On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-873 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLAUS KRESS

AbstractAt the beginning of the renaissance of international criminal law in the 1990s, the law on crimes against humanity was in a fragile state. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decisively contributed to the consolidation of customary international law on crimes against humanity and paved the way for its first comprehensive codification in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the same time, the ICTY in its early decisions already showed a certain inclination to broaden the scope of the application of the crime by downgrading its contextual requirement. More recently, this tendency culminated in the complete abandonment of the policy requirement. While this ‘progressive’ facet of the ICTY's jurisprudence largely took the form of obiter dicta, the Situation in the Republic of Kenya has confronted the ICC with the need to ‘get serious’ about the present state of the law. This has led to a controversy in Pre-Trial Chamber II about the concept of organization in Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute. While the majority essentially follows the path of the more recent case law of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone and supports a liberal interpretation, Judge Kaul prefers to confine the term to state-like organizations and generally calls for caution against too hasty an expansion of the realm of international criminal law stricto sensu. This comment agrees with the main thrust of the Dissenting Opinion and hopes that it will provoke a thorough debate.

Author(s):  
Beth van Schaack

Crimes against humanity have both a colloquial and a legal existence. In daily parlance, the term is employed to condemn any number of atrocities that violate international human rights. As a legal construct, crimes against humanity encompass a constellation of acts made criminal under international law when they are committed within the context of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. In the domain of international criminal law, crimes against humanity are an increasingly useful component of any international prosecutor’s toolbox, because they can be charged in connection with acts of violence that do not implicate other international criminal prohibitions, such as the prohibitions against war crimes (which require a nexus to an armed conflict) and genocide (which protects only certain human groups and requires proof of a specific intent to destroy such a group). Although the concept of crimes against humanity has deep roots, crimes against humanity were first adjudicated—albeit with some controversy—in the criminal proceedings following the World War II period. The central challenge to defining crimes against humanity under international criminal law since then has been to come up with a formulation of the offense that reconciles the principle of sovereignty—which envisions an exclusive territorial domain in which states are free from outside scrutiny—with the idea that international law can, and indeed should, regulate certain acts committed entirely within the borders of a single state. Because many enumerated crimes against humanity are also crimes under domestic law (e.g., murder, assault, and rape), it was necessary to define crimes against humanity in a way that did not elevate every domestic crime to the status of an international crime, subject to international jurisdiction. Over the years, legal drafters have experimented with various elements in an effort to arrive at a workable penal definition. The definitional confusion plaguing the crime over its life span generated a considerable amount of legal scholarship. It was not until the UN Security Council promulgated the statutes of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—that a modern definition of the crime emerged. These definitions were further refined by the case law of the two tribunals and their progeny, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone. All these doctrinal developments were codified, with some additional modifications, in a consensus definition in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is now clear that the offense constitutes three essential elements: (1) the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and (2) the intentional commission of an enumerated act (such as an act of murder or torture) (3) by an individual with knowledge that his or her act would contribute to the larger attack. A renewed effort is now afoot to promulgate a multilateral treaty devoted to crimes against humanity based on the ICC definition and these central elements. Through this dynamic process of codification and interpretation, many—but not all—definitional issues left open in the postwar period have finally been resolved. Although their origins were somewhat shaky, crimes against humanity now have a firm place in the canon of international criminal law.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Krug

The norms and mechanisms for international prosecution of humanitarian law and mass human rights violations have been refined in the 1990s to include affirmation of the principle that separate (or “affirmative”) defenses to individual liability are admissible in international criminal law. Explicit recognition of the availability and nature of separate defenses is found in the statute of the international criminal court (ICC). Indirect application is found to a very limited extent in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), but not in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Moreover, although the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has rejected the argument that duress is a complete defense under customary international law or general principles of law to a charge of crimes against humanity involving the taking of innocent lives, it has implicidy accepted that duress could be available in other circumstances.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 681-681
Author(s):  
ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT

The editorial board of the Leiden Journal of International Law is pleased to announce a debate on a very important but underexposed topic in international criminal law: witness proofing. Witness proofing is an accepted and well-established practice at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). It entails setting up a meeting between a party to the proceedings and a witness, usually shortly before the witness is to testify in court, the purpose of which is to prepare and familiarize the witness with courtroom procedure and to review the witness's evidence. Recently a trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) prohibited witness proofing. On 30 November 2007, Trial Chamber I held in the Lubanga case that the possibility of witness proofing is not expressly provided for in the ICC Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and that no general principle exists in national or international criminal law that would require the ICC to adhere to such a practice. Moreover, and this is the most interesting argument, the trial chamber held that the ICC Statute ‘moves away from the procedural regime of the ad hoc tribunals’ and that as a result witness proofing is not easily transferable to the ICC.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Steven Freeland

The recent issue by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of an arrest warrant against Omar Al Bashir, the President of Sudan, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, represents the first time that the ICC has acted in such a way against an incumbent Head of State. It has renewed the debate about the potential international criminal responsibility of Heads of State and has led to strong opinions both for and against such actions. Yet, the prosecution of Heads of State is by no means a new phenomenon, and its continued use represents an important element in the internationalisation of justice that has gained renewed emphasis over the past two decades. This article offers some thoughts and reflections on several key issues associated with this debate, focusing particularly on the political, legal and historical dimensions that have combined to allow for the prosecution under international criminal law of any person, irrespective of their official capacity. It also examines the important role in this regard for the ICC, the world's first permanent international criminal tribunal, as well as the increasing range of prosecutions now taking place within national jurisdictions, as the period of impunity in relation to the commission of international crimes that had existed for several decades up to the 1990s has come to an end. 


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Mary Ann Johnson Navis

<p>This dissertation focuses on the role played by officials of transnational corporations and transnational corporations themselves in the situation in Burma. The main aim of this dissertation is to assess the liability of officials of transnational corporations in Burma and transnational corporations in Burma for crimes against humanity such as slave labour and for war crimes such as plunder under International Criminal Law. However at present transnational corporations cannot be prosecuted under International Criminal Law as the International Criminal Court only has jurisdiction to try natural persons and not legal persons. In doing this analysis the theory of complicity, actus reus of aiding and abetting and the mens rea of aiding and abetting in relation to officials of transnational corporations will be explored and analysed to assess the liability of these officials in Burma. In doing this analysis the jurisprudence of inter alia the Nuremberg cases, the cases decided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) will be used. This dissertation also examines the problems associated with suing or prosecuting transnational corporations due to the legal personality of transnational corporations and the structure of transnational corporations. At the end of the dissertation some recommendations are made so as to enable transnational corporations to be more transparent and accountable under the law.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Mary Ann Johnson Navis

<p>This dissertation focuses on the role played by officials of transnational corporations and transnational corporations themselves in the situation in Burma. The main aim of this dissertation is to assess the liability of officials of transnational corporations in Burma and transnational corporations in Burma for crimes against humanity such as slave labour and for war crimes such as plunder under International Criminal Law. However at present transnational corporations cannot be prosecuted under International Criminal Law as the International Criminal Court only has jurisdiction to try natural persons and not legal persons. In doing this analysis the theory of complicity, actus reus of aiding and abetting and the mens rea of aiding and abetting in relation to officials of transnational corporations will be explored and analysed to assess the liability of these officials in Burma. In doing this analysis the jurisprudence of inter alia the Nuremberg cases, the cases decided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) will be used. This dissertation also examines the problems associated with suing or prosecuting transnational corporations due to the legal personality of transnational corporations and the structure of transnational corporations. At the end of the dissertation some recommendations are made so as to enable transnational corporations to be more transparent and accountable under the law.</p>


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 585-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Gadler

The concern for the safety and security of personnel involved in peacekeeping missions has grown in the last two decades, mainly because of the increased risks deriving from deployment in volatile environments and mandates comprising multiple tasks. This article provides an overview of the developments of international law regarding the protection of peacekeepers, with a special focus on international criminal law and its role in enhancing the safety of the personnel and objects involved in peacekeeping missions. Indeed, starting in 2008, international and hybrid tribunals have issued their first decisions and judgments against individuals indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in connection with attacks against peacekeepers.After an analysis of the legal regimes established by the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and by international humanitarian law, the article examines the relevant international criminal law provisions and their application and interpretation by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court. It is argued that the application of the specific war crime of attacking peacekeepers, introduced for the first time in the Rome Statute in 1998, presents particular challenges, but it has also led to the punishment of a broader range of offences against peacekeepers. Furthermore, the application of this crime may contribute to the broadening of the range of punishable offences under the more general war crime of attacking civilians, thus leading to the enhancement of the protection of civilians.


2019 ◽  
pp. 439-467
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter describes international criminal law. International criminal law represented a fundamental shift for international law. Historically, international law regarded accountability and responsibility almost purely through the lens of the State and contained neither substantive rules nor the requisite institutions to prosecute an individual. Today, there exist several institutions, most prominently the International Criminal Court (ICC), which have given shape both to the substance of the crimes themselves and to the method for their effective prosecution. Through international criminal law, the criminal responsibility and liability of individuals, even if acting in groups, are now addressed internationally. There is a category of indisputable ‘core crimes’ under customary international law: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. These are helpfully defined in an ICC document called the ‘Elements of Crimes’, which is intended to guide the Court in the interpretation and application of these crimes.


Author(s):  
Schwöbel-Patel Christine

The ‘core’ crimes set out in the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute - the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression - are overwhelmingly assumed to be the most important international crimes. In this chapter, I unsettle the assumption of their inherent importance by revealing and problematising the civilizational, political-economic, and aesthetical biases behind designating these crimes as ‘core’. This is done by shedding light on discontinuities in the history of the core crimes, and unsettling the progress narrative ‘from Nuremberg to Rome’. More specifically, crimes associated with drug control are placed in conversation with the accepted history of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exemplify a systematic editing of the dominant narrative of international criminal law.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 245-250
Author(s):  
Bing Bing Jia

Legacy is a matter that may become topical when its creator finally stops producing. Normally, the silent years would be many before the thought of legacy enters into open, formal discourse among lawyers and decision-makers. This comment treats the meaning of the word as relative to the circumstances in which it is invoked. The more closely it is used in relation to the present, the more distant it drifts from its literal meaning, to the extent that it denotes what the word “impact” signifies. This essay questions whether the word “legacy” is apt in describing the footprint of the work of the two ad hoctribunals in China, where its influence has, as a matter of fact, been waning ever since the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (“Rome Statute” ). The Chinese example suggests that the work of the tribunals is (at least so far) no more significant to international criminal law than the illustrious Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials of the 1940s. The most major impact (a more apposite term than legacy) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for China may be that China’s policy with regard to the tribunals, manifested mostly in the United Nations, has determined its approach to the International Criminal Court (“ICC” ). For that, the work of the tribunals could be considered as having left China something in the nature of an indirect legacy.


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