Chapter 17. Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights

1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-545
Author(s):  
Geo. B. Davis

There is probably no branch of the laws of war which stands in greater need of explanatory comment than do the chapters relating to prisoners of war. The generation preceding the great peace conferences at The Hague was marked by a number of important wars of which continental Europe was the theater; during these conflicts the number of persons reduced to captivity surpassed all experience, as did the number of problems which arose in connection with their safe-keeping and repatriation; but during the entire period the regulations governing their administration and detention remained substantially unchanged. It is true that several European states caused their regulations in that regard to be revised, but as those regulations were strictly internal in character and had no external operation, save in the territory of the enemy which they held in military occupation, the condition of prisoners of war remained substantially unchanged. Indeed, until the condition of this unfortunate class was made the subject of conventional regulation at The Hague, but few important ameliorations had been brought about in their status since the activity of the Emperor Napoleon was brought to a close at the battle of Waterloo.


2019 ◽  
pp. 305-318
Author(s):  
Andrew Clapham

Human rights are said to be ill-adapted to times of armed conflict or for dealing with exceptional terrorist threats. Are human rights limited by the applicability of other branches of international law including the laws of war? Are there limits to the work human rights can usefully do in situations of threatened violence when their strict application is said to put lives at risk? This chapter tackles some of the contemporary arguments surrounding the limitations of human rights law in the face of the competing demands of winning the war and killing terrorists. It focuses on killings and detention inside and outside armed conflict. It also asks whether there are limits to the obligations we can impose on armed groups.


2019 ◽  
pp. 297-304
Author(s):  
Knut Traisbach

This chapter is a comment on a reflection by Frédéric Mégret on the limits of the laws of war. It proposes a jurisprudence of limits that focuses less on absolute ideals but on the compromising and enabling space ‘in-between’ these absolutes. Relying on Hannah Arendt’s views on different conceptions of humanity, the comment critically engages with a thinking in terms of inherent opposing interests and oscillations between them. A conception of limits as reproducing inherent absolutes is disabling and passive. Instead, limits can be understood as facilitating a space that enables us to judge and to act, also through compromise. International humanitarian law and international human rights law, perhaps more than other areas of international law, depend on preserving and actively seeking this politically relevant space.


1991 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-510
Author(s):  
Richard Dicker

Since its founding in May 1988, Africa Watch has documented and reported on human rights abuses in 13 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These findings are available in eight book-length reports and more than 70 newsletters, with new evidence available all the time on such topics as, for example, the suppression of information in the Sudan, violations of laws of war in Liberia, the devastating impact of the 15-year armed conflict in Angola, slavery in Mauritania, and interference with academic freedom in Zimbabwe.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL E. NEWELL

Abstract:The laws of war and international human rights law (IHRL) overlap, often with competing obligations. When two or more areas of the law overlap, political agents attempt to address these areas of ambiguity with interstitial rules. However, a lack of consensus on interstitial rules can destabilise the law, leading to increased contestation of legal norms and principles. Such is the case for international law in counterterrorism. Prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks (9/11), international agreements and US domestic practices placed counterterrorism within the framework of law enforcement. After 9/11, the Bush Administration replaced law enforcement with armed conflict and the laws of war as the dominant paradigm for counterterrorism, but this decision, among other legal justifications in the War on Terror, has been contested by the international legal community. As IHRL still applies in law enforcement operations, international law in counterterrorism now sits within a contested overlap of IHRL and the laws of war. The contestation of US policies in the War on Terror, including the use of drone strikes in particular, is a product of this unresolved overlap and the lack of clear interstitial rules. Lacking these rules, US counterterrorism policies risk undermining the rule of law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document