Unilateral Military Action in the Syrian Arab Republic: A Right to Humanitarian Intervention or a Crime of Aggression?

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-343
Author(s):  
Manisuli Ssenyonjo

On 29 August 2013 the UK government officially endorsed humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for using force against Syria. The UK government stated that if its action in the Security Council is blocked, the UK would still be permitted under international law to take ‘exceptional measures’ in order to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. The UK government claimed that such a legal basis is available, under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, provided three conditions are met: (i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief; (ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved; and (iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose). It concluded that all three conditions would clearly be met in the case of Syria. This article argues that UK’s legal position is flawed and not supported by the permitted exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force under Charter of the United Nations.

Author(s):  
W Scholtz

This article focuses on three instances of the use of armed force in international relations. The three instances that are explored are the intervention by NATO in Kosovo, the armed attack by mainly the USA and the UK against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq in 2003. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the legality of the coercive measures in order to ascertain the effects that these actions had in relation to article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The proposed justifications for the attacks differ and these are carefully scrutinized against the jus ad bellum as to determine the legality of the attacks. The notion of humanitarian intervention was used as a ground for justification by various international scholars to explain the use of force in Kosovo, but this concept is not recognized in terms of international law. The attack on Afghanistan was based on article 51 of the UN Charter. The attacks were directed at Afghanistan as this state harboured the terrorists responsible for the attacks on the USA. The mere harbouring of terrorists does not give rise to the use of armed force on the basis of article 51 and as such the use of coercive measures against Afghanistan was illegal. The use of force in Iraq was mainly based on the doctrine of pre-emptive force which is alien to international law. The USA and its coalition partners also acted in contravention with the jus ad bellum in this regard. The author poses certain proposals in relation to the jus ad bellum and stresses the importance of article 2(4) which must ensure that international relations are not once more regulated by the use of armed force. 


2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Henderson

AbstractOn 29 August 2013, the UK government published a memorandum setting out its ‘position regarding the legality of military action in Syria following the chemical weapons attack in Eastern Damascus on 21 August 2013’. While other States had contemplated some form of military action, most notably the US, none had been as clear and candid as to the legal basis upon which this would be launched. It might seem in this respect perhaps a little surprising that the UK decided in its relatively brief opinion that ‘the legal basis for military action would be humanitarian intervention’. As this article will attempt to highlight, this basic justification is far from uncontroversial. This short article will seek to be clear as to what the UK's legal position exactly was, whether and how this position can be reconciled with the lex lata governing the use of force for humanitarian purposes and its immediate impact upon it, and finally offer some reflections upon the contribution the opinion and its central legal argument has made to future legal argumentation in this area.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-154
Author(s):  
Ondřej Svaček

Summary In its final report on aggression and the use of force, the International Law Association opined that the only way in which unilateral humanitarian intervention could possibly be seen as a legal exception to the prohibition of the use of force is if State practice and opinio juris were to be found establishing its status as an additional exception in customary international law. After the airstrikes conducted by the US, the UK, and France against Syria in April 2018, which took place in reaction to unprecedented usage of chemical weapons against civilian population by regime of Bashar Asad, some States and part of scholars argued that this permissive rule (exception) has already crystalized and humanitarian intervention became part of international law. The aim of this article is to assess whether these opinions are relevant or whether they are simply premature. The text is divided into three parts. Firstly, legality of humanitarian intervention is considered in the framework of the UN Charter and customary international law on the use of force based on evaluation of scholarly debates and the most prominent examples of State practice before 2018. Then, the article describes methodology that is employed in relation to the creation (modification) of customary international law in general and peremptory norm concerning the prohibition on the use of force in particular. This part analyzes how possible normative changes of jus ad bellum should be assessed. The third part evaluates justifications and reactions of States with respect to the use of force against Syria in April 2018 that were presented by the international community of States. The article concludes that the concept of humanitarian intervention remains still illegal even after the airstrikes against Syria from 2018, what conforms to the prevailing opinion presented in contemporary scholarly literature. Even though the positive echoes identified in State practice (and doctrine) are yet premature, they indicate that process of gradual normative change has already been triggered. At the same time, the expectations concerning crystallization of a new possible exception to the general prohibition on the use of force should not be too exaggerated.


1994 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dunn

There are at Least Three Possible Types of View about the justifiability of the use of force by states or private individuals on behalf of other private individuals or groups who are the victims of brutal and gratuitous coercion by another state. The first type of view is that no human being, and a fortiori no state, can be justified in using force under any circumstances and for any purpose, because (and only because) force is an intrinsic evil. This unflinchingly deontological view is generous but practically absurd. The second type of view is that states (or even private individuals) can be, and often arc, justified in using force against the brutally coercive actions of another state when, but only when, the latter is acting outside its own territorial jurisdiction. At least in the case of states what grounds that justification is their entitlement to defend themselves against foreign (as against domestic) aggression, and to defend also any other states with whom they have linked themselves either by standing alliances or by solemn common undertakings to secure each other's safety and sovereignty within the bounds of international law. In the case of private individuals, the corresponding justification would lie in their several personal entitlements to defend themselves as best they can against aggression.


Author(s):  
Franchini Daniel ◽  
Tzanakopoulos Antonios

This contribution discusses the forcible intervention by NATO against Serbia in 1999 in response to the situation in Kosovo. It sets out the facts and background of the crisis, along with the legal positions of the main protagonists and the reactions of the international community. It then proceeds to survey the debates surrounding the legality of the intervention and to assess the soundness of the legal justifications put forward by states and authors. Finally, it discusses the precedential value of the intervention, especially in view of claims of the existence or emergence of a rule or principle of international law permitting the unilateral use of force in response to humanitarian crises. The contribution concludes that the NATO intervention has significant precedential value in that it confirms the unlawfulness of forcible unilateral humanitarian intervention.


Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón ◽  
Bas van der Vossen

We introduce general concepts of just war theory and describe different kinds of war: national self-defense, collective self-defense, and humanitarian intervention. After laying down the conditions for the justification of humanitarian intervention, we highlight some of our differences. We conclude with an outline of the international law of use of force and some jurisprudential themes that bear on the current humanitarian intervention debate.


2010 ◽  
Vol 92 (877) ◽  
pp. 235-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha T. Godec

AbstractAdopting a feminist perspective, this paper analyses the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and its impact on women in recipient states, particularly with regard to sexual violence. By analysing the phenomenon of post-conflict trafficking in Kosovo following the NATO intervention, the author presents a challenge to the ‘feminist hawks’ who have called for military intervention in situations of systematic sexual violence. It is the author's contention that such intervention would be counterproductive for women's rights and thus constitute a disproportionate response to sexual violence in terms of the international law governing the use of force.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Brunstetter ◽  
Megan Braun

In the preface of the 2006 edition ofJust and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer makes an important distinction between, on the one hand, “measures short of war,” such as imposing no-fly zones, pinpoint air/missile strikes, and CIA operations, and on the other, “actual warfare,” typified by a ground invasion or a large-scale bombing campaign. Even if the former are, technically speaking, acts of war according to international law, he proffers that “it is common sense to recognize that they are very different from war.” While they all involve “the use of force,” Walzer distinguishes between the level of force used: the former, being more limited in scope, lack the “unpredictable and often catastrophic consequences” of a “full-scale attack.” Walzer calls the ethical framework governing these measuresjus ad vim(the just use of force), and he applies it to state-sponsored uses of force against both state and nonstate actors outside a state's territory that fall short of the quantum and duration associated with traditional warfare. Compared to acts of war,jus ad vimactions present diminished risk to one's own troops, have a destructive outcome that is more predictable and smaller in scale, severely curtail the risk of civilian casualties, and entail a lower economic and military burden. These factors makejus ad vimactions nominally easier for statesmen to justify compared to conventional warfare, though this does not necessarily mean these actions are morally legitimate or that they do not have potentially nefarious consequences.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-631 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Ruffert

The intensive debate about the legality of NATO air strikes from March to June 1999 in the context of use of force, Chapter VII competences and humanitarian intervention1 including their implication in the domestic constitutional law of NATO members,2 may be concealed another development the importance of which in modern Public International Law should not be underestimated: since the time when the Yugoslav/Serbian army left Kosovo, the province has been under direct administration by the international community.3 Only a little time later the same phenomenon of international administration came into being in East-Timor, a Portuguese colony until 1975 and claimed by Indonesia afterwards.4


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