scholarly journals Game of neutrophils: modeling the balance between apoptosis and necrosis

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (S6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alva Presbitero ◽  
Emiliano Mancini ◽  
Filippo Castiglione ◽  
Valeria V. Krzhizhanovskaya ◽  
Rick Quax

Abstract Background Neutrophils are one of the key players in the human innate immune system (HIIS). In the event of an insult where the body is exposed to inflammation triggering moieties (ITMs), neutrophils are mobilized towards the site of insult and antagonize the inflammation. If the inflammation is cleared, neutrophils go into a programmed death called apoptosis. However, if the insult is intense or persistent, neutrophils take on a violent death pathway called necrosis, which involves the rupture of their cytoplasmic content into the surrounding tissue that causes local tissue damage, thus further aggravating inflammation. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon fuels the inflammatory process by triggering the recruitment of additional neutrophils to the site of inflammation, aimed to contribute to the complete neutralization of severe inflammation. This delicate balance between the cost and benefit of the neutrophils’ choice of death pathway has been optimized during the evolution of the innate immune system. The goal of our work is to understand how the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of the different death pathways of neutrophils, in response to various levels of insults, has been optimized over evolutionary time by using the concepts of evolutionary game theory. Results We show that by using evolutionary game theory, we are able to formulate a game that predicts the percentage of necrosis and apoptosis when exposed to various levels of insults. Conclusion By adopting an evolutionary perspective, we identify the driving mechanisms leading to the delicate balance between apoptosis and necrosis in neutrophils’ cell death in response to different insults. Using our simple model, we verify that indeed, the global cost of remaining ITMs is the driving mechanism that reproduces the percentage of necrosis and apoptosis observed in data and neutrophils need sufficient information of the overall inflammation to be able to pick a death pathway that presumably increases the survival of the organism.

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rocío Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer

In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards.


Author(s):  
Wenqin Cao ◽  
Xiang Xu

Using evolutionary game theory, the factors influencing the cooperation between high-speed railway express and express companies were further investigated. The results show that the evolutionary game path of the system is related to the excess returns, cooperation costs, excess returns, cost-sharing allocation coefficients and default amounts of both sides in the payment matrix. Specifically, when the excess returns are greater than the cost of cooperation, the two parties can cooperate, and the probability of cooperation is positively related to the excess returns and negatively related to the cost of cooperation. Penalties affect the possibility of cooperation between the two parties and are related to the parameters of cooperation.


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