The Impact of Ideology on Disinvestment Decisions of a Coalition

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 821-849
Author(s):  
Ritika Jain ◽  
Shubhro Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Ideological Difference

We build a two-stage game theoretic model to capture the effect of ideologies of parties in a coalition on disinvestment decisions. We focus on three specific aspects of ideology—ideology score of the coalition, ideology dispersion of the coalition, and ideology difference between the center and the state where the enterprise is located. The benchmark two-party coalition predicts that a left government prefers less disinvestment than a right one more often than not. However, there may be a case where moving toward the left end of the ideology spectrum may raise disinvestment incidence. Similarly, a coalition with ideologically similar parties favors privatization more frequently than one in which parties are more diverse. However, for a narrow parametric range, the effect may be reversed. Low ideological difference between the center and the state in which the enterprise is located improves disinvestment incidence. Finally, we extend the model to three-party coalitions.

scholarly journals Location–Price Competition in Mobile Operator Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850015
Author(s):  
Vladimir Mazalov ◽  
Andrey Lukyanenko ◽  
Andrei Gurtov
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Mobile Network ◽  
Logistic Function ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Mobile Operator ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Mobile Network Operators

In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model of the mobile network market. The market is presented by three sides: primary mobile network operators (MNO), mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) and consumers of the services. MVNO are mobile operators without their own infrastructure. They buy resources from MNO and compete with other MVNO for the consumers selling a service in the mobile network market. We construct a two-stage game. In the first stage, MVNO (players) select the MNO, one or several, and then announce the price for their service for the consumers in this MNO. After the profile of prices is determined, the consumers are distributed among MVNOs following the logistic function. The equilibrium in this two-stage game is constructed. For identical consumers, the analytic formulas for the solution are derived.

R&D Investment on Alternative Fuel Vehicles: Insights from a Two-Stage Game Theoretic Model

2012 ◽  
Vol 544 ◽  
pp. 105-109
Author(s):  
Chun Jie Chi ◽  
Tie Ju Ma
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Fuel ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Alternative Fuel Vehicles ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
D Investment

The R&D on alternative fuel vehicles has gained increasing attention by companies. In this study we develop a two-stage game theoretic model to explore the cooperative and noncooperative R&D activities in alternative fuel vehicles with spillovers. The results provide practical insights into actions that could be considered by regulators and organizations to encourage environmental investments.

Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

Accessing the state: Executive constraints and credible commitment in dictatorship

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 568-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Meng
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
State Power ◽  
The State ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
The Future ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
Commitment Problems

When do executive constraints provide credible commitment power in dictatorships, and under what conditions do leaders establish such constraints? This article argues that institutions successfully constrain autocrats only when elites are given real access to state power, such as appointments to key governmental positions. I present a game theoretic model in which an autocratic leader decides whether to establish binding constraints at the start of her rule. Doing so shifts the future distribution of power in favor of elites, alleviating commitment problems in bargaining. I show that leaders are likely to place constraints on their own authority when they enter power especially weak, and these initial decisions shape the rest of their rule. Even if a leader enters power in a uniquely weak position vis-á-vis other elites, and is on average, quite strong, the need to alleviate commitment problems in the first period swamps expectations about the future distribution of power. I illustrate the model’s findings through case studies of Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire.

Hobbes's State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUN CHUNG
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

ABSTRACT:Hobbes's own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that without a government our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes's state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of conflict in the state of nature—namely, uncertainty, rather than people's egoistic psychology. Therefore, I claim that any game-theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game theory to show how universal conflict can break out in the state of nature—even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people—due to uncertainty about what type of person the other player is. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one's own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion.

Advertising in a social network as a signal of quality

2021 ◽  
pp. 118-139
Author(s):  
Kamilla Timerbulatova
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Opinion Leaders ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

Advertising in a social network has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other types of advertising, and which may be of key importance in answering the question about its ability to serve as a signal of quality. In the game-theoretic model presented in this paper, the monopolist sends an advertising signal to bloggers who act as “opinion leaders” in the social network. The latter, in turn, make decisions about posting advertising messages on their blogs, taking into account the impact that this action may have on their reputation. The paper investigates the question of when advertising can serve as a reliable signal of quality in a separating equilibrium.

scholarly journals Knowledge Spillovers through Networks of Scientists

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1989-2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Zacchia
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Spillovers ◽  
Relative Proportion ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Private Return ◽  
Innovation Outcomes

Abstract In this article, I directly test the hypothesis that interactions between inventors of different firms drive knowledge spillovers. I construct a network of publicly traded companies in which each link is a function of the relative proportion of two firms’ inventors who have former patent collaborators in both organizations. I use this measure to weigh the impact of R&D performed by each firm on the productivity and innovation outcomes of its network linkages. An empirical concern is that the resulting estimates may reflect unobserved, simultaneous determinants of firm performance, network connections, and external R&D. I address this problem with an innovative IV strategy, motivated by a game-theoretic model of firm interaction. I instrument the R&D of one firm’s connections with that of other firms that are sufficiently distant in network space. With the resulting spillover estimates, I calculate that among firms connected to the network the marginal social return of R&D amounts to approximately 112% of the marginal private return.

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