Reconstructing unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter

2019 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 272-283
Author(s):  
Gavin Leigh
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Current Definition ◽  
Specific Circumstance ◽  
Risk Of Injury ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Objective Risk ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Foreseeable Risk

In the last three decades, unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter has been subject to contradictory recommendations for reform. The debate has been dominated in that time by disagreement over the change of normative position, considered when attempting to justify liability for causing death in the commission of a crime with the objective risk of injury in the circumstances. The article suggests that this current definition of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter is defensible if appropriately interpreted by the Supreme Court. The interpretation requires an intended unlawful act and the foreseeable risk of injury from a specific circumstance known to the defendant before the unlawful act.

scholarly journals Defining Terrorism in Pakistani Anti-Terrorism Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 272-302
Author(s):  
Khurshid Iqbal ◽  
Niaz A. Shah
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Rights Violations ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Current Definition ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Human Rights Standards ◽  
Principle Of Legality

We critically examine the definition of ‘terrorism’ in the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan and as it is interpreted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan under the principle of legality in criminal and human rights law standards. 1 We conclude that the definition of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act does not pass the test of the principle of legality and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is inconsistent confounding the situation further. We recommend that Pakistan, following the principle of legality and human rights standards, amend the current definition of terrorism as an overbroad definition could be misused and abused leading to human rights violations.

Medical and Legal Issues Raised by the Protz Decision Issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 12-13
Author(s):  
LuAnn Haley ◽  
Marjorie Eskay-Auerbach
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Workers Compensation ◽  
Sixth Edition ◽  
Complex Concept ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Compensation Claims ◽  
Recent Edition ◽  
Impairment Ratings ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract Pennsylvania adopted the impairment rating provisions described in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) in 1996 as an exposure cap for employers seeking predictability and cost control in workers’ compensation claims. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down the Protz decision, which held that requiring physicians to apply the methodology set forth in the most recent edition of the AMA Guides reflected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the American Medical Association. The decision eliminates the impairment-rating evaluation (IRE) mechanism under which claimants were assigned an impairment rating under the most recent edition of the AMA Guides. The AMA Guides periodically are revised to include the most recent scientific evidence regarding impairment ratings, and the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, acknowledges that impairment is a complex concept that is not yet defined in a way that readily permits an evidence-based definition of assessment. The AMA Guides should not be considered standards frozen in time simply to withstand future scrutiny by the courts; instead, workers’ compensation acts could state that when a new edition of the AMA Guides is published, the legislature shall review and consider adopting the new edition. It appears unlikely that the Protz decision will be followed in other jurisdictions: Challenges to using the AMA Guides in assessing workers’ compensation claims have been attempted in three states, and all attempts failed.

scholarly journals Role and Place of Higher Specialized Courts in the Judicial System of Ukraine

2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-257
Author(s):  
V. V. Chumak
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Legal Documents ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Specialized Courts ◽  
Definition Of

The role and place of higher specialized courts in the judicial system of Ukraine have been studied and determined. The author has studied such main categories as “judicial system of Ukraine”, “judiciary”, “judicial system” and “judicial power”. The judicial system of Ukraine has been established. The normative and legal base of functioning of highest specialized courts of Ukraine has been characterized. The author has provided own definition of the categories “judicial system of Ukraine” and “judicial power of Ukraine”. The author has offered to understand the category of “judicial system of Ukraine” as the totality of all hierarchically structured elements of the system (courts), which are endowed with exclusive competence to administer justice, built on the principles of territoriality and specialization, are defined by law and united by general principles of their organization and activity. In turn, the concept of “judicial power of Ukraine” is defined as the activity of courts (judicial system) to administer justice and to perform their professional duties within the limits and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine in accordance with international and legal documents. It has been determined that highest specialized courts in the judicial system of Ukraine are the Supreme Court on Intellectual Property Issues and the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court. It has been concluded that highest specialized courts in the judicial system of Ukraine play an important role in the holistic mechanism of the entire judicial system, since they are endowed with exclusive competence to consider and decide cases on the merits of certain categories, and their activities are determined at the level of a separate regulatory act, which determines their legal status, and hence their place in the judicial system of Ukraine.

Dissemination of damaging information (defamation) as a type of civil tort: concept definition

2020 ◽  
pp. 378-382
Author(s):  
Valeriya Smorchkova
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
Personal Information ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Foreign Countries ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Definition Of

We consider such category as defamation, which is widespread in many foreign countries. Defamation is the dissemination of damaging information, which, however, is true. This concept has become widespread in the last century, many states have adopted special legislation that mediates relations in this area. For example, the United Kingdom has the “Defamation Act 1996” and Singapore has the “Defamation Ordinance 1960”. We emphasize that in the same 1960s in our country “the system of defamation seemed absolutely unacceptable and contrary to the spirit of society”. In the course of study, comparative legal methods are used to analyze the legislation of states with the Anglo-Saxon and Romano-Germanic legal system. Based on the study of the doctrinal points of view of scientists and the positions of higher courts, the definition of this category is formed from the position of civil tort. The following definition is proposed: “Defamation is a violation of civil legislation, which consists in the dissemination of false information damaging the honor, dignity and business reputation of a person and also the dissemination of truthful personal information, the disclosure of which violates the conservation law are listed in the intangible benefits of the citizens”. We analyze the provisions of the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of February 24, 2005 no. 3 “On judicial practice in cases of protecting the honor and dignity of citizens, as well as the business reputation of citizens and legal entities”. We conclude that the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation borrowed advanced provisions from the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.

Overview

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shira Tarrant
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
The United States ◽  
French Film ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Definition Of

What Is the Definition of Pornography? In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States faced a controversy over whether Louis Malle’s French film The Lovers violated the First Amendment prohibition against obscene speech. In determining what exactly distinguishes pornography from obscenity,...

Overview

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shira Tarrant
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
The United States ◽  
French Film ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Definition Of

What Is the Definition of Pornography? In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States faced a controversy over whether Louis Malle’s French film The Lovers violated the First Amendment prohibition against obscene speech. In determining what exactly distinguishes pornography from obscenity,...

12. Theft

2020 ◽  
pp. 356-406
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter examines the law governing theft. It considers the extent to which the criminal law of theft conflicts with civil law concepts of property; whether it is possible to steal property that belongs to oneself; the types of property that may be stolen; and the extent to which it is possible to provide a definition of ‘dishonesty’. The test for dishonesty has been fundamentally altered by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, developments which are analysed in this chapter.

Is There a Need for an Amending Power Theory?

1978 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude Klein
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Academic Writing ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Power Theory ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Opinion Writing

In his case note on the famous Bergmann decision of the Supreme Court, Professor Akzin wrote: While the Court's conclusions seem to be perfectly justified and went so far as they could in the circumstances, the reasoning in its decision shows serious flaws… [others] seem to have sprung from the Court's unwillingness to look for help to the very thorough discussion of the issues by several Israeli scholars, notably Messrs. Sternberg, Akzin, Klinghoffer and Rubinstein. The dignity of the Court would not have suffered if the opinion-writing judge had taken a look at academic writing in a case where precedents offer little or no guidance.These remarks probably express the most original view ever put forward on this land mark case. They emphasize the crux of the complex constitutional problem discussed in the Bergmann case, i.e., the definition of the legal nature of the basic laws in the legal order of Israel. The extremely abstract questions involved in that discussion, indeed, the most abstract that exist in public law, concern the definition of the nature of the power which adopts the Constitution and more specifically, of the power which amends the Constitution.

Calling the farce on minority schools

2018 ◽  
pp. 57-70
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Private Schools ◽  
Compulsory Education ◽  
Quality Education ◽  
Minority Status ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Education Act ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

This chapter looks at the Indian Supreme Court's exemption of minority schools from the requirements of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 (RTE Act). It argues that the consequences of the minority school exemptions from the RTE Act by the Supreme Court have led to the unfortunate result of a large number of private schools falsely appealing for minority status. This is made possible by the ambiguous definition of what constitutes a minority institution and also the lack of clarity as to who is the authority that would declare schools to be minority schools. There is therefore an urgent need to review the definition of what constitutes a minority institution. More importantly, it is crucial to argue that minority schools should not be exempted from the norms and standards prescribed in the RTE Act that are necessary for quality education.

scholarly journals How Do You Qualify as a Whistleblower Under The Dodd-Frank Act? Blowing the Whistle on a Circuit Split

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-130
Author(s):  
Hugo S. W. Farmer
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Consumer Protection ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Wall Street ◽  
Group V ◽  
Consumer Protection Act ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Definition Of

            Recently, a circuit split has arisen with regard to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The circuit split concerns the question of what it takes for an individual to qualify as a “whistleblower” under the terms of the statute. This circuit split is surprising, as the Dodd- Frank Act purports to answer this question itself by providing a definition of this term, a definition which the Fifth Circuit has treated as being conclusive. Nonetheless, the Second and the Ninth Circuits have held that with respect to some, but not all, of the Dodd-Frank Act, this statutory “whistleblower” definition does not apply. Shortly, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve the matter when it hears an appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc. This article provides three broad reasons why the Supreme Court should reject the Second and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations. First, the interpretation endorsed by the Second and Ninth Circuits is the result of a flawed exercise in statutory interpretation that incorrectly applies principles recently set down by the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell, and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. Secondly, while the Second and Ninth Circuits rejected the Fifth Circuits’ interpretation on the basis that it withholds the protection of the Dodd-Frank Act from auditors and attorneys, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ preferred interpretations also fail to protect auditors and attorneys. Finally, the policy reasons in favor of extending the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower protections to auditors and attorneys are insufficiently strong to warrant departing from the natural meaning of the statutory language at issue.   

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