Memoirs: On the Nature of the Trabecula Cranii

1931 ◽  
Vol s2-74 (296) ◽  
pp. 701-536
Author(s):  
G.R. R. de BEER
Keyword(s):  
Rana Temporaria ◽  
Ventral Side ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Prima Facie Case ◽  
The Brain

1. The existing evidence concerning the origin and nature of the trabecula cranii is reviewed, and it is shown that it constitutes a prima facie case for supporting Huxley's opinion that it represents a visceral structure. 2. The origin of the trabecula is studied in Scyllium canicula, Salmo fario, Rana temporaria, and Amblystoma tigrinum, and the results of this investigation support Huxley's opinion. 3. The grounds for adhering to Huxley's view are chiefly that: the trabecular rudiment is a mesenchymatous condensation in the maxillary process; there is no evidence of the trabecular rudiment being derived from the somites; the trabecular rudiment is closely associated with that of the pterygo-quadrate; if the trabecular rudiment is of sclerotomic origin, then the palatine process of the pterygo-quadrate and the mesenchyme of the ventral side of the front of the head must also be derived from the sclerotonies: an impossible conclusion. 4. The implications of the recognition of the trabecula as a premandibular arch are considered, and it is concluded that the mouth of Gnathostomata represents the original velar perforation of Amphioxus which has extended to the side and obliterated a pair of mandibular clefts or the dermal pouches corresponding to them. 5. Sewertzoff's view that the brain-case of Petromyzon is wholly chordal in composition is supported, and the homologues of the trabeculae are represented by a pair of premandibular visceral arches.

scholarly journals Human Rights Law Without Natural Moral Rights

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-232
Author(s):  
Rowan Cruft
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Current System ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Modern Human ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Prima Facie Case ◽  
Human Rights Practice

In this latest work by one of our leading political and legal philosophers, Allen Buchanan outlines a novel framework for assessing the system of international human rights law—the system that he takes to be the heart of modern human rights practice. Buchanan does not offer a full justification for the current system, but rather aims “to make a strong prima facie case that the existing system as a whole has what it takes to warrant our support of it on moral grounds, even if some aspects of it are defective and should be the object of serious efforts at improvement” (p. 173).

Prima Facie Case

2018 ◽  
pp. 2796-2797
Author(s):  
Robert L. Heilbronner
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Prima Facie Case

Fairness to Idleness is There A Right Not to Work?

1995 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Levine
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The State ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
Prima Facie Case ◽  
Involuntary Unemployment ◽  
Paid Employment ◽  
Productive Labor ◽  
The Unemployed

It is universally agreed that involuntary unemployment is an evil for unemployed individuals, who lose both income and the non-pecuniary benefits of paid employment, and for society, which loses the productive labor that the unemployed are unable to expend. It is nearly as widely agreed that there is at least a prima-facie case for alleviating this evil – for reasons of justice and/or benevolence and/or social order. Finally, there is little doubt that the evils of involuntary unemployment cannot be adequately addressed in contemporary societies without state intervention – whether through monetary or fiscal policies, cash payments or other subsidies to the unemployed, direct provision of employment by the state, or some combination of these measures.

Implementing Free Will

2011 ◽  
pp. 108-124
Author(s):  
Bruce Edmonds
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Evolutionary Algorithms ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Social Accountability ◽  
The Brain

Free will is described in terms of the useful properties that it could confer, explaining why it might have been selected for over the course of evolution. These properties are exterior unpredictability, interior rationality, and social accountability. A process is described that might bring it about when deployed in a suitable social context. It is suggested that this process could be of an evolutionary nature—that free will might “evolve” in the brain during development. This mental evolution effectively separates the internal and external contexts, while retaining the coherency between individual’s public accounts of their actions. This is supported by the properties of evolutionary algorithms and possesses the three desired properties. Some objections to the possibility of free will are dealt with by pointing out the prima facie evidence and showing how an assumption that everything must be either deterministic or random can result from an unsupported assumption of universalism.

Why Means MatterLegally Relevant Differences Between Direct and Indirect Interventions into Other Minds

2020 ◽  
pp. 49-88
Author(s):  
Jan Christoph Bublitz
Keyword(s):  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Causal Pathways ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
And Control ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Brain

Whether there are intrinsic differences between different means to intervene into brains and minds is a key question of neuroethics, which any future legal regulation of mind-interventions has to face. This chapter affirms such differences by a twofold argument:. First, it present differences between direct (biological, physiological) and indirect (psychological) interventions that are not based on crude mind–brain dualisms or dubious properties such as naturalness of interventions. Second, it shows why these differences (should) matter for the law. In a nutshell, this chapter suggests that indirect interventions should be understood as stimuli that persons perceive through their external senses whereas direct interventions reach brains and minds on different, nonperceptual routes. Interventions primarily differ in virtue of their causal pathways. Because of them, persons have different kinds and amounts of control over interventions; direct interventions regularly bypass resistance and control of recipients. Direct interventions also differ from indirect ones because they misappropriate mechanisms of the brain. These differences bear normative relevance in light of the right to mental self-determination, which should be the guiding normative principle with respect to mind-interventions. As a consequence, the law should adopt by and large a normative—not ontological—dualism between interventions into other minds: nonconsensual direct interventions into other minds should be prohibited by law, with few exceptions. By contrast, indirect interventions should be prima facie permissible, primarily those that qualify as exercises of free speech. The chapter also addresses a range of recent objections, especially by Levy (in the previous chapter).

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