Implementing Free Will

2011 ◽  
pp. 108-124
Author(s):  
Bruce Edmonds

Free will is described in terms of the useful properties that it could confer, explaining why it might have been selected for over the course of evolution. These properties are exterior unpredictability, interior rationality, and social accountability. A process is described that might bring it about when deployed in a suitable social context. It is suggested that this process could be of an evolutionary nature—that free will might “evolve” in the brain during development. This mental evolution effectively separates the internal and external contexts, while retaining the coherency between individual’s public accounts of their actions. This is supported by the properties of evolutionary algorithms and possesses the three desired properties. Some objections to the possibility of free will are dealt with by pointing out the prima facie evidence and showing how an assumption that everything must be either deterministic or random can result from an unsupported assumption of universalism.

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Rigoni ◽  
M. Brass ◽  
B. Burle
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

Nomological determinism does not mean everything is predictable. It just means everything follows the law of nature. And the most important thing Is that the brain and consciousness follow the law of nature. In other words, there is no free will. Without life, brain and consciousness, the world follows law of nature, that is clear. The life and brain are also part of nature, and they follow the law of nature. This is due to scientific findings. There are not enough scientific findings for consciousness yet. But I think that the consciousness is a nature phenomenon, and it also follows the law of nature.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Berent ◽  
Melanie Platt

Recent results suggest that people hold a notion of the true self, distinct from the self. Here, we seek to further elucidate the “true me”—whether it is good or bad, material or immaterial. Critically, we ask whether the true self is unitary. To address these questions, we invited participants to reason about John—a character who simultaneously exhibits both positive and negative moral behaviors. John’s character was gauged via two tests--a brain scan and a behavioral test, whose results invariably diverged (i.e., one test indicated that John’s moral core is positive and another negative). Participants assessed John’s true self along two questions: (a) Did John commit his acts (positive and negative) freely? and (b) What is John’s essence really? Responses to the two questions diverged. When asked to evaluate John’s moral core explicitly (by reasoning about his free will), people invariably descried John’s true self as good. But when John’s moral core was assessed implicitly (by considering his essence), people sided with the outcomes of the brain test. These results demonstrate that people hold conflicting notions of the true self. We formally support this proposal by presenting a grammar of the true self, couched within Optimality Theory. We show that the constraint ranking necessary to capture explicit and implicit view of the true self are distinct. Our intuitive belief in a true unitary “me” is thus illusory.


Author(s):  
Hans Liljenström

AbstractWhat is the role of consciousness in volition and decision-making? Are our actions fully determined by brain activity preceding our decisions to act, or can consciousness instead affect the brain activity leading to action? This has been much debated in philosophy, but also in science since the famous experiments by Libet in the 1980s, where the current most common interpretation is that conscious free will is an illusion. It seems that the brain knows, up to several seconds in advance what “you” decide to do. These studies have, however, been criticized, and alternative interpretations of the experiments can be given, some of which are discussed in this paper. In an attempt to elucidate the processes involved in decision-making (DM), as an essential part of volition, we have developed a computational model of relevant brain structures and their neurodynamics. While DM is a complex process, we have particularly focused on the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for its emotional, and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) for its cognitive aspects. In this paper, we present a stochastic population model representing the neural information processing of DM. Simulation results seem to confirm the notion that if decisions have to be made fast, emotional processes and aspects dominate, while rational processes are more time consuming and may result in a delayed decision. Finally, some limitations of current science and computational modeling will be discussed, hinting at a future development of science, where consciousness and free will may add to chance and necessity as explanation for what happens in the world.


2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E. J. Linden
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-83
Author(s):  
Jonas Gonçalves Coelho

Many neuroscientific experiments, based on monitoring brain activity, suggest that it is possible to predict the conscious intention/choice/decision of an agent before he himself knows that. Some neuroscientists and philosophers interpret the results of these experiments as showing that free will is an illusion, since it is the brain and not the conscious mind that intends/chooses/decides. Assuming that the methods and results of these experiments are reliable the question is if they really show that free will is an illusion. To address this problem, I argue that first it is needed to answer three questions related to the relationship between conscious mind and brain: 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do conscious events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that is, who consciously intends/chooses/ decides, the conscious mind, the brain, or both? I answer these questions by arguing that the conscious mind is a property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal capacity to interact adaptively with its body, and trough the body, with the physical and sociocultural environment. In other words, the brain is the agent and the conscious mind, in its various forms - cognitive, volitional and emotional - and contents, is its guide of action. Based on this general view I argue that the experiments aforementioned do not show that free will is an illusion, and as a starting point for examining this problem I point out, from some exemplary situations, what I believe to be some of the necessary conditions for free will.Key-words: Agent brain, conscious mind, free will, Libet-style experiments.


1931 ◽  
Vol s2-74 (296) ◽  
pp. 701-536
Author(s):  
G.R. R. de BEER

1. The existing evidence concerning the origin and nature of the trabecula cranii is reviewed, and it is shown that it constitutes a prima facie case for supporting Huxley's opinion that it represents a visceral structure. 2. The origin of the trabecula is studied in Scyllium canicula, Salmo fario, Rana temporaria, and Amblystoma tigrinum, and the results of this investigation support Huxley's opinion. 3. The grounds for adhering to Huxley's view are chiefly that: the trabecular rudiment is a mesenchymatous condensation in the maxillary process; there is no evidence of the trabecular rudiment being derived from the somites; the trabecular rudiment is closely associated with that of the pterygo-quadrate; if the trabecular rudiment is of sclerotomic origin, then the palatine process of the pterygo-quadrate and the mesenchyme of the ventral side of the front of the head must also be derived from the sclerotonies: an impossible conclusion. 4. The implications of the recognition of the trabecula as a premandibular arch are considered, and it is concluded that the mouth of Gnathostomata represents the original velar perforation of Amphioxus which has extended to the side and obliterated a pair of mandibular clefts or the dermal pouches corresponding to them. 5. Sewertzoff's view that the brain-case of Petromyzon is wholly chordal in composition is supported, and the homologues of the trabeculae are represented by a pair of premandibular visceral arches.


Author(s):  
Jay Schulkin

Sport as a practice and cognitive event is largely action-oriented: there is thought in action, even if it is not particularly conscious thought. Habits codified in the motor regions of the brain underlie action. Muscle memory is fundamental; it is a metaphor for the organization of action. Importantly, neurotransmitters such dopamine are tied to the organization of action, salience, cognition, and, perhaps, the prediction of events. Diverse regions of the brain (e.g., the amygdala) and neuropeptides (oxytocin) are linked to social contact and play-related behaviors, and these same regions are crucial to a broad-based assessment of social context and meaning.


2020 ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Yael Tamir

This chapter discusses the establishment of Nutopia, a borderless state anyone can voluntarily join, founded by John Lennon and Yoko Ono. It argues that a borderless world is far from ideal; it can be neither democratic nor just. The chapter also analyzes how a social contract eroded the rationality of transgenerational commitments, as the children of those who now invest in structuring some institution or another will grow up, be educated, mature, and age in another social context. It asserts that Nutopia is an attractive vision for those who do not depend on the existence of a social network for either their security or their livelihood. The chapter then shifts to examine the concept of borders and the movement across borders. It argues that all solutions presuppose closure and some restricted degree of free movement — hence no society is a voluntary association of people gathering together out of their own free will.


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