Methodological individualism as anti-reductionism

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathalie Bulle

The demarcation criterion of methodological individualism is not defined in relation to entities ultimately involved in explanation – individuals to the exclusion of structures – as supposed by its reductionist interpretations. It introduces an epistemological approach that distinguishes between causal powers representing driving forces – they arise from individual (trans-situational) rational capacities – and structural properties which do not exert a causal power but have nevertheless a crucial causal role – they define the situational properties on the basis of which individuals’ rational capacities are developed. Whereas the forces in action in society are governed by the subjective meaning of/the reasons for individual actions, social structures have an explanatory or causal role insofar as they affect the subjective meaning of/the reasons for individual actions.

Author(s):  
Keith Campbell ◽  
Nicholas J.J. Smith

Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning – rather, both the feeling and the yawning are effects of an underlying neural state. Mental states are real, and in being conscious we are more than merely physical organisms. Nevertheless, all our experiences, thoughts and actions are determined by our physical natures. Mental states are actually as smoke from a machine seems to be, mere side effects making no difference to the course of Nature.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 105-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Mandel

Professor Jon Elster advances the proposal that Marx – and Marxists–really stand for ‘methodological individualism,’ as opposed to ‘methodological collectivism.’ He defines ‘methodological individualism’ in the following terms: Social science explanations are seen as three-tiered. First, there is a causal explanation of mental states, such as desires and beliefs … Next, there is intentional explanation of individual action in terms of the underlying beliefs and desires … Finally, there is causal explanation of aggregated phenomena in terms of the individual actions that go into them. The last form is the specifically Marxist contribution to the methodology of the social sciences.1


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 774-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-277
Author(s):  
May L-Y Wong

Abstract This paper examines the mechanisms of semantic change in the creation of ten Cantonese slang words. It demonstrates with synchronic evidence that metaphorization, metonymization and (inter)subjectification are three principal driving forces behind the shift in meaning. It is argued that Traugott and Dasher’s (2002) Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change (IITSC), initially proposed for and widely used in the context of grammaticalization, is equally useful for the study of neologisms – in this case, the relatively recent slang expressions in Cantonese. These monosyllabic lexemes are shown to have followed the same unidirectional pathway of semantic change – that is, the shift from non-subjective meaning to encoded (inter)subjective meaning – outlined in their model of semantic change.


ChemInform ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (37) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandro Sonnino ◽  
Alessandro Prinetti ◽  
Laura Mauri ◽  
Vanna Chigorno ◽  
Guido Tettamanti

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