Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-151
Author(s):  
Tanya Harmer

This article explains how Latin American governments responded to the Cuban revolution and how the “Cuban question” played out in the inter-American system in the first five years of Fidel Castro's regime, from 1959 to 1964, when the Organization of American States imposed sanctions against the island. Drawing on recently declassified sources from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and the United States, the article complicates U.S.-centric accounts of the inter-American system. It also adds to our understanding of how the Cold War was perceived within the region. The article makes clear that U.S. policymakers were not the only ones who feared Castro's triumph, the prospect of greater Soviet intervention, and the Cuban missile crisis. By seeking to understand why local states opposed Castro's ascendance and what they wanted to do to counter his regime, the account here offers new insight into the Cuban revolution's international impact and allows us to evaluate U.S. influence in the region during key years of the Cold War.


1998 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 1159
Author(s):  
Timothy Naftali ◽  
Edward C. Keefer ◽  
Charles S. Sampson ◽  
Louis J. Smith

1973 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-90
Author(s):  
Arthur P. Whitaker

Russia'S new naval presence in the Caribbean creates a situation somewhat like the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This time, however, the problem confronting the United States, though less urgent, is more difficult in the sense that it is more complex. Its complexity arises mainly from the fact that, as regards the Latin Americans, Russia's main objective must be political. Its use of military force to coerce them is out of the question, and the scale of its trade with all of them except Cuba is too small to provide economic leverage. On the other hand, its naval penetration of the Caribbean could reasonably be expected to help promote Soviet prestige and political influence throughout Latin America.


1964 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold L. Horelick

In A television interview not long after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, President Kennedy observed that both the United States and the Soviet Union had made serious miscalculations in the Cuban affair. “I don't think we expected that he [Khrushchev] would put the missiles in Cuba,” he said, “because it would have seemed such an imprudent action for him to take He obviously thought he could do it in secret and that the United States would accept it.”


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
James G. Hershberg

Though virtually ignored in the historiography, Brazil played an intriguing role in the politics and diplomacy of the Cuban missile crisis and in U.S. Cuban relations during the Kennedy administration. In the years after Fidel Castro took power, successive Brazilian governments tried secretly to mediate between Washington and Havana as their mutual confrontation intensified. Newly available U.S., Brazilian, Cuban, and other sources reveal that this role climaxed during the missile crisis, as John F. Kennedy clandestinely sought to employ Brazil to transmit a message to Castro. In turn, Brazil, which was also promoting a Latin American denuclearization scheme at the United Nations as a possible means of resolving the crisis, sought to broker a formula for U.S. Cuban reconciliation that would heighten the prestige of its own “independent”policy in the Cold War. Ultimately, these efforts failed, but they shed light on previously hidden aspects of both the missile crisis and the triangular U.S. Cuban-Brazilian relationship. This is the concluding part of a two-part article.


2020 ◽  
pp. 71-96
Author(s):  
Anne Searcy

Chapter 3 explores the Bolshoi Ballet’s 1962 tour of the United States, which took place during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the wake of the crisis, President Kennedy and his family staged numerous public meetings with the Bolshoi dancers to soothe the mounting political tensions. In the critical reception of the Bolshoi, however, a less conciliatory strain emerged. American critics understood the Soviet works through the lens of taste, a framework related to domestic struggles about the positioning of ballet in an aesthetic and class hierarchy. They disparagingly compared the Bolshoi’s new production of Spartacus to Hollywood epic films. These concerns were in turn related to a desire to foster the United States’ status as an emerging ideological empire.


2018 ◽  
pp. 122-151
Author(s):  
Rósa Magnúsdóttir

This chapter focuses on the official cultural exchange agreement from 1958 and its immediate outcome. The focus is first on Soviet reactions to the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959 and then Khrushchev’s trip to the United States, which aptly illustrates the changes in both official and popular discourses on America that had taken place since 1945. In 1959, Khrushchev emphasized the demonstrated capabilities of the Soviet and American people to fight for peace together: the Soviet-American alliance again entered the Soviet narrative of the Great Patriotic War, and even if hopes for a real thaw in Soviet-American relations came to nothing in the early 1960s, culminating in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was never again such a strong effort to control and contain images of the United States in the Soviet Union as there had been during the early Cold War.


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