Governmental functions and the specification of rights

2019 ◽  
pp. 147488511985756
Author(s):  
Cosmin Vraciu
Author(s):  
András Sajó ◽  
Renáta Uitz

This chapter examines the idea of separating distinct governmental functions into at least three branches (horizontal separation) as a means to safeguard individual liberty. The three branches of government have different functions: the legislature legislates, the executive branch executes the laws, and the judiciary administers justice. This corresponds to the functional distribution of essential governmental tasks and competences. The chapter explores how governments based on separated (or at least divided) powers work, in a perpetual balancing exercise as a result of the operation of checks and balances. Finally, it discusses independent agencies that are now routinely added to the old constitutional mix of powers and the problem of outsourcing public powers to private actors.


1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard N. Swift

No governmental functions are traditionally more suspect than those relating to public information. National legislators always demur at the public relations work of civil servants. They inevitably assume (at times, with good reason) that appropriating funds to inform people about the performance of government agencies only helps to preserve the bureaucracy and to create and nurture a public which ultimately will bring pressure to bear upon the legislature itself.


2020 ◽  
pp. 47-84
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner

The constitution of the Roman Republic featured a system of checks and balances that would eventually influence the American founders, yet it was very different from the system of separation of powers that the founders created. The Roman senate gave advice but did not legislate; the people voted directly on bills and appointments in popular assemblies; and a group of magistrates, led by a pair of consuls, proposed bills, brought prosecutions, served as judges, led military forces, and performed other governmental functions. This chapter analyzes the Roman constitution from the perspective of agency theory, and argues that the extensive checks and balances, which were intended to prevent the recurrence of monarchy, may have gone too far. Suitable for an earlier period in which the population was small and the political class was homogenous, the constitution proved unworkable when Rome acquired a vast, diverse empire. The lessons of Roman constitutionalism for the American constitution are also discussed.


Legal Studies ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 264-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary KY Chan

This paper examines fundamental issues concerning a corporation's right to sue for defamatory attacks on its reputation, the scope of the right and the remedies available. It first outlines the opposed positions in England and Australia, respectively. It also argues that a corporation, save for a government corporation that exercises governmental functions based on markedly different rationales, should have the right to sue in defamation premised on the concept of corporate reputation as property and for the purpose of vindicating its reputation. On the question of remedies, a corporation should be entitled to recover special damages as reparation for damage to reputation provided they are proved. This paper considers, instead of presumed damages, alternative remedies for vindicating corporate reputation. Finally, it examines the business and non-business reputations of both trading and non-trading corporations in relation to claims for damages.


1981 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward H. Buehrig

The resolution is a convenient vehicle, alternative to the cumbersome procedure of treaty-making, whereby an already established international organization—itself treaty-based—may create entities which, in turn, are corporate beings. Structurally they very much resemble each other. Functionally they are similar in their direct involvement in international relations, though they establish contact with governments and private parties in different ways. Through research and debate they may seek consensus in a particular area. More typically, they may render tangible benefits: a benefit for the taking, or a conditional benefit, the latter affording leverage on fellow actors in the international system. They may also perform governmental functions, with or without territorial jurisdiction.


1914 ◽  
Vol 1 (7) ◽  
pp. 497
Author(s):  
Charles M. Bryan

1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avery Leiserson

Time was, perhaps before the New Deal, when the limitations upon executive reorganization were largely self-limitations, which arose from a conception of administrative reform as primarily a technical problem. That is to say, students of administration assumed that their work had nothing to do with politics. The basic political decisions were to be acknowledged, and if changes were necessary they would be made by legislative enactment. Administrative analysis consisted in determining, according to criteria of efficiency and economy, the proper distribution and relationships of governmental functions. The responsibilities of the technician ended with the submission of a factual report and plans for reorganization, except that if the politicians insisted upon a different set of organizational objectives, he might give advice on the best arrangements for meeting those objectives. He might accept the responsibility of a consultant or adviser on organizational policy; but in so doing he was acting in a professional capacity, contributing the results of his experience in investigating methods of policy execution.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document