Double Couponing and Retail Pricing in a Couponed Product Category

A common practice in many supermarkets is double, and in some cases, triple couponing. Retail managers adopting this policy react emotionally to couponing by manufacturers: They “won't tolerate dumping in this marketplace by manufacturers who run 25 cents coupons elsewhere, but 50 cents coupons [t]here.” How justified are retail managers in their claims? Does it really benefit manufacturers to do this? How is the retail pricing of the category affected by the double-couponing policy? And, what happens to the competing retailer that does not double coupon? The authors provide answers to these questions. They use a game theoretic model to (1) study the effects of double couponing, (2) derive the equilibrium level of couponing by manufacturers, and (3) derive the double-couponing retailer's retail pricing of brands in the category, as well as the pricing of the competing retailer that does not follow the double-couponing policy. The authors then test their results using primary data on retail prices.

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Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

Arthaniti-Journal of Economic Theory and Practice ◽

10.1177/0976747921989171 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 097674792198917

Author(s):

Nikita Jain

Keyword(s):

Theoretic Model ◽

Wrongful Discharge ◽

Equilibrium Level ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

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Fraud and Monitoring in Non-competitive Elections

Political Science Research and Methods ◽

10.1017/psrm.2014.9 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

pp. 21-41 ◽

Cited By ~ 22

Author(s):

Andrew T. Little

Keyword(s):

Theoretic Model ◽

The Core ◽

Political Interaction ◽

International Monitoring ◽

Equilibrium Level ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Incumbent Regime

This article develops a game-theoretic model that reconciles three facts: (1) fraud is pervasive in non-competitive elections, (2) domestic and international monitoring of elections have become nearly universal and (3) incumbent regimes often invite monitoring and still cheat. The incumbent regime commits fraud to manipulate the information generated by a non-competitive election before a political interaction with some audience. The audience expects fraud, so the incumbent commits fraud because she would appear weak if not doing so. Increasing the visibility of fraud with monitoring is valuable because it lowers the equilibrium level of costly fraud without changing how popular the incumbent appears. The core results hold under multiple extensions, which produce a rich set of comparative static results.

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Group Size and Collective Action

Comparative Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0010414001034001003 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 34 (1) ◽

pp. 63-93 ◽

Cited By ~ 123

Author(s):

ARUN AGRAWAL ◽

SANJEEV GOYAL

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Group Size ◽

Third Party ◽

Collective Good ◽

Primary Data ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Distinctive Aspect ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Large Groups

This article examines the hypothesis that group size is inversely related to successful collective action. A distinctive aspect of the article is that it combines the analysis of primary data collected by the authors with a game-theoretic model. The model considers a group of people protecting a commonly owned resource from excessive exploitation. The authors view monitoring of individual actions as a collective good and focus on third-party monitoring. We argue that the costs of monitoring rise more than proportionately as group size increases. This factor along with lumpiness in the monitoring technology yields the following theoretical conclusion: Medium-sized groups are more likely than small or large groups to provide third-party monitoring. The authors find that the empirical evidence is consistent with this theoretical result.

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Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2017-3-120-130 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 120-130

Author(s):

A. Lyasko

Keyword(s):

Social Control ◽

Institutional Economics ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Transfer System ◽

Value Transfer ◽

Partner Interaction ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

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