scholarly journals Sanctions and international interaction improve cooperation to avert climate change

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Grimalda ◽  
Alexis Belianin ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Till Requate ◽  
Marina Ryzhkova
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Experimental Test ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Interaction ◽  
Expected Payoffs ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract Imposing sanctions on noncompliant parties to international agreements is often advocated as a remedy for international cooperation failure, notably in climate agreements. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture in a collective-risk social dilemma simulating the effort to avoid catastrophic climate change. We involve groups of participants from two cultural areas that were shown to achieve different levels of cooperation nationally when peer-level sanctions were available. Here we show that, while this result still holds nationally, international interaction backed by sanctions is overall beneficial. Cooperation by low cooperator groups increases significantly in comparison with national cooperation and converges to the cooperation levels of high cooperation groups. While the increase is only marginally significant without sanctions, it becomes sizable when sanctions are imposed. When sanctions are available, individuals are willing to cooperate above the level that would maximize expected payoffs. Revealing or hiding counterparts’ nationality does not affect results.

scholarly journals Sanctions and international interaction improve cooperation to avert climate change

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Grimalda ◽  
Alexis Belianin ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Till Requate ◽  
Marina Ryzhkova
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Experimental Test ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Interaction ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract Imposing sanctions on noncompliant parties to international agreements is often advocated as a remedy for international cooperation failure, notably in climate agreements. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture in a collective-risk social dilemma simulating the effort to avoid catastrophic climate change. We involve groups of participants from two cultural areas that were shown to achieve different levels of cooperation nationally when peer-level sanctions were available. Here we show that, while this result still holds nationally, international interaction backed by sanctions is overall beneficial. Cooperation by low cooperator groups increases in comparison with national cooperation and converges to the cooperation levels of high cooperation groups. While such an increase is small without sanctions, it becomes sizable when sanctions are imposed. Revealing or hiding counterparts’ nationality does not affect results. Our study supports the proposal to use sanctions to support international cooperation to avert collective risk such as climate change.

scholarly journals Sanctions and international interaction improve cooperation to avert climate change

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Grimalda ◽  
Alexis Belianin ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Till Requate ◽  
Marina V. Ryzhkova
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Strong Preference ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Interaction

Imposing sanctions on non-compliant parties to international agreements is advocated as a remedy for international cooperation failure. Nevertheless, sanctions are costly, and rational choice theory predicts their ineffectiveness in solving cooperation problems. Empirically, sanctions were shown to increase cooperation substantially in some cultural areas but to be detrimental in others. We test sanctions' effectiveness experimentally in international collective-risk social dilemmas simulating efforts to avoid catastrophic climate change. We involve individuals from cultural areas where sanctions were shown to have different effectiveness: Russia and Germany. Here we show that, while this result still holds nationally, international interaction backed by sanctions is beneficial. Cooperation by low cooperator groups increases relative to national cooperation and converges to the levels of high cooperators. Moreover, international groups interacting under sanctions contribute more to catastrophe prevention than what is prescribed by the group payoff-maximizing solution. This behavior signals a strong preference for protection against collective risks.

THE CANCUN CLIMATE AGREEMENTS: READING THE TEXT, SUBTEXT AND TEA LEAVES

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lavanya Rajamani
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
Tea Leaves ◽  
New Era ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Climate Negotiations

The Cancun Agreements, hailed by Patricia Espinosa, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs and President of the Cancun Conference, as launching ‘a new era of international cooperation on climate change,’1 were concluded on 11 December 2010 to widespread acclaim. These agreements that will guide the climate negotiations for the foreseeable future represent another twist in the tale of the ongoing negotiations.

scholarly journals The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change

2008 ◽  
Vol 105 (7) ◽  
pp. 2291-2294 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Milinski ◽  
R. D. Sommerfeld ◽  
H.-J. Krambeck ◽  
F. A. Reed ◽  
J. Marotzke
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
Dangerous Climate Change

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110273
Author(s):  
Aseem Mahajan ◽  
Reuben Kline ◽  
Dustin Tingley
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Characteristic Feature ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Intergovernmental Panel ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Alternating Offers ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

scholarly journals Exploring the interactions between vulnerability, resilience and adaptation to extreme temperatures

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Raquel Nunes
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Separate Analysis ◽  
Extreme Temperatures ◽  
Older Individuals ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Adaptation To Climate Change ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
Integrated Assessments ◽  
Current Deficit ◽  
Different Levels

AbstractProposed ways of improving adaptation to climate change have most often been supported by narrowly framed and separate analysis. This article investigates how different levels of vulnerability and resilience interplay with adaptation to extreme temperatures, what is the nature of these relationships and whether lower vulnerability and higher resilience contribute to increased adaptation. This article explores the governance implications of a project that, unlike other, brings together vulnerability, resilience and adaptation assessments. The project has made significant advances in addressing the current deficit integrated assessments for shaping governance propositions. Such propositions argue that the diverse levels of vulnerability and resilience convey important bases for (1) targeting at-risk older individuals; (2) developing vulnerability reduction actions; (3) resilience building actions; and (4) understanding ‘success cases’ and learn from them for developing appropriate policy measures. Taken together, these propositions offer a social, psychological and health framework not simply for governing extreme temperatures but for governing responses to climate change at large.

scholarly journals The COVID-19 test of the United Nations Security Council

2021 ◽  
pp. 002070202098689
Author(s):  
Bruno Charbonneau
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
United Nations ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Global Order ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
The United Nations

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has failed the COVID-19 test, unable to promote or facilitate multilateral cooperation in dealing with the outbreak. This is worrying given its relevance as a principal organ of the United Nations (UN) that could enable or constrain international cooperation and given the need for such cooperation in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. The failure of the UNSC to respond adequately to the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the historical limits of the UNSC as a forum for international cooperation. It also suggests that highlighting and debating UNSC reforms are not sufficient or even productive ways to move forward, especially in the context of the challenges that pandemics and climate change represent for global cooperation. It is far from clear if the UN system can change the global structures on which it was built. What does seem clear is that the UNSC is not where one will find the seeds of change for reimagining global order.

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