Calling the farce on minority schools

This chapter looks at the Indian Supreme Court's exemption of minority schools from the requirements of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 (RTE Act). It argues that the consequences of the minority school exemptions from the RTE Act by the Supreme Court have led to the unfortunate result of a large number of private schools falsely appealing for minority status. This is made possible by the ambiguous definition of what constitutes a minority institution and also the lack of clarity as to who is the authority that would declare schools to be minority schools. There is therefore an urgent need to review the definition of what constitutes a minority institution. More importantly, it is crucial to argue that minority schools should not be exempted from the norms and standards prescribed in the RTE Act that are necessary for quality education.

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-464
Author(s):  
A. A. Martsun

The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution of December 21, 2017 No. 54 “On some issues of application of the provisions of Chapter 24 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation on the change of persons in an obligation on the basis of a transaction", which sets out important clarifications regarding the application standards contained in this chapter. At the same time, not all issues related to the assignment of the claim were resolved by the above resolution. One of these issues is the definition of the term “essential value of the identity of the creditor” or approximate criteria for such a value in the context of the need to obtain the latter’s consent to the assignment of rights. The presence of this problem is rightly indicated in the scientific literature [3, p. 549–655, 688–713]. The Author examines the Model Rules of European Private Law and the UNIDROIT principles in order to find a solution to the problem. Attention is drawn to the problem of determining the essential value of the creditor for the debtor in the case of assignment of the right of claim, as well as to the consequences of making the assignment without the consent of the debtor under an obligation in which the identity of the creditor was essential.In the Author's opinion, the identity of the creditor is recognized as essential for the debtor when the connection between the debtor and the creditor arose as a result of the conclusion of a transaction that has a personallyconfidential nature, or if the connection arose during the conclusion of other transactions in the case when the connection was broken during the execution assignment of rights entails or may entail a significant deprivation for the debtor of what he had the right to count on when concluding a transaction with the creditor.In addition, situations are considered that are an exception to the presumption of the absence of a significant value of the creditor's personality for the assignment of claims for monetary obligations. The author also points out that the consequence of the transaction on the assignment of rights without the consent of the debtor in the context of paragraph 2 of Art. 388 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation is the nullity of the transaction on the basis of paragraph 2 of Art. 168 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 156-180
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Discrimination is prohibited in different provisions of the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda (the Constitution), in different pieces of legislation and in international and regional human rights treaties ratified by Rwanda. According to the 2003 Constitution, one of the fundamental principles which have to be upheld by the State is the ‘eradication of discrimination and divisionism based on ethnicity, region or on any other ground as well as promotion of national unity’. Article 15 of the Constitution provides for equality before the law and Article 16 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination and it provides for the grounds on which a person shall not be discriminated against. Rwanda is also one of the very few African countries whose constitutions criminalise discrimination and different laws have been enacted to deal with the offence of discrimination. The Supreme Court of Rwanda, the highest court in the country, has handed down decisions on Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. The purpose of this article is to analyse these decisions and illustrate how the Supreme Court has dealt with the issues such as the definition of discrimination and the difference between discrimination and differentiation. The author also discusses the issues that the Rwandan judiciary and prosecutors are likely to face when dealing with the offence of discrimination.


Author(s):  
Akhileshwar Pathak

Ajay Hasia and few others failed to secure admission to Regional Engineering College, Srinagar. They challenged before the Supreme Court that the admission process was arbitrary and violative of the Fundamental Right of equality in Article 14 of the Constitution. The right, however, is available only against the ‘state’ as defined in Article 12. The definition of ‘state’ includes ‘other authorities.’ The term ‘other authorities’ has been subject to judicial interpretation and come to include instrumentality or agency of the government. The Ajay Hasia Case consolidated the developing law and formulated that not only the bodies created by an Act but also bodies created under a law, like societies under the Societies Registration Act can be ‘other authorities’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Michael Lafleur ◽  
Prachi Srivastava

India’s Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 compels private schools to reserve a proportion of their seats for free for disadvantaged children. Although controversial, it is idealized as an equity measure for inclusion in and through education. This small-scale study, feeding into a larger research project, details children’s accounts of their everyday lived experiences at private schools in Delhi. Children reported labelling students by teachers as ‘naughty’ or academically ‘weak’ or ‘incapable’ as a pervasive practice. These ‘designated identities’ (Sfard & Prusak, 2005) were reinforced by teachers and through peer interactions. They were internalized by participants about their peers and affected how they interacted with them. Peers who were labelled were reported to be stigmatized. Surprisingly, neither caste nor gender were mentioned as explicitly marking participant experiences. The paper also discusses the participatory methods employed in the study as a further contribution to the literature on private schooling. Data are from participatory ‘draw-and-talk’ sessions conducted with 16 children in 2015-16 from marginalized backgrounds, accessing six different private schools in one catchment area, half of whom secured a free private school seat. Participants were from amongst the first cohorts eligible for the free seats provision.  


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 12-13
Author(s):  
LuAnn Haley ◽  
Marjorie Eskay-Auerbach

Abstract Pennsylvania adopted the impairment rating provisions described in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) in 1996 as an exposure cap for employers seeking predictability and cost control in workers’ compensation claims. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down the Protz decision, which held that requiring physicians to apply the methodology set forth in the most recent edition of the AMA Guides reflected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the American Medical Association. The decision eliminates the impairment-rating evaluation (IRE) mechanism under which claimants were assigned an impairment rating under the most recent edition of the AMA Guides. The AMA Guides periodically are revised to include the most recent scientific evidence regarding impairment ratings, and the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, acknowledges that impairment is a complex concept that is not yet defined in a way that readily permits an evidence-based definition of assessment. The AMA Guides should not be considered standards frozen in time simply to withstand future scrutiny by the courts; instead, workers’ compensation acts could state that when a new edition of the AMA Guides is published, the legislature shall review and consider adopting the new edition. It appears unlikely that the Protz decision will be followed in other jurisdictions: Challenges to using the AMA Guides in assessing workers’ compensation claims have been attempted in three states, and all attempts failed.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”


1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-288
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

On February 15, 1943, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, took the seat on the Supreme Court vacated by the resignation in October, 1942, of Mr. Justice Byrnes. There were no other changes in the Court's personnel. Disagreement among the justices abated somewhat. In only a dozen cases of importance did either four or three justices dissent, as against some thirty cases in the last term. The Court overruled two earlier decisions, both recent; and the reversal in each case was made possible by the vote of Mr. Justice Rutledge.A. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER1. WAR POWER-CIVIL VERSUS MILITARY AUTHORITYWest Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese-American Citizens. In February, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the creation of military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to which the right of persons to enter, remain in, or leave should be subject to such regulations as the military authorities might prescribe. On March 2, the entire West Coast to an average depth of forty miles was set up as Military Area No. 1 by the Commanding General in that area, and the intention was announced to evacuate from it persons of suspected loyalty, alien enemies, and all persons, aliens and citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 299-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Rabin ◽  
Yuval Shany

AbstractThis article addresses the constitutional discourse surrounding the status of economic and social rights in Israel. It examines the principal interpretive strategies adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the 1992 basic laws (in particular, with respect to the right to human dignity) and criticizes the Court's reluctance to apply analogous strategies to incorporate economic and social rights into Israeli constitutional law. Potential explanations for this biased approach are also critically discussed. The ensuing outcome is a constitutional imbalance in Israeli law, which perpetuates the unjustified view that economic and social rights are inherently inferior to their civil and political counterparts, and puts in question Israel's compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the same time, encouraging recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the YATED and Marciano judgments, indicate growing acceptance on the part of the Court of the role of economic and social rights in Israeli constitutional law, and raise hopes for a belated judicial change of heart concerning the need to protect at least a ‘hard core’ of economic and social rights. Still, the article posits that the possibilities of promoting the constitutional status of economic and social rights through case-to-case litigation are limited and calls for the renewal of the legislation procedures of draft Basic Law: Social Rights in the Knesset.


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