Dissociable influences of reward and punishment on adaptive cognitive control

To invest effort into any cognitive task, people must be sufficiently motivated. Whereas prior research has focused primarily on how the cognitive control required to complete these tasks is motivated by the potential rewards for success, it is also known that control investment can be equally motivated by the potential negative consequence for failure. Previous theoretical and experimental work has yet to examine how positive and negative incentives differentially influence the manner and intensity with which people allocate control. Here, we develop and test a normative model of control allocation under conditions of varying positive and negative performance incentives. Our model predicts, and our empirical findings confirm, that rewards for success and punishment for failure should differentially influence adjustments to the evidence accumulation rate versus response threshold, respectively. This dissociation further enabled us to infer how motivated a given person was by the consequences of success versus failure.

Effect of provider and patient reminders, deployment of nurse practitioners, and financial incentives on cervical and breast cancer screening rates

<p>Objective : To evaluate the effect of the Provider and Patient Reminders in Ontario: Multi-Strategy Prevention Tools (P-PROMPT) reminder and recall system and pay-for-performance incentives on the delivery rates of cervical and breast cancer screening in primary care practices in Ontario, with or without deployment of nurse practitioners (NPs). </p> <p>Design : Before-and-after comparisons of the time-appropriate delivery rates of cervical and breast cancer screening using the automated and NP–augmented strategies of the P-PROMPT reminder and recall system. </p> <p>Setting : Southwestern Ontario. </p> <p>Participants : A total of 232 physicians from 24 primary care network or family health network groups across 110 different sites eligible for pay-for-performance incentives. </p> <p>Interventions : The P-PROMPT project combined pay-for-performance incentives with provider and patient reminders and deployment of NPs to enhance the delivery of preventive care services. </p> <p>Main outcome measures : The mean delivery rates at the practice level of time-appropriate mammograms and Papanicolaou tests completed within the previous 30 months. </p> <p>Results : Before-and-after comparisons of time-appropriate delivery rates (<30 months) of cancer screening showed the rates of Pap tests and mammograms for eligible women significantly increased over a 1-year period by 6.3% (P >< .001) and 5.3% (P < .001), respectively. The NP-augmented strategy achieved comparable rate increases to the automated strategy alone in the delivery rates of both services. </p> <p>Conclusion : The use of provider and patient reminders and pay-forperformance incentives resulted in increases in the uptake of Pap tests and mammograms among eligible primary care patients over a 1-year period in family practices in Ontario.</p>

Research on Public Rental Housing PPP Project Launching Dilemmas with Dynamic Evolutionary Game

The public housing PPP projects have encountered a cold reception from the government, which constrained solving the urban housing problem. This paper builds a dynamic game model under incomplete contract conditions, analyzes the key factors affecting the signing of PPP contracts by dynamic evolutionary game analysis, and verifies these factors by simulation. The results show that fiscal spending smoothing, risk transfer, and government performance can promote government to adopt cooperation strategy. Expected project benefits and government performance incentives can promote private capital to adopt cooperation strategy. Changes in transaction cost have a significant impact on the decision of cooperation strategy.

Do Women Respond Less to Performance Pay? Building Evidence from Multiple Experiments

Existing empirical work raises the hypothesis that performance pay—whatever its output gains—may widen the gender earnings gap because women may respond less to incentives. We evaluate this possibility by aggregating evidence from existing experiments on performance incentives with male and female subjects. Using a Bayesian hierarchical model, we estimate both the average effect and heterogeneity across studies. We find that the gender response difference is close to zero and heterogeneity across studies is small, while performance pay increases output by 0.36 standard deviations on average. The data thus support agency theory for men and women alike. (JEL C11, C90, J16, J31, J33)

Exploring patient experiences coping with using multiple medications: a qualitative interview study

ObjectiveLong-term adherence to evidence-based medications in cardiometabolic diseases remains poor, despite extensive efforts to develop and test interventions and deploy clinician performance incentives. The limited success of interventions may be due to ignored factors such as patients’ experience of medication-taking. Despite being potentially addressable by clinicians, these factors have not been sufficiently explored, which is particularly important as patients use increasing numbers of medications. The aim is to explore patient perspectives on medication-taking, medication properties that are barriers to adherence, and coping strategies for their medication regimen.DesignIndividual, in-person, semistructured qualitative interviews.SettingUrban healthcare system.ParticipantsTwenty-six adults taking ≥2 oral medications for diabetes, hypertension or hyperlipidaemia with non-adherence. Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. Data were analysed using developed codes to generate themes. Representative quotations were selected to illustrate themes.ResultsParticipants’ mean age was 55 years, 46% were female and 39% were non-white. Six key themes were identified: (1) medication-taking viewed as a highly inconvenient action (that patients struggle to remember to do); (2) negative implications because of inconvenience or illness perceptions; (3) actual medication regimens can deviate substantially from prescribed regimens; (4) certain medication properties (especially size and similar appearance with others) may contribute to adherence deviations; (5) development of numerous coping strategies to overcome barriers and (6) suggestions to make medication-taking easier (including reducing drug costs, simplifying regimen or dosing frequency and creating more palatable medications).ConclusionPatients with poor adherence often find taking prescription medications to be undesirable and take them differently than prescribed in part due to properties of the medications themselves and coping strategies they have developed to overcome medication-taking challenges. Interventions that reduce the inconvenience of medication use and tailor medications to individual needs may be a welcome development.

Swachh Survekshan Needs to Clean up its Methodology: An Assessment of Ranks as Performance Incentives for Indian Cities

The Government of India is increasingly using ranks to incentivise sub-units of government. The largest such exercise, the Swachh Survekshan, has been conducted since 2016 and aims to incentivise cities to compete on and improve waste management and sanitation outcomes. Using publicly available Swachh Survekshan data, this article suggests that the current scoring methodology provides weak signals to urban local bodies (ULBs) and citizens on performance metrics. In particular, it shows that the ranks are not consistent and stable across years, there are severe discrepancies in data between components of the awarded score, and that the current methodology favours larger cities. Caution must be exercised, therefore, in interpreting the current methodology as fostering competition. More crucially, a ranking exercise is unlikely to succeed as a policy tool unless it is implemented as one component of a broader effort to improve ULB capacity on managing administrative data.

Health, Safety, Incentives And Motivation In Employee Performance At Aneka Lovina Villas & Spa

This study aims to determine the effect of health & safety on motivation, the effect of incentives on motivation, the effect of health & safety on employee performance, the effect of incentives on employee performance, the effect of motivation on employee performance at Aneka Lovina Villas & Spa. This study uses a quantitative approach, the population in this study are all employees of various lovina villas & spas. The sample was 79 respondents who were determined by questions in the form of a questionnaire to the respondents. The technique uses saturated samples. The data analysis technique used in this research is the SPSS model. The results showed that health & safety had a positive and significant effect on motivation, incentives had a positive and significant effect on motivation, health & safety had a positive and significant effect on employee performance, incentives had a positive and significant impact on employee performance, and motivation had a positive and significant effect on performance. employee.

Kinerja Karyawan Bank Syariah : Evaluasi Faktor-faktor Pengaruhnya

The problem in this research is the decline in the performance of marketing employees of Bank BRI Syariah Semarang due to not being able to achieve the targets that have been charged. The research aims to evaluate the influence of incentive factors, emotional intelligence, organizational commitment and work morale on employee performance. The population as well as the sample in this study were all marketing employees of Bank BRI Syariah Semarang totaling 40 people (census technique). The analytical tool in this study is multiple linear regression. The results show that incentives, emotional intelligence, organizational commitment and work morale partially have a positive and significant effect on the performance of marketing employees of Bank BRI Syariah Semarang and the adjusted R square value in the regression model is 0.628 or 68.6 percent of employee performance can be explained by variations incentive variables, emotional intelligence, organizational commitment and morale while the remaining 31.4 percent is explained by other variables. Keywords: performance, incentives, emotional, commitment, passion