cia aquatone briefing paper for the joint chiefs of staff re guided missiles atomic energy and long range bombers august 28 1957 top secret eider chess

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-111
Author(s):  
Huw Dylan ◽  
David V. Gioe ◽  
Michael S. Goodman

This chapter is concerned with analysing the Soviet strategic threat. It opens with a discussion of how technological innovations creating relatively small movable weapons ensured that modern warfare had forever changed. Atomic intelligence became a matter of the highest priority, as did spying on the aircraft and missiles that would deliver these weapons. US intelligence underestimated the speed at which the USSR could develop and test an atomic weapon and overestimated the number of bombers capable of delivering such weapons. Developing better intelligence became a principal national priority. Document: AQUATONE Briefing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff RE Guided Missiles, Atomic Energy, and Long Range Bombers.


Author(s):  
Lawrence S. Kaplan

It was apparent from the beginning that the Foreign Operations Administration would have a short life. Arms control and disarmament played a larger role in Eisenhower’s thinking than did the management of foreign aid. After appointing Stassen his special assistant for disarmament, the president appeared to be unnerved by the complicated program he proposed. Eisenhower was particularly put off by the numbers—the 20,000 to 30,000 non-Russian inspectors on Russian soil that Stassen recommended. Dulles, too, derided those figures as unrealistic. Ultimately, according to historian H. W. Brands, Stassen failed to win the president’s support for his plan. Political scientist David Tal phrased Eisenhower’s disapproval more starkly, claiming that he “excoriated the plan” and that the only thing it achieved was to unite. the Atomic Energy Commission, the CIA, the Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff against Stassen’s ambitious program.


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