm. Finally, the analysis turns to accountability for environmental harm as a facet of jus post bellum, emphasizing the interconnected nature of environmental harm and cycles of violence and atrocities.

Recharacterisation of Crimes and the Principle of Fair Labelling in International Criminal Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 788-821
Author(s):  
Talita de Souza Dias
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Legal Scholarship ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Central Claim

The principle of fair labelling has informed the creation of international crimes and other concepts of international criminal law since the modern inception of this discipline. In particular, it was the symbolic and condemnatory import of international labels such as genocide and crimes against humanity that partly motivated their introduction as offences separate from domestic ordinary crimes. Paradoxically, fair labelling has received marginal attention in legal scholarship and practice. Moreover, frequent instances of relabelling known as ‘recharacterisation of crimes’ may not be entirely consistent with that principle, inviting further analysis thereof. In this context, the purpose of this article is to provide a more systematic and comprehensive analysis of the principle of fair labelling in international criminal law, particularly in light of the phenomenon of recharacterisation of crimes. Its central claim is that fair labelling is as a fair trial right which precludes recourse to recharacterisation in certain circumstances.

s.VIII Boundaries, Ch.33 The Core Crimes of International Criminal Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Schwöbel-Patel Christine
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
The Core ◽  
History Of ◽  
Political Economic

The ‘core’ crimes set out in the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute - the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression - are overwhelmingly assumed to be the most important international crimes. In this chapter, I unsettle the assumption of their inherent importance by revealing and problematising the civilizational, political-economic, and aesthetical biases behind designating these crimes as ‘core’. This is done by shedding light on discontinuities in the history of the core crimes, and unsettling the progress narrative ‘from Nuremberg to Rome’. More specifically, crimes associated with drug control are placed in conversation with the accepted history of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exemplify a systematic editing of the dominant narrative of international criminal law.

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