Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

The Impact of Ideology on Disinvestment Decisions of a Coalition

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 821-849
Author(s):  
Ritika Jain ◽  
Shubhro Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Ideological Difference

We build a two-stage game theoretic model to capture the effect of ideologies of parties in a coalition on disinvestment decisions. We focus on three specific aspects of ideology—ideology score of the coalition, ideology dispersion of the coalition, and ideology difference between the center and the state where the enterprise is located. The benchmark two-party coalition predicts that a left government prefers less disinvestment than a right one more often than not. However, there may be a case where moving toward the left end of the ideology spectrum may raise disinvestment incidence. Similarly, a coalition with ideologically similar parties favors privatization more frequently than one in which parties are more diverse. However, for a narrow parametric range, the effect may be reversed. Low ideological difference between the center and the state in which the enterprise is located improves disinvestment incidence. Finally, we extend the model to three-party coalitions.

scholarly journals Fraud and Monitoring in Non-competitive Elections

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew T. Little
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
The Core ◽  
Political Interaction ◽  
International Monitoring ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Incumbent Regime

This article develops a game-theoretic model that reconciles three facts: (1) fraud is pervasive in non-competitive elections, (2) domestic and international monitoring of elections have become nearly universal and (3) incumbent regimes often invite monitoring and still cheat. The incumbent regime commits fraud to manipulate the information generated by a non-competitive election before a political interaction with some audience. The audience expects fraud, so the incumbent commits fraud because she would appear weak if not doing so. Increasing the visibility of fraud with monitoring is valuable because it lowers the equilibrium level of costly fraud without changing how popular the incumbent appears. The core results hold under multiple extensions, which produce a rich set of comparative static results.

Advertising in a social network as a signal of quality

2021 ◽  
pp. 118-139
Author(s):  
Kamilla Timerbulatova
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Opinion Leaders ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

Advertising in a social network has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other types of advertising, and which may be of key importance in answering the question about its ability to serve as a signal of quality. In the game-theoretic model presented in this paper, the monopolist sends an advertising signal to bloggers who act as “opinion leaders” in the social network. The latter, in turn, make decisions about posting advertising messages on their blogs, taking into account the impact that this action may have on their reputation. The paper investigates the question of when advertising can serve as a reliable signal of quality in a separating equilibrium.

scholarly journals Knowledge Spillovers through Networks of Scientists

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1989-2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Zacchia
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Spillovers ◽  
Relative Proportion ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Private Return ◽  
Innovation Outcomes

Abstract In this article, I directly test the hypothesis that interactions between inventors of different firms drive knowledge spillovers. I construct a network of publicly traded companies in which each link is a function of the relative proportion of two firms’ inventors who have former patent collaborators in both organizations. I use this measure to weigh the impact of R&D performed by each firm on the productivity and innovation outcomes of its network linkages. An empirical concern is that the resulting estimates may reflect unobserved, simultaneous determinants of firm performance, network connections, and external R&D. I address this problem with an innovative IV strategy, motivated by a game-theoretic model of firm interaction. I instrument the R&D of one firm’s connections with that of other firms that are sufficiently distant in network space. With the resulting spillover estimates, I calculate that among firms connected to the network the marginal social return of R&D amounts to approximately 112% of the marginal private return.

Transaction Utility and Quality Choice

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sajeesh Sajeesh ◽  
Sang-Young Song
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Consumer Decision Making ◽  
Firm Strategies ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Quality Choice ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThis paper uses a game-theoretic model to examine the role of reference price for firms that vary in their quality positioning in competing for customers. Reference prices provide consumers with additional components of utility. Building on previous research on the impact of consumer decision making on firm strategies, we focus on how firms choose their positioning when consumer utility is driven not only by acquisition utility but also by the transaction utility associated with the purchase and how this, in turn, affects firms’ pricing decisions and profits. Considering a competition between two firms, this paper shows that the firm with higher product quality provides greater discounts to consumers. We also show that when firms are allowed to set a high ‘regular’ price, product differentiation is greater between the firms, and price competition is less intense. Furthermore, under some conditions, the profits of both firms can be higher than the benchmark case (when the effects of transaction utility are ignored).

Behavioral Consequence of Exploitation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frédérique Dubois ◽  
Philipp Heeb ◽  
Sasha R. X. Dall ◽  
Luc-Alain Giraldeau
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Population Structure ◽  
Behavioral Ecology ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Behavioral Consequence ◽  
Major Consequence ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

In behavioral ecology, the behavioral consequences of individuals (exploiters) using the investments of others (investors), rather than investing time or effort in procuring a resource themselves, has been traditionally studied using the producer–scrounger (PS) model—a simple evolutionary game theoretic model in which producers (investors) search for resources while scroungers (exploiters) use the resources found by producers. A key assumption in the PS model is that the producer remains passive toward scroungers. As the presence of scroungers is costly, evidence is reviewed that one major consequence of having exploiters is the adoption by producers of strategies that reduce the benefits of scroungers, giving rise to countermeasures by scroungers. Scroungers also affect population structure by generating consistent differences among individuals and affecting spatial preferences within groups. Reviewing the impact of scrounging on populations should help generate parallels to explore the consequences of exploitative behavior in economics and public health.

scholarly journals The impact of competition on elephant musth strategies: A game–theoretic model

2017 ◽  
Vol 417 ◽  
pp. 109-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Max Wyse ◽  
Ian C.W. Hardy ◽  
Lisa Yon ◽  
Mike Mesterton-Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Double Couponing and Retail Pricing in a Couponed Product Category

1995 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trichy V. Krishnan ◽  
Ram C. Rao
Keyword(s):  
Product Category ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Retail Pricing ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Retail Managers ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

A common practice in many supermarkets is double, and in some cases, triple couponing. Retail managers adopting this policy react emotionally to couponing by manufacturers: They “won't tolerate dumping in this marketplace by manufacturers who run 25 cents coupons elsewhere, but 50 cents coupons [t]here.” How justified are retail managers in their claims? Does it really benefit manufacturers to do this? How is the retail pricing of the category affected by the double-couponing policy? And, what happens to the competing retailer that does not double coupon? The authors provide answers to these questions. They use a game theoretic model to (1) study the effects of double couponing, (2) derive the equilibrium level of couponing by manufacturers, and (3) derive the double-couponing retailer's retail pricing of brands in the category, as well as the pricing of the competing retailer that does not follow the double-couponing policy. The authors then test their results using primary data on retail prices.

scholarly journals Globalization mitigates the risk of conflict caused by strategic territory

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (39) ◽  
pp. e2105624118
Author(s):  
Quentin Gallea ◽  
Dominic Rohner
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Trade Openness ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Baseline Risk ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Important Policy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Globalization is routinely blamed for various ills, including fueling conflict in strategic locations. To investigate whether these accusations are well founded, we have built a database to assess any given location’s strategic importance. Consistent with our game-theoretic model of strategic interaction, we find that overall fighting is more frequent in strategic locations close to maritime choke points (e.g., straits or capes), but that booming world trade openness considerably reduces the risks of conflict erupting in such strategic locations. The impact is quantitatively sizable, as moving one SD (1,100 km) closer to a choke point increases the conflict likelihood by 25% of the baseline risk in periods of low globalization, while reducing it during world trade booms. Our results have important policy implications for supranational coordination.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

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