scholarly journals Myths of military revolution: European expansion and Eurocentrism

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.C. Sharman

This article critiques explanations of the rise of the West in the early modern period premised on the thesis that military competition drove the development of gunpowder technology, new tactics, and the Westphalian state, innovations that enabled European trans-continental conquests. Even theories in International Relations and other fields that posit economic or social root causes of Western expansion often rely on this “military revolution” thesis as a crucial intervening variable. Yet, the factors that defined the military revolution in Europe were absent in European expeditions to Asia, Africa, and the Americas, and conventional accounts are often marred by Eurocentric biases. Given the insignificance of military innovations, Western expansion prior to the Industrial Revolution is best explained by Europeans’ ability to garner local support and allies, but especially by their deference to powerful non-Western polities.

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 311-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tonio Andrade

Did Europeans have a military advantage over other peoples of the world during the early modern period (1500-1800)? Scholars of the “military revolution” school have argued that European guns, tactics, fortification techniques, and ships conferred significant benefits on European forces, whereas other scholars suggest that the European military edge was slight at best. This article examines the first armed conflict in history between European and Chinese forces: the so-called Sino-Portuguese War of 1521 and 1522. Scholars on both sides of the military effectiveness argument have adduced this conflict to buttress their positions, but there are few studies of it in either western or East Asian languages. This article suggests that during the first set of engagements, which occurred in 1521, Portuguese artillery was markedly superior, but that in the second set of engagements, in 1522, Chinese artillery played a significant role, causing significant damage to the Portuguese. If there was still a gap in 1522, it was much smaller. Thus, the Sino-Portuguese conflict is less interesting for what it tells us about the “military balance” than for what it tells us about military change. When we discuss military balances, we tend to forget how swiftly they could shift, how rapidly adaptations could take hold. Indeed, historians should take a wider perspective on the military revolution: it was not a process that simply occurred in Europe and provided an edge to Europeans abroad. It was, rather, a global process of intermixture and adaptation. In the case of China, the rapid adoption of western artillery may have started around the time of the Sino-Portuguese Conflict, but it continued through the ensuing decades, as the Ming redesigned Portuguese-style guns and adapted them to their own needs until the only thing western about them was their name: Frankish guns.


2013 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-316
Author(s):  
Daniel Szechi

Abstract Early modern European rebellions have long been of interest to military historians, yet, with the exception of the 1745 rebellion led by Charles Edward Stuart, the military history of the Jacobite rebellions against the English/British state is little known outside the Anglophone world. Likewise, though there have been many analyses of particular rebellions no analytical model of rebel military capabilities has hitherto been proposed, and thus meaningful comparisons between early modern rebellions located in different regions and different eras has been difficult. This article accordingly offers an analysis of the military effectiveness of the Jacobite rebels in 1715-16 structured by a model adapted from the ›Military Effectiveness‹ framework first advanced by Allan Millett and Williamson Murray. This is with a view to stimulating military-historical interest in Jacobite rebellions other than the ’45, and promoting more systematic discussion of the military effectiveness of early modern European rebel armies.


1983 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Knud J. V. Jespersen

There is general agreement among scholars of military history on the main features of military developments during the transition from the middle ages to the early modern period. A brief sketch of the broad outlines of these developments may therefore suffice as a preface to an investigation of Danish knight service in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.The decisive factor in the medieval army was the fully armoured, lancebearing mounted knight. The battlefield was totally dominated by the combat technique of these bands of qualifizierten Einzelkämpfern, offensive combat at close quarters. The remaining forces, in contrast, functioned merely as auxiliaries to the main arm - the heavy mounted knights.


Author(s):  
Stefan Dudink ◽  
Karen Hagemann

This chapter offers an introduction to the entangled histories of gender and war from the Thirty Years’ War to the Wars of Revolution and Independence, against the background of a wider history of war and warfare in the early modern period. It starts with a critical discussion of some of the concepts historians have used to capture the nature and development of early modern war and warfare, such as military revolution, limited war, and total war. An important aspect of this discussion is the relations between transformations in early modern warfare and processes of state formation, which are central to various arguments made by historians about gender and war in the early modern period. Against this conceptual background, the chapter then presents an overview of the major wars from this period, with a focus on the Thirty Years’ War, the Seven Years’ War, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which points, among other things, to the increasing entwinement of European and colonial war in this era. The chapter concludes with an introduction to the state of research and central themes in the history of gender and war.


Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth

This chapter discusses wartime spending and the rise of the fiscal-military state. The need to borrow was intimately related to the cost of war. After 1500, a “military revolution” transformed warfare in Europe. The invention of gunpowder meant that old medieval city walls no longer offered protection. The increasing use of cannon therefore required an entirely new set of protective walls. These new fortifications meant that wars became longer, with many sieges lasting more than a year. Then, the rise of firearms translated into a need to train soldiers. All these changes—the arms used, the rise of permanent, large armies and navies, new fortifications, and high frequency and great length of conflict—made wars vastly more expensive. Success in war therefore depended in the early modern period on financial resources. Eventually, states run by a successful military-fiscal complex dominated the map of Europe.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Scott

Fewer than three hundred years ago there occurred the most fundamental reordering of human existence since the beginning of agriculture. How was this possible, involving as it did the disappearance of an entire and heavily defended way of life? The Industrial Revolution is a major field for economic and social historians. But explaining it requires us to understand a complex of developments across the early modern period connecting the sub-fields of environmental, economic, social, political, intellectual and cultural history, and to examine the unfolding of world-changing processes and events, including the large-scale migration of peoples....


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