A novel theory of life and its implications on viruses and robots

A novel theory of life is proposed and its implications on the viruses and the future robots are discussed. The universal laws of physics are inferred phenomena that originate from the observed regularity in the physical realm. An apparent distinct feature of living beings compared to the nonliving ones is the presence of a higher level of regularity, which is indicative of a supplemental set of governing laws within the sphere of life. In this article a living or animate being is defined concisely as a natural entity whose internal changes and external behavior cannot be predicted by the universal laws and forces of physics alone at all times. Everything else is nonliving or inanimate. Likewise, life is defined as a supplemental set of laws and influences that act over a confined space which constitutes the domain of life, superimposed on the universal laws and forces of physics. Also, life is shown to be a field phenomenon like a quantum field, except that life pervades a bounded region rather than the entire spacetime. It is argued that life is an agency with causal power rather than an ordinary emergent property, and that a virus qualifies as a living being. The proposed field theory of life predicts that the future robots are unlikely to acquire life, and that the notion of highly intelligent future robots posing an existential threat to humanity is, in all likelihood, an illusion.

The Manifestation of Desire

Chapter 4 conceptualizes the device of ‘manifestation,’ the term identifying the causal power of desires, thoughts, and words to call forth objects and even characters in Shakespeare’s comic world. In the spirit of critic Elena Zupančič, the device shows, among other things, the way that comedy can surface the amusing monstrousness and presumptuousness of human wishes. The concept of manifestation entails various literary and dramatic values that characterize Shakespearean comedy. Historically, it reflects interests and theories found in Renaissance treatises on magic, and it even parallels certain modern-day linguistic patters. The chapter formalizes and theorizes the device, drawing examples from a range of comedies. The Comedy of Errors (Dr. Pinch), A Midsummer Night’s Dream (Helana and the love potion), and The Merry Wives of Windsor (the Witch of Brainford) come in for special discussion. The chapter ends by situation manifestation in relation to entrance effects in medieval and Tudor drama and to allegorical effects in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene.

The Roots of Occasionalism? Causation, Metaphysical Dependence, and Soul-Body Relations in Augustine

It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine’s views about the causal and dependence relations between body and soul. He argues that, contrary to what is often thought, Augustine allows that corporeal objects do act upon souls and merely rules out that corporeal objects exercise a particular kind of causal power (that of efficient or sustaining causes). He clarifies how Augustine conceives of the kind of causal influence exercised by souls and bodies.

What Is Consciousness? Integrated Information vs. Inference

Any successful naturalistic account of consciousness must state what consciousness is, in terms that are compatible with the rest of our naturalistic descriptions of the world. Integrated Information Theory represents a pioneering attempt to do just this. This theory accounts for the core features of consciousness by holding that there is an equivalence between the phenomenal experience associated with a system and its intrinsic causal power. The proposal, however, fails to provide insight into the qualitative character of consciousness and, as a result of its proposed equivalence between consciousness and purely internal dynamics, into the intentional character of conscious perception. In recent years, an alternate group of theories has been proposed that claims consciousness to be equivalent to certain forms of inference. One such theory is the Living Mirror theory, which holds consciousness to be a form of inference performed by all living systems. The proposal of consciousness as inference overcomes the shortcomings of Integrated Information Theory, particularly in the case of conscious perception. A synthesis of these two perspectives can be reached by appreciating that conscious living systems are self-organising in nature. This mode of organization requires them to have a high level of integration. From this perspective, we can understand consciousness as being dependent on a system possessing non-trivial amounts of integrated information while holding that the process of inference performed by the system is the fact of consciousness itself.

Uncertainty, Possibility, and Causal Power in QCA

Uncertainty undermines causal claims; however, the nature of causal claims decides what counts as relevant uncertainty. Empirical robustness is imperative in regularity theories of causality. Regularity theory features strongly in QCA, making its case sensitivity a weakness. Following qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) founder Charles Ragin’s emphasis on ontological realism, this article suggests causality as a power and thus breaks with the ontological determinism of regularity theories. Exercising causal powers makes it possible for human agents to achieve an outcome but does not determine that they will. The article explains how QCA’s truth table analysis “models” possibilistic uncertainty and how crisp sets do this better than fuzzy sets. Causal power is at the heart of critical realist philosophy of science. Like Ragin, critical realism suggests empirical analysis as merely describing underlying causal relationships. Empirical statements must be substantively interpreted into causal claims. The article is critical of “empiricist” QCA that infers causality from the robustness of set relationships.

Difficulties of The Theory

This chapter addresses common criticisms of the gene’s-eye view. The first is the use of intentional language and the anthropomorphizing involved in calling genes selfish. The chapter shows how disagreements over the suitability of such language reflects an old conflict in biology over the place for telological explanations. The second is the criticisms that came from mathematical population geneticists and the chapter outlines the phenomena of epistasis and hetorozygous advantage and evaluates how the gene’s-eye view handles interactions between genes. It discusses whether the gene’s-eye’s view is merely accounting and if it is bound to commit the so-called averaging fallacy. It also assesses the charge from developmental biologists that the gene’s-eye view affords too much causal power to genes in the process of development and in so doing ignores too many other interesting biological processes. Lastly, the chapter deals with how the gene’s-eye view fits into evolutionary biology#x2019;s troubled relationship with the concept of human nature and morality.

Neoliberalism with Scandinavian characteristics: The slow formation of neoliberal common sense in Denmark

This article describes the ascension of neoliberal economic ideas in the macroeconomic establishment in Denmark. Based on a systematic analysis of documents from the Danish government and the Economic Council from the 1970s to the early 2000s, the article traces the development of the economic ideas and policy instrument that dominate the analytical process of the Danish macroeconomic establishment. The article applies a Gramscian-inspired framework to track the gradual and uneven process under which neoliberal economic ideas became common sense in the Danish context. This framework challenges some of the assumptions of the ideational focus of much constructivist literature, and offers an alternative analysis focused on the legitimating role of economic ideas. As much of the ideational change took place after policy adaptions to international economic developments, the Danish case provides little support for the theory of the causal power of ideas. Rather, it seems as though economic models and ideas are imported as ‘after the fact’ legitimations of changes in policy.

Pure first-person experience and the unfolding argument: Neo-Cartesian reasoning as a foundation for IIT and other causal structure theories ends up in dissociative epiphenomenalism

We recently put forward an argument, the Unfolding Argument (UA), that integrated information theory (IIT) and other causal structure theories are either already falsified or unfalsifiable, which provoked significant criticism. It seems that we and the critics agree that the main question in this debate is whether pure first-person experience, independent of third-person measurements, is a sufficient foundation for theories of consciousness. Here, we show, first, that the use of pure first-person experience relies on non-scientific, neo-Cartesian reasoning. Second, even if this reasoning is accepted, it leads to consciousness being entirely epiphenomenal, with absolutely no causal power. Third, consciousness would be fully detached from the content of reports about subjective experience. A human may report to perceive X but their content of consciousness is Y. Hence, IIT and other causal structure theories end up in a form of dissociative epiphenomenalism, invalidating pure first-person experience as a viable foundation.

The stability of interaction channels between tourism and financial development in 10 top tourism destinations: Evidence from a Fourier Toda-Yamamoto estimator

Our article investigates the dynamic interlinkages between financial development, tourism development and economic growth in the top 10 tourism destination countries. The knowledge of which series has a causal power to predict tourism can inform policy making about which country needs marketing support and additional investment for its tourism growth. Moreover, results will throw light on which countries are assisted by their ex ante economic and financial development and can thus evolve into a tourism hub through the aid of the general economic development characterizing a country and/or a flourishing financial environment. Our study has employed a battery of cointegration and Granger-causality methods, which prove the robustness of our results. Specifically, we rely on the augmented mean group estimator and the novel Fourier Toda-Yamamoto (FTY)-based Granger-causality test, whose advantage lies in taking into account sharp and smooth structural breaks and resilient to cross-sectional dependence. The FTY reveals that the tourism-led growth hypothesis is confirmed for the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Russia, while economic growth Granger-causes tourism development in the United States only. The financial development growth hypothesis in confirmed only for Spain and the United Kingdom, while economic growth Granger causes financial development in the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Russia.