Angélica Maria Bernal, “Beyond Origins: Rethinking Founding in a Time of Constitutional Democracy” (2017)

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 251-255
Author(s):  
Alicia Pastor y Camarasa
2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-317
Author(s):  
Osahon O. Guobadia

A new constitutional democracy was established in Nigeria on 29 May 1999. This Fourth Republic was founded upon the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) which unshackled the judiciary from the bondage of military decrees. This also brought excitement to the citizenry which finds expression in the belief that the judiciary, their last bastion of succour, is now poised to intervene in the inevitable tussle between might and the exercise of new democratic tenets. These tenets encompass the ideals of economic justice, political justice and social justice. 1 1 C. C. Nweze, ‘Judicial Sustainability of Constitutional Democracy in Nigeria: A Response to the Phonographic Theory of the Judicial Function’, in E. S. Nwauche and F. I. Asogwah (eds), Essays in Honour of Professor C. O. Okunkwo, (SAN) Jite Books (2000), p. 225. Against the backdrop of this reality, the article will examine the extent to which the judiciary in Nigeria has performed its constitutional role as an independent arm of government towards ensuring the observance of democratic values in a free, open, humane and civilised society.


Author(s):  
Hoolo Nyane

While electoral discontent has been the enduring feature of constitutional democracy in Lesotho since independence, disagreement over electoral system is a fairly recent phenomenon. When the country attained independence in 1966 from Britain, electoral system was not necessarily one of the topical issues of pre-independence constitutional negotiations. The major issues were the powers of the monarch, the office of prime minister, the command of the army and many more.  It was taken for granted that the country would use the British-based plurality electoral system.  This is the system which the country used until early 2000s when the electoral laws were reformed to anchor a new mixed electoral system.  When the new electoral laws were ultimately passed in 2001, the country transitioned from a plurality electoral system to a two-ballot mixed member proportional system. By this time, electoral system had acquired prominence in politico-legal discourse in Lesotho.  In the run-up to 2007 elections, bigger political parties orchestrated the manipulation of electoral laws which culminated in clearly distorted electoral outcomes. The manipulations motivated further reforms in the run-up to 2012 election which resulted in the single-ballot mixed member proportional system. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate how electoral laws have anchored electoral system reforms throughout the various historical epochs in Lesotho since independence. The paper contends that while the country has been courageous, unlike most of its peers, to introduce far-reaching electoral system changes, the reform of electoral laws has not been so helpful in attaining the higher objectives of political inclusivity, constitutionalism and stability in Lesotho.


1991 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-70
Author(s):  
Christopher Buck

Vindicating the mission of the Persian reformer known as the Báb (d. 1850) Bahá’u’lláh’s Book of Certitude (1862) focused on spiritual authority from an Islamic perspective. In this work, a subtext may be discerned, in which Bahá’u’lláh intimates his own mission in the same terms of reference. Later, in his epistles to the monarchs of Europe and West Asia (1866–1869), Bahá’u’lláh exercised that authority and spoke of world reform. This article places Bahá’u’lláh in the context of Islamic reform, with particular reference to the advocacy of constitutional democracy by prominent Iranian secularists. In an ideological ether pervaded by “Westoxication,” Bahá’u’lláh sought to reverse the direction of Western influence. Bahá’u’lláh prosecuted his own reforms in three stages: Bábí reform; Persian reform; and world reform. In the centrifugal sequence, Bahá’u’lláh is shown to have bypassed Islamic reform altogether in his professed role as “World Reformer.”


Author(s):  
Christie Hartley

The conclusion stresses that the argument for the view that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism depends on claims made about the substantive content of free and equal citizenship and how this conception of citizenship limits and shapes what kinds of state action can be justified to others. Some may charge that the position defended in the book is actually a comprehensive liberalism, not a political liberalism. This objection is addressed in the conclusion as well as the inability of political liberalism to address certain egalitarian commitments that may be part of some feminist comprehensive doctrines. It is argued that our view does not amount to a partially comprehensive liberalism, as the view rests on political values that are part of the idea of constitutional democracy and the demands of citizenship within such societies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Andraž Teršek

Abstract The central objective of the post-socialist European countries which are also Member States of the EU and Council of Europe, as proclaimed and enshrined in their constitutions before their official independence, is the establishment of a democracy based on the rule of law and effective legal protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this article the author explains what, in his opinion, is the main problem and why these goals are still not sufficiently achieved: the ruthless simplification of the understanding of the social function and functioning of constitutional courts, which is narrow, rigid and holistically focused primarily or exclusively on the question of whether the judges of these courts are “left or right” in purely daily-political sense, and consequently, whether constitutional court decisions are taken (described, understood) as either “left or right” in purely and shallow daily-party-political sense/manner. With nothing else between and no other foundation. The author describes such rhetoric, this kind of superficial labeling/marking, such an approach towards constitutional law-making as a matter of unbearable and unthinking simplicity, and introduces the term A Populist Monster. The reasons that have led to the problem of this kind of populism and its devastating effects on the quality and development of constitutional democracy and the rule of law are analyzed clearly and critically.


2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-33
Author(s):  
Lucky Mathebe

After almost 25 years of what could justifiably be called transformative change in South Africa, a truism is that the country’s new legal order, established by the Constitution in 1993 and 1996, provides the critical foundation of peace and security upon which its freedom has been built. The Constitutional Court was one of the most important of the new democratic institutions in the shaping of the country’s position as a constitutional democracy, upholding the values for which millions of people, black and white, had fought. This article is a brief reflection on the role of the Court in establishing the meaning of this democracy and giving it effect. The main goal of the article is to understand how the Court’s new jurisprudence works in particular contexts, how its work is related to crime and punishment, and what it means for the rights of marginalised groups in society. Using the examples of the Court’s decision in Makwanyane on the death penalty, and the Court’s decision on the findings of the Public Protector’s report on Nkandla, the article finds that the Court’s new jurisprudence takes quite a different view of legal developments in South Africa, insofar as the jurisprudence entrusts broad discretion to the Court and emphasises the need for sustained leadership of the Court to advance the battle for fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and democratic accountability.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document