COVID-19 £500 bonus payments for pharmacists

This paper studies how receiving a bonus changes the consumers’ demand for auto loans and the risk of future delinquency. Unlike traditional consumer products, auto loans have a long-term impact on consumers’ financial state because of the monthly payment obligation. Using a large consumer panel data set of credit and employment information, the authors find that receiving a bonus increases auto loan demand by 21 percent. These loans, however, are associated with higher risk, as the delinquency rate increases by 18.5 −31.4 percent depending on different measures. In contrast, an increase in consumers’ base salary will increase the demand for auto loans but not the delinquency. By comparing consumers with bonuses with those without bonuses, the authors find that bonus payments lead to both demand expansion and demand shifting on auto loans. The empirical findings help shed light on how consumers make financial decisions and have important implications for financial institutions on when demand for auto loans and the associated risk arise.

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Organizational environments and bonus payments: Rent destruction or rent sharing?

Research in Social Stratification and Mobility ◽

10.1016/j.rssm.2016.04.005 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 47 ◽

pp. 7-19 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Michael Schweiker ◽

Martin Groß

Keyword(s):

Organizational Environments ◽

Bonus Payments ◽

Rent Sharing

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Works councils and performance appraisals

Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership ◽

10.1108/jpeo-10-2019-0027 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

pp. 29-50

Author(s):

Christian Grund ◽

Dirk Sliwka ◽

Krystina Titz

Keyword(s):

Industrial Relations ◽

Performance Appraisals ◽

Data Sets ◽

Content Type ◽

Works Councils ◽

Bonus Payments ◽

Actual Use ◽

And Performance ◽

Works Council ◽

The Individual

PurposeWe analyze the role of works councils for the use of performance appraisals (PA). We distinguish between the incidence of PA systems as intended by the firm and their actual implementation on the level of the individual employee.Design/methodology/approachWe draw on two complementary data sets. These are the German Linked Personnel Panel (LPP), which combines firm-based information with information provided by several of those employees, and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is a representative longitudinal study of persons living in Germany.FindingsWe find that works councils tend to promote rather than restrict PA. Employees working in establishments with a works council are more likely to face a formal PA procedure. Works councils also act as a transmission institution for the actual use of an existing PA system – i.e. among the firms that claim to implement PA for all their employees, the likelihood of their employees actually having regular appraisals is substantially larger when works councils are in place. Moreover, the existence of works councils is positively related particularly to PA systems, which affects bonus payments.Research limitations/implicationsWe contribute to the understanding of the work of works councils in firms. In more general, we shed light to the relation of industrial relations and human resource management in firms.Practical implicationsThis result hints at a higher acceptance of PA systems in firms with works councils. It seems likely that the stronger formalization of such systems necessitated by codetermination laws increases the likelihood of supervisors consistently carrying out such appraisals.Originality/valueWe are the first who complement the analysis of the existence of HR practices (PA system) with its actual use for employees.

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Do households smooth expenditure over anticipated income changes? Evidence from bonus payments to public employees in Japan

Journal of the Japanese and International Economies ◽

10.1016/j.jjie.2012.06.001 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 26 (3) ◽

pp. 405-433 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Masahiro Hori ◽

Satoshi Shimizutani

Keyword(s):

Public Employees ◽

Bonus Payments

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Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs

American Economic Journal Microeconomics ◽

10.1257/mic.20170294 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 11 (4) ◽

pp. 33-58

Author(s):

Matthias Fahn ◽

Nicolas Klein

Keyword(s):

Private Information ◽

Alternative Explanation ◽

Relational Contracts ◽

Truth Telling ◽

Relational Contract ◽

Bonus Payments ◽

The Future ◽

Short Run ◽

Future Value ◽

The Relationship

We analyze a relational-contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling, the optimal relational contract may introduce distortions after a bad report. For some levels of the discount factor, output is reduced by more than would be sequentially optimal. This distortion is attenuated over time even if prospects remain bad. Our model thus provides an alternative explanation for indirect short-run costs of downsizing. (JEL D23, D82, D86)

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Quality-Based Payment for Medical Groups and Individual Physicians

INQUIRY The Journal of Health Care Organization Provision and Financing ◽

10.5034/inquiryjrnl_46.02.172 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 46 (2) ◽

pp. 172-181 ◽

Cited By ~ 22

Author(s):

James C. Robinson ◽

Stephen M. Shortell ◽

Diane R. Rittenhouse ◽

Sara Fernandes-Taylor ◽

Robin R. Gillies ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Primary Care ◽

Patient Satisfaction ◽

Primary Care Physicians ◽

Pay For Performance ◽

Fee For Service ◽

Performance Incentives ◽

Payment Incentives ◽

Medical Groups ◽

Bonus Payments ◽

Service Basis

This paper measures the extent to which medical groups experience external pay-for-performance incentives based on quality and patient satisfaction and the extent to which these groups pay their primary care and specialist physicians using similar criteria. Over half (52%) of large medical groups received bonus payments from health insurance plans in the period 2006–2007 based on measures of quality and patient satisfaction. Medical groups facing external pay-for-performance incentives are more likely to pay their primary care physicians (odds ratio [OR] 4.5; p<.001) and specialists (OR 2.5; p=.07) based on quality and satisfaction. Groups facing capitation payment incentives to control costs are more likely to pay member physicians on salary and less likely to pay based on productivity (p<.001 for primary care; p<.05 for specialists) than groups paid by insurers on a fee-for-service basis.

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