scholarly journals Public goods equilibria under closed- and open-list proportional representation

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M Kselman
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Electoral Volatility ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Electoral Studies ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Theoretic Foundations

Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of local public goods under closed- and open-list proportional representation (CLPR and OLPR). The core results suggest that, all thing equal, legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volatility. Firstly, public goods effort increases as district magnitude increases in OLPR systems, while it tends to decrease as magnitude increases in CLPR systems. Indeed, when district magnitude is [Formula: see text], the two systems are often indistinguishable. Furthermore, the distinction between OLPR and CLPR weakens when electoral volatility is low, such that neither system generates high levels of public goods effort. In addition to their relevance for political economy, the paper’s results provide game theoretic foundations for a series of theoretical conjectures found in Carey and Shugart’s (1995) seminal study of electoral institutions and legislative personalism (Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank-ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies 1995; 14(4): 417–439).

Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups

2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deniz Aksoy ◽  
David B. Carter
Keyword(s):  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Representation System ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Terrorist Groups

A wide range of studies find that democracies experience more terrorism than non-democracies. However, surprisingly little terrorism research takes into account the variation among democracies in terms of their electoral institutions. Furthermore, despite much discussion of the differences in terrorist groups’ goals in the literature, little quantitative work distinguishes among groups with different goals, and none explores whether and how the influence of electoral institutions varies among groups with different goals. The argument in this article posits that electoral institutions influence the emergence of within-system groups, which seek policy changes, but do not influence the emergence of anti-system groups, which seek a complete overthrow of the existing regime and government. The study finds that within-system groups are significantly less likely to emerge in democracies that have a proportional representation system and higher levels of district magnitude, while neither of these factors affects the emergence of anti-system groups.

scholarly journals Hegemons, Leaders and Followers: A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Postwar Dynamics of International Political Economy

1997 ◽  
pp. 35-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Hausken ◽  
Thomas Plumper
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
International Political Economy ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
The Public ◽  
Benevolent Leadership ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

The article introduces the concept of hegemony to leadership theory, which has developed mainly as a critique of hegemonic stability theory. We argue that it makes sense to combine the two theories by introducing the concept of 'size' into neoliberal thinking about International Political Economy. We accept the neo-institutional hypothesis that a hegemon is not needed to provide public goods, and demonstrate with non-cooperative games how multiple leaders may jointly provide public goods. A game-theoretic model is developed illustrating with Nash equilibria the conditions under which a hegemon rationally switches from hegemony to leadership. It also shows why followers rationally switch from free-riding in their consumption of the public goods to taking part in leading, in the sense of contributing to covering the cost of the production of the public goods. The emergence of joint leadership leads to multiple equilibria in the sense of allowing for multiple stable leadership constellations. The actors are in a mixed-motive or coordination game where they have different preferences for the equilibria, and thus different preferences for which strategies to choose, and for who is to take part in covering the cost of the production of the public goods. Two aspects of joint leadership 'after hegemony' are treated, namely coercive and benevolent leadership on the one hand, and collective action in the sense of joint leadership on the other hand. Finally, future leadership constellations and the quest for international order are discussed.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Hollywood’s Movie Production Companies in Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nargiz Mammadova ◽  
Aygun Malikova ◽  
Arzu Heydarova
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Human Rights Regime ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Future ◽  
Technological Developments ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategic Context

Abstract How will advances in digital technology affect the future of human rights and authoritarian rule? Media figures, public intellectuals, and scholars have debated this relationship for decades, with some arguing that new technologies facilitate mobilization against the state and others countering that the same technologies allow authoritarians to strengthen their grip on power. We address this issue by analyzing the first game-theoretic model that accounts for the dual effects of technology within the strategic context of preventive repression. Our game-theoretical analysis suggests that technological developments may not be detrimental to authoritarian control and may, in fact, strengthen authoritarian control by facilitating a wide range of human rights abuses. We show that technological innovation leads to greater levels of abuses to prevent opposition groups from mobilizing and increases the likelihood that authoritarians will succeed in preventing such mobilization. These results have broad implications for the human rights regime, democratization efforts, and the interpretation of recent declines in violent human rights abuses.

Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

scholarly journals Formalization and study of the game-theoretic model of the optimal distribution of workers in enterprises

2019 ◽  
Vol 1399 ◽  
pp. 033095
Author(s):  
Irina Zaitseva ◽  
Tatiana Svechinskaya ◽  
Vladimir Zakharov ◽  
Natalia Zakharova ◽  
Andrey Murashko
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Optimal Distribution ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model
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