William Charlton, Society and God: Culture and Creed from a Philosophical Standpoint

Theology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 124 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-152
Author(s):  
Tony Carroll
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Standpoint

AN INTENSIONAL LEIBNIZ SEMANTICS FOR ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
KLAUS GLASHOFF
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Formal System ◽  
Aristotelian Logic ◽  
Categorical Logic ◽  
Characteristic Numbers ◽  
Formal Syntax ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
Classical Philosophy

Since Frege’s predicate logical transcription of Aristotelian categorical logic, the standard semantics of Aristotelian logic considers terms as standing for sets of individuals. From a philosophical standpoint, this extensional model poses problems: There exist serious doubts that Aristotle’s terms were meant to refer always to sets, that is, entities composed of individuals. Classical philosophy up to Leibniz and Kant had a different view on this question—they looked at terms as standing for concepts (“Begriffe”). In 1972, Corcoran presented a formal system for Aristotelian logic containing a calculus of natural deduction, while, with respect to semantics, he still made use of an extensional interpretation. In this paper we deal with a simple intensional semantics for Corcoran’s syntax—intensional in the sense that no individuals are needed for the construction of a complete Tarski model of Aristotelian syntax. Instead, we view concepts as containing or excluding other, “higher” concepts—corresponding to the idea which Leibniz used in the construction of his characteristic numbers. Thus, this paper is an addendum to Corcoran’s work, furnishing his formal syntax with an adequate semantics which is free from presuppositions which have entered into modern interpretations of Aristotle’s theory via predicate logic.

Are Special Education Programs Unjust to Nondisabled Children?: Justice, Equality, and the Distribution of Education

1998 ◽  
Vol 180 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Nathanson
Keyword(s):  
Special Education ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Special Needs ◽  
Children With Disabilities ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Education Programs ◽  
Social Consensus ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
The Difference

This article deals in depth with perhaps the most troubling education issue of the day—funding and proper distribution of educational resources. How is the money raised and how is its allocation decided? Can the ideals of both justice and equality be served? Is “extra” spending on behalf of children with special needs justified? Stephen Nathanson raises the central questions and, approaching them from a moral-philosophical standpoint, presents and evaluates the arguments of those who defend extra spending for children with disabilities and those who believe that “unequal” spending violates the principle of justice. Nathanson treats various theories of distributive justice—entitlement, utilitarianism, the “difference principle,” and the “decent level” idea. In focusing on the latter, he contends that social consensus developed around “decent level” may be the touchstone, more helpful than any rationale (or rhetoric) in satisfying the claims of justice and equality.

scholarly journals John Dewey's conception of application of law in its philosophical and social context

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-249
Author(s):  
Bojan Spaic
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual History ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Cultural Background ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Critical Approach ◽  
Legal Process ◽  
Application Of Law ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
American Society ◽  
Long Course

John Dewey, one of the most important thinkers of pragmatism, elaborated a specific conception of law partially and gradually in the long course of his intellectual career. This part of his broader philosophical outlook is analyzed here through one of its most important segments - application of law - and interpreted in its historical, social and cultural background. The first part of the article concentrates on the 'objective' (cultural, social and historical) reasons for giving emphasis to the application of law in his legal philosophy. This domination of the application of law in his legal thought is derived from the needs of a rapidly changing structure of the American society in the first half of the XX century, and theoretically has its place in an all around phenomenon in American intellectual history in general that Morton White terms antiformalism. The second part of the article analyses his legal conceptions and their connection with the general philosophical position of this pragmatist. Dewey formed his conception of application of law as an integral part of his broader philosophical standpoint, and especially on the basis of his radical reinterpretation of logic and truth. Since his understanding of the legal process has roots in his experimentalist conception of logic that encompasses the apprehension of the process of experimentation as the only warrant for the validity of propositions (that the 'truth' of a proposition is built in the process of its verification), he regards application as conditio sine qua non of the legality of norms in general. This leads us to the last part of the article that scathes possible lines of critical approach to Dewey's work in this field. The view that the legality of norms is derived from their application is in legal theory often regarded as sociologism, inasmuch as it disregards the normative aspects of the legal process and emphasizes the social ones to the point of making it void of the normative aspects in the totality of the process itself. The proper understanding of possible lines of criticism of Dewey's standpoints in legal philosophy guides us back again to confront his conceptions with their cultural background, with which the article begins.

The Problem of Psychologism and the Idea of a Phenomenological Science

Husserl ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 15-48
Author(s):  
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
Keyword(s):  
Decisive Role ◽  
Initial Response ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint

This chapter is a detailed discussion of the nature of psychologism and the efficacy of Husserl’s critique thereof. It argues, first, that the critique of logical psychologism in the “Prolegomena” reveals that the problem raised by psychologism is fundamentally one of determining the proper philosophical standpoint and, second, that this critique played a central and decisive role in the development of Husserl’s phenomenology. The proper standpoint incorporates a commitment to the presuppositionless description of essential structures of experience, and from this perspective, Husserl saw that his initial response to psychologism was inadequate insofar as it focused on the consequences of psychologism rather than its presuppositions.

Metaphysics, Moral Sense, and the Pragmatism of the Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna L. Blumenthal
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
American Constitution ◽  
Brain Sciences ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Sense Philosophy

The authors of these insightful and stimulating commentaries all express skepticism about the role I assign to the Scottish Common Sense philosophy in my historical analysis, though their reasons for doing so are strikingly at odds with each other. Sarah Seo and John Witt concede the importance of the Common Sense philosophy at a theoretical level, even as they call attention to certain “competitor theories” of human nature, noting that these darker views of the self may have proved more influential in the framing of the American constitution. However, they go on to contend that all of this philosophizing about the human mind was actually of little consequence in the everyday adjudication of civil and criminal liability, as judges found more practical means of resolving “the otherwise intractable questions of moral responsibility” left unanswered by the Scottish philosophy. John Mikhail, by contrast, appears to be far more sanguine about the tractability of these questions, from a philosophical standpoint, going so far as to suggest that they were more or less resolved by British moralists before the Scottish Common Sense school even came into being. What truly set the Common Sense philosophers apart from their predecessors, and ought to determine their place in this history of ideas, Mikhail concludes, was the manner in which they contributed to the scientific process of tracing out the inner structure and innate capacities of “the moral mind”—a topic that is currently of intense interest in the cognitive and brain sciences.

Force, Mathematics, and Physics in Newton's Principia: A New Approach to Enduring Issues

2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koffi Maglo
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Modeling ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
History Of ◽  
Axiomatic Systems ◽  
Mathematical Construct ◽  
Mathematics And Physics

ArgumentThis paper investigates the conceptual treatment and mathematical modeling of force in Newton's Principia. It argues that, contrary to currently dominant views, Newton's concept of force is best understood as a physico-mathematical construct with theoretical underpinnings rather than a “mathematical construct” or an ontologically “neutral” concept. It uses various philosophical and historical frameworks to clarify interdisciplinary issues in the history of science and draws upon the distinction between axiomatic systems in mathematics and physics, as well as discovery patterns in science. It also dwells on Newton's “philosophy” of mathematics, described here in terms of mathematical naturalism. This philosophy considers mathematical quantities to be physically significant quantities whose motions are best mapped by geometry. It then shows that to understand the epistemic status of force in the Principia, it is important to scrutinize both Newton's mathematical justificatory strategies and his background assumptions about force – without constructing, however, an overarching metaphysical framework for his science. Finally, the paper studies scientific attempts to redefine or eliminate force from science during the period between Newton and Laplace. From a philosophical standpoint, the paper implicitly suggests that questions about the reality of force be distinguished from questions about the validity of force, and that both sets of questions be distinguished from questions about the utility of the concept of force in science.

scholarly journals Ecological approach to perception and action: Fundaments for motor behavior

2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sérgio T. Fonseca ◽  
Christina D. C. M. Faria ◽  
Juliana M. Ocarino ◽  
Marisa C. Mancini
Keyword(s):  
Perception And Action ◽  
Motor Behavior ◽  
Direct Perception ◽  
Ecological Approach ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
The Core ◽  
Core Concepts ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
Human Motor

The objective of the present study is to introduce the philosophical position and the core concepts of the Ecological Approach to Perception and Action, emphasizing its principles and its uniqueness in relation to other theories related to motor behavior. The Ecological Approach, as opposed to other approaches, assumes the direct realism as its philosophical standpoint. Thus, the Ecological Approach to Perception and Action proposes the concepts of specificity, direct perception and affordance. By assuming the direct realism, the Ecological Approach to Perception and Action commits to the mutuality animal  environment and perception and action, and proposes that the dualism, commonly found in other theories, does not contribute to the understanding of human motor behavior. The choice of a given theory, during the process of scientific investigation, implies in a commitment to the philosophical views and to the principles and assumptions in which it is based. The knowledge about the core concepts of the Ecological Approach may support the decision making process about accepting or rejecting the ideas advanced by James Gibson and, consequently, direct the use of this theory to the development of investigations on perception and action.

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