The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections

2007 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris W. Bonneau
2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris W. Bonneau

Among the least-researched American elections are those for seats on the states' supreme courts, arguably some of the most important political positions in the states. We know not only that campaign spending in these races has increased sharply in the past 20 years but also that there is great variation in spending among them. What factors cause campaign spending to vary among races for the states' highest courts? And what can an understanding of campaign spending in these races tell us about campaign spending for other offices? I use data from 281 state supreme court races in 21 states from 1990 to 2000 to answer these questions. I find that state supreme court campaign spending is driven by the characteristics of the race, institutional arrangements, and the electoral and state supreme court context.


Commonwealth ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jenna Becker Kane

Judicial candidates and outside groups spent a record $15.8 million in a 2015 election that decided the partisan balance of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Adding to the record-­setting election was a barrage of televised attack advertising in which outside interests spent over $4 million to influence the outcome of the high court race. This article places the 2015 Pennsylvania Supreme Court election in comparative perspective to assess whether or not the campaign fundraising, campaign spending, and campaign advertising in this race was as “historic” as commonly claimed. Interestingly, when compared with other Pennsylvania high court races, the 2015 race was not a watershed election for candidate fundraising, especially when fundraising totals are averaged per candidate. Neither was the tone and tenor of campaign advertising in the 2015 Pennsylvania race outside the trend of contemporary judicial campaigns in other states, which have seen a marked increase in televised attack advertising by outside groups that often target candidates as soft on crime. Overall, the cost and tone of the 2015 Pennsylvania Supreme Court race appears to be a part of wider trends in contemporary judicial elections and very much in line with the cost of high court races in Pennsylvania over the last decade. The article concludes by surveying empirical evidence on the efficacy of judicial elections and assesses Pennsylvania’s prospects for reforming its method of judicial selection.


2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-114
Author(s):  
Elisha Carol Savchak ◽  
Jennifer Barnes Bowie

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Heise

Proponents of judicial elections and related campaign activities emphasize existing First Amendment jurisprudence as well as similarities linking publicly-elected state judges and other publicly-elected state officials. Opponents focus on judicial campaign contributions’ corrosive effects, including their potential to unduly influence judicial outcomes. Using a comprehensive data set of 2,345 business-related cases decided by state supreme courts across all fifty states between 2010–12, judicial election critics, including Professor Joanna Shepherd, emphasize the potential for bias and find that campaign contributions from business sources to state supreme court judicial candidates corresponded with candidates’ pro-business votes as justices. While Shepherd’s main findings generally replicate, additional (and alternative) analyses introduce new findings that raise complicating wrinkles for Shepherd’s strong normative claims. Findings from this study illustrate that efforts to influence judicial outcomes are not the exclusive domain of business interests. That is, judicial campaign contributions from non- (and anti-) business interests increase the probability of justices’ votes favoring non-business interests. As a result, critiques of judicial elections cannot properly rely exclusively on the influence of business interests. Moreover, that both business and non-business interests can successfully influence judicial outcomes through campaign contributions point in different (and possibly conflicting) normative directions. On the one hand, even if one agrees that the judicial branch qualitatively differs from the political and executive branches in terms of assessing campaign contributions’ proper role, that the potential to influence judicial outcomes is available to any interest group (willing to invest campaign contributions) complicates popular critiques of judicial elections. On the other hand, the same empirical findings also plausibly strengthen critiques of judicial elections, especially for those who view the judicial domain differently than other political domains.


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