A Neutralization Plan for the Pacific: Roosevelt and Anglo-American Cooperation, 1934-1937

Keyword(s):  

The Second World War marked the apex of industrial war and was nothing short of the most costly and destructive conflict ever experienced. It was total in its conduct and global in its scale—a true World War. The scale of the conflict may be explained by virtue of the fact that it was the product of numerous regional conflicts and theaters of operation that increasingly became woven into a contiguous war. In Western Europe the conflict began as a rerun of the Great War. In Eastern Europe it evolved into an ideological war of extermination between the polar opposites of fascism and communism. Parts of Africa and the Middle East became battlegrounds where European colonial ambitions clashed while other parts provided men and material. Maintaining access to resources more generally was indispensable for all belligerents in order to sustain their war efforts, thus attempting to stem the flow of their opponents’ resources was a central facet of most wartime strategies. Farther east, Japanese imperial ambitions clashed with the dynamics of a civil war in China in the attempt to create a new “Asian” international system free of American and European encroachments. In this respect, the war in the Asia-Pacific region that broke out in December 1941 should be separated from the one conducted in China up until that point. Japanese operations in China and on the Mongolian border before 1941 certainly had an impact on, but were different from, the vast new front that opened up in the Pacific following the Japanese attacks on Anglo-American positions from Pearl Harbor to Singapore. It was the events of December 1941 that brought these disparate strands formally together and linked them to events in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere. The result was a single war with very few areas formally out of bounds to armed conflict....


Author(s):  
J.M. Opal

The foreign relations of the Jacksonian age reflected Andrew Jackson’s own sense of the American “nation” as long victimized by non-white enemies and weak politicians. His goal as president from 1829 to 1837 was to restore white Americans’ “sovereignty,” to empower them against other nations both within and beyond US territory. Three priorities emerged from this conviction. First, Jackson was determined to deport the roughly 50,000 Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles living in southern states and territories. He saw them as hostile nations who threatened American safety and checked American prosperity. Far from a domestic issue, Indian Removal was an imperial project that set the stage for later expansion over continental and oceanic frontiers. Second and somewhat paradoxically, Jackson sought better relations with Great Britain. These were necessary because the British Empire was both the main threat to US expansion and the biggest market for slave-grown exports from former Indian lands. Anglo-American détente changed investment patterns and economic development throughout the Western Hemisphere, encouraging American leaders to appease London even when patriotic passions argued otherwise. Third, Jackson wanted to open markets and secure property rights around the globe, by treaty if possible but by force when necessary. He called for a larger navy, pressed countries from France to Mexico for outstanding debts, and embraced retaliatory strikes on “savages” and “pirates” as far away as Sumatra. Indeed, the Jacksonian age brought a new American presence in the Pacific. By the mid-1840s the United States was the dominant power in the Hawaiian Islands and a growing force in China. The Mexican War that followed made the Union a two-ocean colossus—and pushed its regional tensions to the breaking point.


Author(s):  
JoAnna Poblete

This chapter examines the Philippines's authority over labor complaints in Hawaiʻi, with particular emphasis on the position of resident labor commissioner that Filipino U.S. colonials in Hawaiʻi lobbied for and acquired in 1923. It first provides an overview of the U.S. government's Filipinization policy in 1913 before turning to early Philippine labor mediators. It then considers the creation of a permanent worker representative in the islands through the Philippine legislature. It also looks at the appointment of Cayetano Ligot as the first Philippine labor commissioner and the movement launched by Filipinos in Hawaiʻi to remove him from office. It shows that Ligot created more problems than solutions for Filipino laborers in Hawaiʻi, and that the Filipinization of the intra-colonial labor complaint process in the Pacific did not result in improved conditions for the average Filipino. Despite the collaboration between Philippine and Anglo-American leaders, Filipino intra-colonials in Hawaiʻi found ways to express their own desires and free will.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niccolo Caldararo

While the world has been distracted since the American war in Vietnam and the Soviet and western adventures in Afghanistan, as well as a rising tide of rebellion directed against symbols of the west by Islamic fundamentalists, a curious contest has appeared on two fronts: Russia and China. At the same time the west is distracted by populist movements whose theme is focused on immigrants from former colonial nations or non-whites in a context, as in America, where aboriginal peoples have been slaughtered and marginalized. The specific nature of this conflict is economic in general form, yet political in rhetoric, especially from western sources. From the Ukraine to the Pacific a kind of “Phoney War” has crept along in starts and stops with overtures of friendship interrupted with threats of violence and minor acts of aggression. Investigation of some of the underlying factors in the East illuminate potential trends for the future. At the same time a new revitalization movement is reshaping the Anglo-American west, one that challenges the role of China in trade and policy.


1963 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-154
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Clifford

Most of the scholarly works on British policy in the years preceding World War II have neglected events in the Far East in favor of those in Europe. Any study of recent British diplomacy is, of course, seriously hampered by the lack of Foreign Office documents and by the generally uninformative nature of British memoirs. Nevertheless, the sources which do exist give a picture which, while still incomplete, is interesting for its own sake in showing how the Chamberlain Government met the problems of the Pacific, and also for the light which it sheds on Anglo-American relations in this period. Perhaps nowhere else was there as much consistent misunderstanding and disappointment between London and Washington as over the questions raised by the Sino-Japanese War. The Manchurian episode had left a legacy of distrust between the two countries; just enough was known about the approaches made by the Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, to the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, so that many on both sides of the Atlantic believed that Britain had rejected American offers for joint action against Japan in 1932, and that as a result nothing had prevented the Japanese advance. When Stimson's The Far Eastern Crisis appeared in 1936, it was read by many with more enthusiasm than accuracy, and seemed to confirm these views. In Britain it provided ammunition for the critics of the Government, while in the United States it increased the suspicions of those unwilling to trust Britain, and strengthened the trend to isolation.


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