Predatory Pricing Under the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 2019 of Nigeria: An Unfinished Business

2021 ◽  
pp. 0003603X2110454
Author(s):  
Wiseman Ubochioma

Predatory pricing is one of the market practices that are prohibited in competition law. It occurs when a dominant firm sells its product at an unreasonably low price in order to eliminate competitors from the market. The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2019 of Nigeria prohibits this practice. This article, therefore, examines predatory pricing under the Act. It argues that the prescription of the cost-based principles of marginal and average cost as sole determinants of predatory pricing under the Act would not provide the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) and courts with the appropriate legal standard in determining predatory pricing. It suggests that the provision of the law should be reformed to include the principle of recoupment as a legal standard for imposing liability for the practice against defaulting firms. This will assist the FCCPC and courts to distinguish pro-competitive predatory pricing from anticompetitive predatory pricing.

2020 ◽  
pp. 284-314
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan ◽  
Vera Bermingham

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. Manufacturers and producers are liable for personal injury or damage to property caused by a defective product. The claimant will not only recover in contract for personal injury and property damage caused by the defective product, but he will also be compensated for the cost of replacing the product itself. The Consumer Protection Act 1987 of the UK involves a strict liability regime for defective products on a variety of potential defendants. This discusses the limitations of the tort system in providing compensation to a victim of harm caused by a defective product, and analyses the scope and limitations of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.


Author(s):  
Vera Bermingham ◽  
Carol Brennan

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. Manufacturers and producers are liable for personal injury or damage to property caused by a defective product. The claimant will not only recover in contract for personal injury and property damage caused by the defective product, but he will also be compensated for the cost of replacing the product itself. The Consumer Protection Act 1987 of the UK involves a strict liability regime for defective products on a variety of potential defendants. This discusses the limitations of the tort system in providing compensation to a victim of harm caused by a defective product, and analyses the scope and limitations of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 128-155
Author(s):  
Paul K. Gorecki

In a 2019 article in the Competition Law Journal Andrews and Fitzgerald argue that the decisional practice of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC), Ireland's competition agency, in clearing three Phase II mergers, demonstrates an ‘openness to resolving identified competition issues via remedy packages even in highly complex [merger] cases’. However, from a competition economics perspective, based on an examination of one these three cases, the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry transaction, the remedy package does not mitigate the competition concerns identified by the CCPC. Indeed, the remedy is likely to exacerbate these concerns. The merger should have been prohibited. This article suggests two ways in which the CCPC's merger procedures can be revised so as to ensure greater congruency between the procedural and competition economics perspectives.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-618
Author(s):  
Andrew Sylvester

Firms have a special cost advantage when they receive a discount or subsidy without assuming any risk or without being innovative. It is thus a received benefit, rather than an earned benefit, which results in a cost below the normal competitive level. The treatment of these special cost advantages has been a complicating factor when the firm in question is a dominant firm accused of charging an excessive price. The relevant benchmark against which to assess the price charged by the firm is the notional competitive market price, which in turn is linked to the cost of production under competitive conditions. This led to the Competition Appeal Court recommending that special cost advantages should be excluded from the cost build-up of the dominant firm when assessing excessive prices allegations. This would artificially inflate the dominant firm’s costs and reduce the likelihood of a finding against the firm. This recommendation by the CAC has a number of theoretical and practical problems, and it remains unclear how special cost advantages should be treated in South African competition law cases. 


2020 ◽  
pp. 241-258
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan ◽  
Vera Bermingham

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. Manufacturers and producers are liable for personal injury or damage to property caused by a defective product. The claimant will not only recover in contract for personal injury and property damage caused by the defective product, but he will also be compensated for the cost of replacing the product itself. The Consumer Protection Act 1987 involves a strict liability regime for defective products on a variety of potential defendants. This discusses the limitations of the tort system in providing compensation to a victim of harm caused by a defective product, and analyses the scope and limitations of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.


Competitio ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoltán Bara

Predatory pricing is one of the most debated issue among the many possibly abusive behaviors of a dominant firm. The general prohibition of the abuse of a dominant power in the competition law is meantto render more difficult to use that power but not to disable them to compete. The borderline between a rough but lawful competitive behavior of a dominant firm and the illegal abuse of the market power could sometimes be very narrow. One of that narrow line is associated with the so called predatory pricing or exclusionary pricing. One of the necessary preconditions for predatory pricing is that the firm is required to set the price below costs. But could it be a sufficient condition as well? Before the AKZO-case lawyers and economists seemed to agree that predatory pricing requires a second phase, after the dominant firm successfully got its prey in the first phase, the recoupment phase during which the dominant firm is able the regain all of his former losses occurred in the first phase. Since the AKZO-case, the Commission succeeded to convince Courts of the EU that it would be enough to make probable but not certain that there had to be a recoupment phase but we don’t have to wait until it really happens. Most of the economists still think that predatory pricing is meaningless without recoupment, and what is more important, it would be beneficial to the consumers during the first phase unless there is no certainty of a second phase. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classifications: K21, L12, L41


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