Conditioning the “Resource Curse”: Globalization, Human Capital, and Growth in Oil-Rich Nations

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 747-770 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus J. Kurtz ◽  
Sarah M. Brooks

Since the 1990s it has become conventional wisdom that an abundance of natural resources, most notably oil, is very likely to become a developmental “curse.” Recent scholarship, however, has begun to call into question this apparent consensus, drawing attention to the situations in which quite the opposite result appears to hold, namely, where resources become a developmental “blessing.” Research in this vein focuses predominantly on the domestic political and economic institutions that condition the growth effects of natural resource wealth. Less attention, however, has been paid to whether or how the context of economic integration has conditioned the domestic political economy of natural resource development. This article specifically addresses this theoretical disjuncture by arguing first that the developmental consequences of oil wealth are strongly conditioned by domestic human capital resources, which, where sizeable, make possible the management of resources in ways that encourage the absorption of technology and development of valuable new economic sectors. In the absence of robust human capital formation, however, the archetypal “resource curse” is likely to result. The authors argue moreover that international economic integration further amplifies the divergence between these outcomes by simultaneously raising the growth-enhancing effects of large stocks of human capital and by directly facilitating economic growth. Analysis of global data on growth and oil abundance (1979-2007) supports their main hypotheses that natural resource wealth can be either a “curse” or a “blessing” and that the distinction is conditioned by domestic and international factors, both amenable to change through public policy, namely, human capital formation and economic openness.

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 662-688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan M. Jensen ◽  
Noel P. Johnston

There is a growing literature on how natural resources affect both economic performance and political regimes. In this article the authors add to this literature by focusing on how natural resource wealth affects the incentives of governments to uphold contracts with foreign investors across all sectors. They argue that although all states suffer reputation costs from reneging on contracts, governments in natural-resource-dependent economies are less sensitive to these costs, leading to a greater probability of expropriation and contract disputes. Specifically, leaders weigh the benefits of reneging on contracts with investors against the reputation costs of openly violating agreements with firms. The authors’ theoretical model predicts a positive association between resource wealth and expropriation. Using a data set from the political risk insurance industry, the authors show that resource dependent economies have much higher levels of political risk.


Author(s):  
Bénédicte de la Brière ◽  
Deon Filmer ◽  
Dena Ringold ◽  
Dominic Rohner ◽  
Karelle Samuda ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212199197
Author(s):  
Robert G Blanton ◽  
Dursun Peksen

The ‘resource curse’ associated with natural resource abundance has long been a subject of study across multiple disciplines. Though much research has focused on possible effects of resource wealth on the formal economy, little is known about how such wealth affects the informal sector, a substantial portion of global economic activity. We posit that resource windfalls directly contribute to growth in the informal economy, as investment and spending patterns associated with such revenues limit opportunities within the formal sector and thus channel more labor and businesses into the informal sector. We test these claims across a panel of over 120 countries for the period 1985 to 2012. Across multiple model specifications, we find that resource wealth growth is associated with increased informal economic activity.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 477-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellis Goldberg ◽  
Erik Wibbels ◽  
Eric Mvukiyehe

The work linking natural resource wealth to authoritarianism and under-development suffers from several shortcomings. In this article, the authors outline those shortcomings and address them in a new empirical setting. Using a new data set for the U.S. states spanning 73 years and case studies of Texas and Louisiana, the authors are able to more carefully examine both the diachronic nature and comparative legs of the resource curse hypothesis than previous research has. They provide evidence that natural resource dependence contributes to slower economic growth, poorer developmental performance, and less competitive politics. Using this empirical setting, they also begin parsing the mechanisms that might explain the negative association between resource wealth and political and economic development. They draw implications from intranational findings for resource abundant countries across the world and suggest directions for future cross-national and cross-state work.


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