Auditor Pricing of Excess Cash Holdings

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly C. Gleason ◽  
Adam J. Greiner ◽  
Yezen H. Kannan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Perceptions ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Bottom Quartile ◽  
Pricing Behavior ◽  
Excess Cash

We examine auditor business risk by analyzing the relation between excess cash holdings and auditor pricing behavior. Prior research links excess cash holdings to risks associated with manager opportunism and external monitoring. Our analyses provide evidence of a positive relationship between excess cash and audit fees. The economic magnitude of the increase in total audit fees due to an increase in excess cash holdings is approximately 5% greater for firms in the top quartile of excess cash holdings versus those in the bottom quartile. We also find that the strength of shareholder rights reduces the positive relationship between excess cash and audit fees, and excess cash holdings are assigned lower audit fees among firms that follow an investment-intensive strategy than those that tend to hold on to their cash. Our article contributes to the literature by examining auditor pricing of excess cash holdings, including factors that affect auditors’ risk perceptions, and ultimately provides unique insights into how auditors view agency conflicts indicated by excess cash holdings.

Excess Cash Holdings and Audit Fees

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-117
Author(s):  
Sang Cheol Lee ◽  
Jaemin Lim
Keyword(s):  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Excess Cash

scholarly journals Family Control And The Value Of Cash Holdings

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Imen Derouiche ◽  
Majdi Hassen
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Firm Resources ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Excess Cash ◽  
Cash Reserves ◽  
Corporate Cash Holdings

The present study investigates the effects of family control on the value of corporate cash holdings. Using a large sample of French listed firms, the results show that the value of excess cash reserves is lower in family firms than in other firms, reflecting investors concern about the potential misuse of cash by controlling families. We also find that the value of excess cash is lower when controlling families are involved in management and when they maintain a grip on control, indicating that investors do not expect the efficient use of cash in these firms. Our findings are consistent with the argument that the extent to which excess cash contributes to firm value is lower when dominant shareholders are likely to expropriate firm resources. Overall, family control seems to be a key determinant of cash valuation when ownership is concentrated.

The effect of managerial horizon on cash holdings

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (8) ◽  
pp. 1092-1110
Author(s):  
Sanjib Guha ◽  
Niazur Rahim
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Cash Holding ◽  
Firm Characteristics ◽  
Current Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ceo Age ◽  
Excess Cash ◽  
Managerial Horizon

Purpose US corporations are now sitting on an enormous stockpile of cash. Instead of investing their resources and creating jobs, the firms are holding on to excess cash. Academicians and practitioners alike have tried to fathom the reasons why companies are holding on to so much cash. Numerous studies have talked about the various motives for holding cash. Many researchers have tried to correlate excess cash holding with particular firm characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to study the correlations that exist between excess cash holding and some measurable managerial characteristics. Design/methodology/approach Four different measures of managerial horizon (MH) were constructed. The first two constructs (MH1 and MH2) are based on the CEO’s age and how long he has been the CEO of the company. The next two constructs (MH3 and MH4) are based on compensation, proportion of current compensation and proportion of future compensation. This paper tries to examine if MH has any impact on excess cash holding. Findings The results clearly show that the CEO age and the proportion of CEO’s compensation (current and future) do determine level of cash holding in the company. Younger CEOs hold more cash compared to older CEOs. Older CEOs hold less cash suggesting that as CEOs grow older they might be motivated by the idea of leaving a long lasting legacy. CEOs who receive more of their compensation in future payments also hold on to more cash, whereas CEOs who receive more of their compensation in current payments hold less cash. Originality/value There is no previous literature dealing with MH and cash holding by corporations.

Do Social Ties between External Auditors and Audit Committee Members Affect Audit Quality?

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 61-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xianjie He ◽  
Jeffrey A. Pittman ◽  
Oliver M. Rui ◽  
Donghui Wu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Information Transfer ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Interpersonal Relations ◽  
Social Ties ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
External Auditors

ABSTRACT We examine whether social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members shape audit outcomes. Although these social ties can facilitate information transfer and help auditors alleviate management pressure to waive correction of detected misstatements, close interpersonal relations can undermine auditors' monitoring of the financial reporting process. We measure social ties by alma mater connections, professor-student bonding, and employment affiliation, and audit quality by the propensity to render modified audit opinions, financial reporting irregularities, and firm valuation. Our evidence implies that social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members impair audit quality. In additional results consistent with expectations, we generally find that this relation is concentrated where social ties are more salient, or firm governance is relatively poor and agency conflicts are more severe. Implying reciprocity stemming from social networks, we also report some suggestive evidence that audit fees are higher in the presence of social ties between an engagement auditor and the audit committee. Collectively, our analysis lends support to the narrative that the negative implications—namely, worse audit quality and higher audit fees—of these social ties may outweigh the benefits.

The Relationship between Aggressive Real Earnings Management and Current and Future Audit Fees

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Greiner ◽  
Mark J. Kohlbeck ◽  
Thomas J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Pricing Behavior ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
The Relationship

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between aggressive income-increasing real earnings management (REM) and current and future audit fees. Managers pursue REM activities to influence reported earnings and, as a consequence, alter cash flows and sacrifice firm value. We posit that the implications of REM are considered in auditors' assessments of engagement risk related to the client's economic condition and result in higher audit fees. We find that, with the exception of abnormal reductions in SG&A, aggressive income-increasing REM is positively associated with both current and future audit fees. Additional analyses provide evidence consistent with increased effort combined with increased risk contributing to the current pricing effect, with increased business risk primarily driving the future pricing effect. We, therefore, provide evidence that aggressive income-increasing REM activities have a significant influence on auditor pricing behavior, consistent with the audit framework associating engagement risk with audit fees. JEL Classifications: G21; G34; M41. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from public sources indicated in the paper.

U.S. Big 4 and Local Auditors in the China Initial Public Offering Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950024 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi-Yuan Feng ◽  
Hua-Wei Huang ◽  
Mai Dao
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Corporate Fraud ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Investment Distortions ◽  
Ipo Pricing ◽  
Public Offering

This paper examines (1) whether auditor type affects initial public offering (IPO) pricing; (2) whether the effect of IPO pricing is different for clients with different ownership structures. We find that (1) firms being audited by Big 4 accounting firms receive IPO premium while others being audited by local accounting firms do not; (2) Big 4 auditors receive higher audit fees than China’s Top 10 or small local auditors. This paper extends the prior research (e.g., Kumar, P and N Langberg (2009). Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 40, 144–172) that reduces agency conflicts between shareholders and manager (by means of better audit quality) and also reconciles corporate misreporting and investment distortions.

The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Relationship Between Cash Holdings and Audit Fees in Egyptian Listed Companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 314
Author(s):  
Eman Abdel-Wanis
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explores the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the nature of the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees, which helps provide an opportunity to identify whether these mechanisms enable to mitigate agency problems, and thus lower audit fees through a sample of 78 Egyptian listed firms in EGX 100 during the period 2014-2016 using panel data analysis. Results indicated that cash holding increases auditing fees. The board characteristics affect negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. Also, ownership structure affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. As well audit committee affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. There results support the view that corporate governance mitigate on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees.

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