How To Make No Sense of Marx

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 105-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Mandel
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Methodological Individualism ◽  
Individual Action ◽  
The Social ◽  
Intentional Explanation ◽  
Individual Actions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Methodological Collectivism

Professor Jon Elster advances the proposal that Marx – and Marxists–really stand for ‘methodological individualism,’ as opposed to ‘methodological collectivism.’ He defines ‘methodological individualism’ in the following terms: Social science explanations are seen as three-tiered. First, there is a causal explanation of mental states, such as desires and beliefs … Next, there is intentional explanation of individual action in terms of the underlying beliefs and desires … Finally, there is causal explanation of aggregated phenomena in terms of the individual actions that go into them. The last form is the specifically Marxist contribution to the methodology of the social sciences.1

Methodological Individualism and Holism

2021 ◽  
pp. 166-169
Author(s):  
Suzan Gibril
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Status ◽  
Methodological Individualism ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Economic Inequalities

This chapter discusses methodological individualism and holism, which are often the focus of ontological debate. Methodological individualism (MI) is a paradigm in the social sciences that emerged from sociology and philosophy. The main purpose of MI is not to favour the individual over the collective, but to explain the occurrence of social phenomena by an action-driven rhetoric, which is motivated by intentional states. MI is primarily based on three postulates: the individualistic postulate; the comprehension postulate; and the rationality postulate. Holism, in contrast, is based on the idea that society cannot be reduced solely to its constituent parts — i.e. individuals. Individuals are the product of societies, histories, economic inequalities, social status, and so on. Therefore, they should be treated as objects that can only be perceived and understood from within.

The Everyday in a Time of Transformation: Exploring a Single South African Lifeworld after 20 Years of Democracy

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-54
Author(s):  
P. Conrad Kotze ◽  
Jan K. Coetzee
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Sociological Research ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Everyday ◽  
Ontological Turn ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Epistemological Framework

Transformation has come to be a defining characteristic of contemporary societies, while it has rarely been studied in a way that gives acknowledgement to both its societal effects and the experience thereof by the individual. This article discusses a recent study that attempts to do just that. The everyday life of a South African is explored within the context of changes that can be linked, more or less directly, to those that have characterized South Africa as a state since the end of apartheid in 1994. The study strives to avoid the pitfalls associated with either an empirical or solely constructivist appreciation of this phenomenon, but rather represents an integral onto-epistemological framework for the practice of sociological research. The illustrated framework is argued to facilitate an analysis of social reality that encompasses all aspects thereof, from the objectively given to the intersubjectively constructed and subjectively constituted. While not requiring extensive development on the theoretical or methodological level, the possibility of carrying out such an integral study is highlighted as being comfortably within the capabilities of sociology as a discipline. While the article sheds light on the experience of transformation, it is also intended to contribute to the contemporary debate surrounding the current “ontological turn” within the social sciences.

Reasons, Causes, and Intentional Explanation

1986 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Stoutland
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Social ◽  
Intentional Explanation ◽  
Covering Law ◽  
Causal Laws ◽  
Physical Laws ◽  
And Behavior

AbstractThe reasons-causes debate concerns whether explanations of human behavior in terms of an agent's reasons presuppose causal laws. This paper considers three approaches to this debate: the covering law model which holds that there are causal laws covering both reasons and behavior, the intentionalist approach which denies any role to causal laws, and Donald Davidson’s point of view which denies that causal laws connect reasons and behavior, but holds that reasons and behavior must be covered by physical laws if reasons explanations are to be valid. I defend the intentionalist approach against the two causalist approaches and conclude with reflections on the significance of the debate for the social sciences.

Coming to Understand the Social and Physical Worlds

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sydney Hopkins
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Conceptual Development ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Load Force ◽  
New Information ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Underlying Processes ◽  
Adaptation Task

Children’s conceptual development has been described as a process of“theory change.” Specifically, children begin with an idea and then iteratively update that idea by combining existing and new information, making and testing predictions and then revising their idea based on new data again. Similar processes have been postulated to account for adaptive phenomenon in perceptual psychology and motor control. The similarities between the two processes suggest that performance on tasks that measure conceptual and sensory‐motor “theory change”respectively may be related. The goal of the present study is to determine whether children’s development in a complex conceptual domain, theory of mind, is associated with children’s performance in a load force adaptation paradigm. Theory of mind is broadly defined as the ability to understand how mental states, such as beliefs and desires, motivate ourown and other people’s actions. In contrast, load force adaptation is the ability to gradually adjust the amount of force exerted on an object in order to smoothly lift it up, as experience with the weight of the object is gained. To explore the mechanisms underlying these two processes, children between the ages of 3.5 and 4.5 years participate in a load force adaptation task and a battery of theory of mind tasks. We predict that since the underlying processes appear to be theoretically similar, the individual differences in the ability to adapt load force and in theory of mind ability will be positively correlated.   

New Outlines of Structural Sociology, 1945–70

2019 ◽  
pp. 63-85
Author(s):  
J.P.S. Uberoi
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
World View ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Home Rule ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Indian Point

This chapter presents a discussion of international intellectual trends in the social sciences, theoretical and empirical studies in India, the question of independence of mind or home rule in intellectual institutions. Following the swarajist project outlined earlier of viewing Europe and its systems of knowledge and practices from an independent Indian point of view, this chapter is in effect a research outline for a new structural sociology in India. We are introduced to structuralism as it exists in the world, its scope and definition and as a methodology for the social sciences. This is followed by the approach to structuralism as scientific theory, method and as philosophical world view. Finally discusses are the principles of structural analysis, structuralism in language, literature and culture, in social structure, with regard to society and the individual, religion, philosophy, politics, sociology and social-anthropology.

Positivism in the social sciences

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold Kincaid
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Quantitative Data ◽  
Social Research ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Methodological Individualism ◽  
Main Function ◽  
Social Convention ◽  
The Social

Positivism originated from separate movements in nineteenth-century social science and early twentieth-century philosophy. Key positivist ideas were that philosophy should be scientific, that metaphysical speculations are meaningless, that there is a universal and a priori scientific method, that a main function of philosophy is to analyse that method, that this basic scientific method is the same in both the natural and social sciences, that the various sciences should be reducible to physics, and that the theoretical parts of good science must be translatable into statements about observations. In the social sciences and the philosophy of the social sciences, positivism has supported the emphasis on quantitative data and precisely formulated theories, the doctrines of behaviourism, operationalism and methodological individualism, the doubts among philosophers that meaning and interpretation can be scientifically adequate, and an approach to the philosophy of social science that focuses on conceptual analysis rather than on the actual practice of social research. Influential criticisms have denied that scientific method is a priori or universal, that theories can or must be translatable into observational terms, and that reduction to physics is the way to unify the sciences. These criticisms have undercut the motivations for behaviourism and methodological individualism in the social sciences. They have also led many to conclude, somewhat implausibly, that any standards of good social science are merely matters of rhetorical persuasion and social convention.

Introduction to the Special Issue on ‘Charisma’

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-114
Author(s):  
Maren Freudenberg ◽  
Tim Weitzel
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Sociology Of Religion ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
The Social ◽  
Conceptual Debate ◽  
The Individual

The introduction to the special issue on ‘charisma’ offers a very brief overview of the development of the concept in the social sciences and various critiques and intersecting debates. It casts a close look at Max Weber’s sometimes contradictory use of the concept and the different ways he conceptualized it in his sociology of religion and his sociology of domination. It then examines alternative theoretical approaches to ‘charisma’ that emerge in the course of the twentieth century before outlining this special issue’s contribution to the conceptual debate and the individual articles’ operationalization of the term by viewing charisma as relational, communicative, procedural, as well as related to ideas, practices, and objects.

Carl Menger's theory of invisible-hand explanations

2000 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Haller
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Individual

Carl Menger's theory of invisible-hand explanations is rooted in his methodology of the social sciences. Contrary to his 18th-century Scottish forerunners he explains both the emergence and the persistence of unplanned social institutions exclusively by the individual pursuit of perceived self-interest. Contrary to Hayek's evolutionary functionalism, Menger's theory is not confined to the explanation of efficient or beneficial institutions. And contrary to Buchanan and Vanberg's constitutional contractualism, it does not require that people form stable preferences over rules.

Scientific Explanation

Philosophy ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Pitt ◽  
Steven Mischler
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Mathematical Physics ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
Carl Hempel ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
The Individual

The modern search for an adequate general theory of explanation is an outgrowth of the logical positivist’s agenda: to lay the groundwork for a general unified theory of science. Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, cited under the Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation) was the first major attempt to put forth an account that met the positivist’s criteria. It initiated a lively debate that has continued up to the present. But as the attention of the philosophers of science became increasingly focused on the individual sciences, it quickly became clear that one general theory of explanation would not do since the particulars of the various sciences called for different accounts of what constituted an adequate explanation in physics and biology as well as chemistry, etc. This article attempts to capture the flavor of the debates and the nature of the shifting targets over the years. It does not profess to be complete, being largely restricted to work published in English, but it is a start. While the modern debates surrounding explanation can be said to begin with Hempel and Oppenheim, the history of philosophical accounts of explanation can be traced at least to Aristotle, whose metaphysics set the logical framework for explanations until Galileo urged that appeals to metaphysical categories be replaced by mathematics and measurement. For the most part, Galileo was not interested in appealing to causes or occult forces. The account of how things behaved was to be expressed in the language of mathematics. Descartes tried to capitalize on that insight with his resurrection of medieval discussions of causation relying on Aristotle’s framework framed in a mathematical physics, only to be countered by Newton, who introduced non-Aristotelian causal explanation grounded in mathematical physics. Finally John Stuart Mill begins the long march to contemporary accounts of causal explanation in both the physical and the social sciences, again relying on certain key assumptions about human nature. So the history of explanation is long and intertwined with a variety of metaphysical frameworks. The Positivists of the 20th century unsuccessfully eschewed metaphysics and sought to create an account of causal explanation that somehow aimed to stick strictly to the dictates of science, only to be thwarted by the metaphysical assumptions in the sciences themselves.

The Not-so-trivial Truth of Methodological Individualism

1998 ◽  
pp. 69-76
Author(s):  
Maarten Franssen
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Methodological Individualism ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Theoretical Terms ◽  
The Social ◽  
Intentional Psychology ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Social Entities

I defend the truth of the principle of methodological individualism in the social sciences. I do so by criticizing mistaken ideas about the relation between individual people and social entities held by earlier defenders of the principle. I argue, first, that social science is committed to the intentional stance; the domain of social science, therefore, coincides with the domain of intentionally described human action. Second, I argue that social entitites are theoretical terms, but quite different from the entities used in the natural sciences to explain our empirical evidence. Social entities (such as institutions) are conventional and open-ended constructions, the applications of which is a matter of judgment, not of discovery. The terms in which these social entities are constructed are the beliefs, expectations and desires, and the corresponding actions of individual people. The relation between the social and the individual 'levels' differs fundamentally from that between, say, the cellular and the molecular in biology. Third, I claim that methodological individualism does not amount to a reduction of social science to psychology; rather, the science of psychology should be divided. Intentional psychology forms in tandom with the analysis of social institutions, unitary psycho-social science; cognitive psychology tries to explain how the brain works and especially how the intentional stance is applicable to human behavior.

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