Wage Policy and Wage Determination in 1983

1984 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Mulvey
1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-602

The primary emphasis of the report of the Director-General of the International Labor Organization to the thirty-fourth session of the Conference was the issue of wage policy in conditions of full employment. The Conference debate on this question, stimulated by the report Mr. Morse hoped, would help ILO member countries to arrive at wage-price policies “designed to promote the best interests both of workers and of the community as a whole, in conditions of full employment and scarcity of labor.” The problem of wage determination had been receiving renewed public attention, mainly owing to the desire to include restraint of wage increases in a program designed to minimize the possible inflationary effects of full employment, economic development and rearmament. There existed also a belief that adjustments in the wage structures of most countries were needed to provide increased incentives for workers to acquire skill, to work harder and to man the essential industries where labor was particularly scarce.


1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
K.J. Hancock

The historical development of Australian wage policy from the turn of the century to the 1950s is traced, with the focus on the growth of institutions and procedures for wage fixation. While state and federal bodies are covered, special attention is given to the constitution of the Commonwealth Court (as it then was) and the varying wage decisions it made. The concept of "flow-on" did not achieve its modern meaning or ease of application till 1941: this sup ports the contention that the techniques of wage determination develop slowly. Many legislative proposals for change have been made but very few have been put into practice; an analysis of the successes and failures reveals the evolving relationship between the government and the arbitration system. The conclusion is that the pursuit of industrial peace through consistency and system is favour able to the development of a wage policy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 281-305
Author(s):  
Samuel Dahan¹

This article uses the concept of ‘institutional learning’ to make a legal case for a stronger wage policy at the EMU level. This article takes the view that an inherent asymmetry in the EMU, namely the presence of a unified monetary policy without a commensurate coordination of wage-setting mechanisms, contributed to the development of the crisis. The latent consequences of this flaw—diverging (wage) growth and cost competitiveness—were brought into full view when the global financial crisis struck. A unique wage-coordination process has already become institutionalised at the EU level through the European Semester: wage and spending cuts supplant the role of currency depreciation as a means of addressing external economic shocks and competitiveness gaps. We argue that the new wage coordination process constitutes a step in the right direction insofar as the EU has learned from its mistake, namely creating a currency union without any transnational wage determination mechanism. However, this paper makes a legal and institutional case for a more reflexive and solidaristic approach to wage coordination. In order to do so, we take the economic view that stronger EU labour coordination is not likely to diminish competitiveness. While market wisdom would seem to support the view that decentralised collective bargaining systems performs better, evidence suggests that solidaristic wage-setting offers a critical means of channelling economic policy into a model less narrowly focused on labour cost. Beyond the economic debate, there is a legal case to be made in favour of stronger wage bargaining that can reconcile the markets with labour law in the EMU. It is the role of lawyers to investigate possible legal avenues towards achieving a more appropriate solution that is compatible with the Treaty of Lisbon as well as with the goal of competitiveness. Our project does not advocate Treaty changes; instead we use the concept of ‘institutional layering/learning’ to reinforce already-existing reflexive approaches such as the Macroeconomic Dialogue (MED) in order to create a multi-level wage determination strategy that mediates a genuine facilitation process between the Commission, the European Central Bank and the unions.


1981 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wright

2004 ◽  
pp. 66-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Kapelyushnikov

The paper examines a specific model of wage-setting evolved in Russia under transition. Using new survey data author reveals paradoxical characteristics of wage-setting mechanisms at Russian industrial enterprises: very high union and collective agreement coverage; nearly unilateral control of managers over wage determination; close correlation between earnings and enterprises' performance; voluntary utilization of wage standards established by the state. The special section explores effects of fulfilling a new provision stipulated for by the recently adopted Labor Code to raise minimum wage to the subsistence minimum level. The author concludes that wage-setting in the Russian labor market is at odds with a textbook competitive model and poorly fits into many other sophisticated theoretical schemes (such as labor-managed firms, bargaining models etc.).


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