Financial control over the performance of State-financed institutions: The institutional approach

Subject. The article discusses the role of the controlling function of governance as part of the evaluation of State-financed institutions' performance. Objectives. The study substantiates institutional aspects of the concept Control with reference to State-financed institutions and the specifics of their finance. I also carry out the theoretical examination of the need in controlling their performance. Methods. The study involves general scientific methods. Drawing on the systems approach and logical generalization, I sorted prevailing views on the analyzable categories. The abstraction was applied to summarize the main conclusions. Results. Scholars still interpret financial control differently. Furthermore, regulatory documents, which are adopted by both the legislature and the government, are not consistent with the existing views on financial control. Some interim types of financial control may possibly be something else, which shall be further studied. In my opinion, any activities associated with financial flows shall be qualified as financial. Therefore, the respective control is financial. governmental budgetary control is subdivided into control over budgetary and extrabudgetary finance due the specifics of budgetary institutions' finance. As the performance of State-financed institutions is evaluated in terms of the efficiency of budgetary spending on governmental functions, control should pursue the evaluation of State-financed institutions' performance by source of finance. Conclusions and Relevance. Governmental financial control includes several interim types, including budgetary and extrabudgetary activities. The performance of State-financed institutions shall be monitored by the two aspects so as to evaluate whether budgetary funds are efficiently spent on governmental functions. The findings are designated for unfolding theoretical views on the control over State-financed institutions' performance as a crucial tool for administration. The findings can be used for scientific and practical purposes in accounting and control.

Parlamente in der Pandemie: Anlass für Verfassungspessimismus?

The pandemic has not led to a crisis of the parliamentary system of government . The Bun­destag in particular has upheld its governmental functions during the Corona crisis . But it could be more open to practice “virtual parliamentarism” . Parliamentary government via the interplay of the Infection Protection Act and statutory ordinances has also shown to be suitable for solving the pandemic; and with regard to the constitutional separation of pow­ers: Especially in a crisis, the executive is only as independent as parliament allows it to be .

Privatización de funciones inherentemente estatales

Interbranch delegation of powers has been an issue of deep and recurrent analysis in our field; particularly, the exercise of legislative powers by the Executive branch. Conversely, the delega-tion of inherently governmental functions to private parties has received less attention. This essay tries to determine what should be understood by such, and consequently, if the transfer of certain quintessential state matters to private hands is tolerated by our legal system –and if so, under what circumstances– in light of the non-delegation doctrine, due process of law and the democratic form of government.

New wine in old bottles: applicability of the rules on attribution to cyberattacks committed against objects of critical infrastructure

Growing number of cyberattacks committed by states or with their support testifies to the need of legal attribution for the purposeof international responsibility. Tallin Manual that comprises authoritative findings on how the attribution rules should be applied raisesa serious concern about the practical possibility to establish attribution. The main reason for this concern may be found in the nature ofcyberspace that is characterized by anonymity, spoofing and targeting from the territory of other states etc.The rules of Tallinn Manual reiterated the provisions of ARSIWA and do not evidence about the existence of lex specialis forcyberattacks attribution. Pursuant to them, states are responsible for actions of their de facto and de jure organs empowered to exercisethe elements of governmental functions, private actors within their effective control or for the violation of due diligence obligations.This article argues that there is no necessity to change the rules on attribution, but, due to limited human and technical resourcesof most states, a special body for technical attribution should be created. The author analyses the different proposals that foresees amembership of states or fully excludes it. Notwithstanding a model, which may be chosen, there should be a variety of technical exper -tise and limitations of states ability to impact a decision concerning the choice of a case and its outcomes.

New wine in old bottles: applicability of the rules on attribution to cyberattacks committed against objects of critical infrastructure

Growing number of cyberattacks committed by states or with their support testifies to the need of legal attribution for the purposeof international responsibility. Tallin Manual that comprises authoritative findings on how the attribution rules should be applied raisesa serious concern about the practical possibility to establish attribution. The main reason for this concern may be found in the nature ofcyberspace that is characterized by anonymity, spoofing and targeting from the territory of other states etc.The rules of Tallinn Manual reiterated the provisions of ARSIWA and do not evidence about the existence of lex specialis forcyberattacks attribution. Pursuant to them, states are responsible for actions of their de facto and de jure organs empowered to exercisethe elements of governmental functions, private actors within their effective control or for the violation of due diligence obligations.This article argues that there is no necessity to change the rules on attribution, but, due to limited human and technical resourcesof most states, a special body for technical attribution should be created. The author analyses the different proposals that foresees amembership of states or fully excludes it. Notwithstanding a model, which may be chosen, there should be a variety of technical exper -tise and limitations of states ability to impact a decision concerning the choice of a case and its outcomes.

The Constitution of the Roman Republic

The constitution of the Roman Republic featured a system of checks and balances that would eventually influence the American founders, yet it was very different from the system of separation of powers that the founders created. The Roman senate gave advice but did not legislate; the people voted directly on bills and appointments in popular assemblies; and a group of magistrates, led by a pair of consuls, proposed bills, brought prosecutions, served as judges, led military forces, and performed other governmental functions. This chapter analyzes the Roman constitution from the perspective of agency theory, and argues that the extensive checks and balances, which were intended to prevent the recurrence of monarchy, may have gone too far. Suitable for an earlier period in which the population was small and the political class was homogenous, the constitution proved unworkable when Rome acquired a vast, diverse empire. The lessons of Roman constitutionalism for the American constitution are also discussed.

Varying Climate Change Governance

This chapter uses climate change governance to illustrate how policymakers can engage in an integrated analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of defining agency jurisdiction along each of the dimensions for different governmental functions. In particular, the chapter assesses and considers alternatives to the interjurisdictional frameworks that have begun to develop, with a three-part focus on climate change adaptation, mitigation, and geoengineering activities. Though undoubtedly contextual within these three general categories of emerging governance, each presents challenges and implies different tradeoffs that are likely to be more consistent with particular types of allocations. The chapter extrapolates from the insights from the book's earlier case studies and draws plausible inferences based on justifications for particular allocations to propose configurations for these three emerging regulatory regimes. Finally, the chapter explains how climate change governance illustrates the merit of integrating into institutional design strategies that promote learning about the efficacy of adopted allocations.

Reorganizing Government

Reorganizing Government seeks to transform how policymakers and scholars understand relationships between government institutions, and offers a pioneering model for constructing and assessing government authority. Regulation is frequently less successful than it could be. This is at least partly because the relationships among regulatory institutions are poorly understood and regulatory structures are routinely poorly designed. The book advances a framework for assessing how governmental authority may be structured along three dimensions-centralization, overlap, and coordination-and demonstrates how differentiating among these dimensions and among particular governmental functions (e.g., standard setting, enforcement) better illuminates the tradeoffs of organizational alternatives. It illustrates these neglected dimensional and functional aspects of interjurisdictional relations through six in-depth explorations involving securities and banking regulation, food safety, environmental protection, and terrorism prevention. In each case study, the authors explore how differentiating among dimensions, and among particular governmental functions, better illuminates the advantages and disadvantages of available structural options. (Re)Organizing Government thus offers a way for officials and scholars to evaluate both adopted and contemplated allocations of authority and to structure intergovernmental authority more effectively. It uses the lens of climate change, an emerging and vital global policy challenge, to illustrate the practical value of applying the book's novel analytical framework to future reorganization efforts. The book concludes by proposing an "adaptive governance" infrastructure that provides a way for policymakers to embed the creation, evaluation, and adjustment of the organization of regulatory institutions into the democratic process itself.

The Public Sector Duty of Care and Diligence

Every Australian jurisdiction has imposed a duty of care and diligence on directors and other officials of public sector entities. This duty is modelled on the duty applicable to directors and officers of corporations and plays a significant role in setting governance standards in the public sector. This article examines the interpretation of the duty and its effectiveness in setting governance standards across the public sector. It argues that there is evidence of an emerging community expectation that entities which carry out governmental functions or manage public resources should be required to take reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of those functions, but that this standard has received only incomplete recognition in Australian legislation. The article argues further that the public sector duty of care presents significant difficulties in interpretation given that some of the key concepts relating to the private sector duty are not readily translatable to the public sector and that the mechanisms for enforcement in every jurisdiction are inconsistent, ineffective and lack a clear policy rationale. The consequence is that the duty of care and diligence does not play a significant role in setting governance standards in the public sector.