scholarly journals Joint bank accounts and survivorship

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 162-166
Author(s):  
Keith Stanton

Who is beneficially entitled to the money deposited in a joint bank account? In the great majority of cases, it is clear that the money is jointly owned and will pass on the death of one of the account holders to the survivor. However, things are not always simple and the law then has to decide as to the ownership of the money in a dispute between the surviving account holder and the estate of the deceased. The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Whitlock v Moree, a case on appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Bahamas is the latest decision on this topic.

2011 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
John McCaughran

This article is about the implication of terms into contracts based upon the presumed intention of the parties. It is particularly concerned with the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Limited,1 a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions thereafter, and whether there has been any change in the law. Before getting to Belize, it is necessary to consider, as briefly as possible, what went before.


1996 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240
Author(s):  
Tamara Kerbel

At present the law fails to provide an adequate balance between the interests of licensor and licensee when a licensor revokes a licence but gives an unreasonably short notice. The prevailing orthodoxy has followed the Court of Appeal decision in Minister of Health v. Bellotti. This article will argue that the consequences of this decision have proved disastrous for both licensors and licensees. In direct conflict with Bellotti is the Privy Council authority of Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. The King.


2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
KJ Keith

In 1769, by a nice coincidence, Captain James Cook made landfall in New Zealand, the first British mariner to do so, and William Blackstone published the final volume of hisCommentaries on the Law of England. Blackstoněs discussion of the application of the law of Englandto newly acquired colonies is not completely coherent, but it does give a strong sense that much, if not all, of the common law did come to apply to many, if not all, of them.1The Privy Council was reminded of this, with express reference to Blackstone, in November 2003 when it was asked to determine whether the rule inSmith v Selwyn,2a decision of the English Court of Appeal given in 1914, was part of the law of Jamaica.3


Author(s):  
Salvatore Caserta ◽  
Mikael Rask Madsen

This chapter analyzes the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), the creation of which was regarded as the culmination of the Caribbean’s long and protracted process toward independence from its former colonizers. Formally, the CCJ was instantaneously empowered to hear cases involving Caribbean Community law (Community law). The CCJ was also empowered to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London—a last court of appeal for civil and criminal cases from the Caribbean and the most visible remnant of the British Empire’s former rule. The CCJ’s unique double jurisdiction—original over Community law and appellate over other civil and criminal matters—underscores the complex sociopolitical context and transformation of which it is a part. Ultimately, the CCJ’s growing authority has increasingly made the Court the institutional intersection for the convergence of these two different paths toward establishing the Caribbean as a legally integrated regional unity.


2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.


2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 305-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun D. Pattinson

It is argued that the application of the doctrine of undue influence to patient's decisions in the context of medical treatment is ripe for development. The doctrine is capable of providing much needed protection for vulnerable patients if developed along lines suggested by its use in other contexts. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal has recently missed an opportunity to develop the law in this way and it may be some time before another suitable opportunity is presented to the courts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Mark Bennett

"A document is put before us. Does it or does it not create a trust?" This article considers the illusory trust doctrine (ITD) and claims that although the ITD has been criticised as doctrinally unfounded and therefore based in substantive, non-legal reasons rather than pre-existing law, there are formal reasons of trusts law to support it. It begins by considering Atiyah and Summers' concepts of form and substance, and then examines how they apply in the context of equity (in general), and then trusts law (in particular). It then briefly considers a number of recent decisions on the ITD: the four cases constituting the Clayton v Clayton litigation in New Zealand, Pugachev and the Cook Islands Court of Appeal and Privy Council decisions in Webb v Webb. Finally, it analyses these ITD decisions using the form and substance distinction, concluding that it is arguable that the ITD is grounded in principles of established trust law, as opposed to purely substantive reasoning.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 42-48
Author(s):  
E. Yu. Boyko

The article is devoted to the directions of improvement of appeal proceedings in the civil process, identified in the analysis of legislation and practice of its application, in connection with the reform of the judicial system. The author not only considers the questions of implementation of the court of appeal of its powers, justifies the need for disclosure of criteria allowing the direction of the court of appeal the case for a new trial in the court of first instance, the limits of choice in the exercise of judicial discretion outside of the petition of appeal, the improvement of term of making a petition of appeal, eliminate of the term “appeal determination”, enshrined in the law of procedure of familiarization with the act court of appeal and its further complaints, but also indicates ways of solving them.


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