scholarly journals Brexit and Scotland

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 512-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aileen McHarg ◽  
James Mitchell

In the 2016 Brexit referendum, Scotland voted decisively to Remain in the EU, while a UK-wide majority voted to Leave. This article discusses responses to the constitutional significance of a territorially divided result, both prior to and following the referendum, including in litigation over the ‘constitutional requirements’ necessary to trigger the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 TEU ( R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union). It considers what these debates reveal about the uncertain and contested nature of the UK’s territorial constitution, focusing on issues of constitutional security for devolved institutions and competences, and constitutional voice for the devolved territories in handling issues of intertwined competence. It argues that the Brexit episode reveals major weaknesses in the dominant reliance on political mechanisms to give recognition to the constitutional significance of devolution, which do not adequately displace continued legal adherence to the assumptions of a unitary constitution.

Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the Withdrawal Agreement of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU). The Withdrawal Agreement, adopted on the basis of Article 50 Treaty on European Union (TEU), spells out the terms and conditions of the UK departure from the EU, including ground-breaking solutions to deal with the thorniest issues which emerged in the context of the withdrawal negotiations. Admittedly, the Withdrawal Agreement is only a part of the Brexit deal. The Agreement, in fact, is accompanied by a connected political declaration, which outlines the framework of future EU–UK relations. The chapter then offers a chronological summary of the process that led to the adoption of the Withdrawal Agreement, describing the crucial stages in the Brexit process — from the negotiations to the conclusion of a draft agreement and its rejection, to the extension and the participation of the UK to European Parliament (EP) elections, to the change of UK government and the ensuing constitutional crisis, to the new negotiations with the conclusion of a revised agreement, new extension, and new UK elections eventually leading to the departure of the UK from the EU.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case note summarizes the facts and decision in R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, Supreme Court. This case concerned whether the government could rely on the prerogative power to issue a notification of the United Kingdom’s intention to secede from the European Union under Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union, or whether parliamentary authorization was required. There is also a brief discussion of the Sewel Convention. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino

This chapter focuses on the current interaction between European Union and UK law. EU law is currently a source of UK law. However, the relationship between the two regimes is expected to change in the future as a consequence of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 stipulates that the European Communities Act 1972 will be ‘repealed on exit day’, which would be 29 March 2019 provided that the two-year period since Article 50 TEU was triggered is not extended. Once the European Communities Act 1972 has been repealed, EU law will cease to be a source of UK law. No major immediate changes to the national competition legislation are to be expected, but future reforms could distance the UK system from the EU rules.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tore Vincents Olsen ◽  
Christian F. Rostbøll

The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw from the European Union (EU) on the basis of a unilateral decision. In June 2016 the United Kingdom decided to leave the EU invoking article 50 of the treaty. But is withdrawal democratically legitimate? In fact, the all-affected principle suggests that it is undemocratic for subunits to leave larger political units when it adversely affects other citizens without including them in the decision. However, it is unclear what the currency of this affectedness is and, hence, why withdrawal would be undemocratic. We argue that it is the effect of withdrawal on the status of citizens as free and equal that is decisive and that explains why unilateral withdrawal of subunits from larger units is democratically illegitimate. Moreover, on the ‘all-affected status principle’ that we develop, even multilaterally agreed withdrawal is undemocratic because the latter diminishes the future ability of citizens to make decisions together regarding issues that affect their status as free and equal. On this basis, we conclude that it is undemocratic for a member state such as the United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU.


Author(s):  
Catherine Barnard ◽  
Emilija Leinarte

This chapter addresses the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement dealing with the protection of citizens’ rights. It explains the scope of application and the content of the rights afforded to EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU after Brexit. The chapter also looks at the enforcement of citizens’ rights, both in the EU and the UK. While the rights of EU citizens already in the UK, and rights of UK citizens in the EU, are fairly generously protected under the WA, the mechanism for enforcement of such rights raises questions of effectiveness. Moreover, the special jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement, while a logical outcome from the perspective of EU constitutional law, will disappoint those who supported the UK government’s insistence that ending the jurisdiction of the CJEU was one of the UK’s red lines during the Article 50 TEU negotiations.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, Supreme Court. This case concerned whether the government could rely on the prerogative power to issue a notification of the UK’s intention to secede from the European Union under Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union, or whether parliamentary authorization was required. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 409-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Gordon

The United Kingdom 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union – challenges of pursuing the decision to withdraw – challenges for the UK constitution in commencing, executing, concluding, and legitimising EU withdrawal – domestic constitutional requirements for triggering Article 50 TEU – roles of UK government, UK Parliament, and devolved institutions in Brexit – a second referendum or a national general election on withdrawal terms – exiting the EU as a challenge of the UK’s political constitution – Brexit as exposing limitations of the UK’s current constitutional arrangements and architecture – Brexit as an unprecedented event and the centrality of politics – constitutional factors contributing to the outcome of the referendum – concerns about sovereignty and the (im)possibility of a national response – potential implications of the referendum for the UK and for the EU


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-368
Author(s):  
Frank Cranmer

The EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill completed its passage through Parliament and received Royal Assent on 16 March. On 29 March, the United Kingdom's Ambassador to the European Union, Tim Barrow, handed over the Prime Minister's formal letter of notification under Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union to the President of the European Council, thereby triggering the withdrawal process. Inevitably, however, the period since the last report was dominated not so much by Brexit as by the unexpected General Election.


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-223
Author(s):  
David Feldman

FOLLOWING a referendum on 23 June 2016 in which 52% of voters (38% of the total electorate) had expressed a preference for the UK to leave the EU, the Government announced that it would start the process of withdrawal, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), by notifying the European Council of the UK's decision, exercising the Government's prerogative power to conduct foreign relations. A number of legal challenges were fast-tracked to the Supreme Court. In R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Birnie and others intervening) [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 after an expedited hearing, the Court decided two issues: (1) whether the Government could exercise its power under the royal prerogative to give notice, or needed an Act of Parliament to authorise the giving of notice; and (2) whether the Government required the consent of devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales before giving notice or introducing to Parliament a Bill authorising the giving of notice. The Court sat unprecedentedly with all 11 serving members. On issue (1), the Court, by an 8–3 majority, held that an Act of Parliament would be required in order to authorise the giving of notice. On issue (2), the Court unanimously held that there was no legal requirement for consent by the devolved institutions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
Dumitrita Florea ◽  
◽  
Narcisa Gales ◽  
◽  
◽  
...  

The reality is that we have witnessed in the last 4 years, since the procedure of negotiating the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union in 2016 has started, a real political impasse on the stage of European relations. Who would have imagined on the 1st of January 1973, when England became a member of the European Union after many indecisions – some of them more arrogant than others that in 47 years' time it will be the first Member State to avail itself of Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which for the first time provided for the right of a Member State to withdraw voluntarily from the European Union? If we look a little at the historical context of England's accession to the EU, we may see similar hesitations that have delayed it so much in joining the EU. Although after the end of the Second World War the economic situation of England was precarious, it still manages to become one of the great world powers. However, in 1951 it refused to join the founding group of the ECSC and also refused to sign the Treaty of Rome in 1957. England believed that the status of leader of the Commonwealth offered you a privileged status compared to other European states in international affairs, especially those with the United States of America, but, nevertheless, it did not bring benefits in the relations with the 6 European states, that were going to establish the European Union. When it realized that this was not a good way for things to happen, in 1961 announced its intention to join the European Economic Community, only that in 1963 France voted against the request. It was only after Charles de Gaulle's resignation in 1969 that the United Kingdom's path to accession was opened. Political and economic integration seemed to be the best solution for achieving a stable economic future.


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