scholarly journals Leverage and the Financial Accelerator in a Liquidity Trap

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karel Mertens ◽  
Morten O Ravn
Keyword(s):  
Lower Bound ◽  
House Price ◽  
Financial Accelerator ◽  
Price Model ◽  
Financial Friction ◽  
Liquidity Trap ◽  
Collateral Constraint ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
Output Losses ◽  
Large Output

We show that the financial accelerator may be very large in a liquidity trap. We study a sticky price model with real estate and a financial friction specified as a collateral constraint. Expectations can lead the economy to a self-fulfilling liquidity trap equilibrium where the lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds. We model these equilibria as stochastic sunspots. As in the Great Depression, a liquidity trap entails house price depreciation and potentially large output losses. Higher leverage implies much larger output losses but at the same time rules out the existence of short-lived liquidity traps.

READING KEYNES AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE LIQUIDITY TRAP, AND UNCONVENTIONAL POLICY

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Sutch
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Lower Bound ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Great Depression ◽  
Zero Lower Bound ◽  
Liquidity Trap ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
Nominal Interest Rates

John Maynard Keynes’s analysis of the Great Depression has strong parallels to recent theorizing about the post-2008 Great Recession. There are also remarkable similarities between the two historical episodes: the collapse of demand for new fixed investment, the role of the zero lower bound liquidity trap in hampering conventional monetary policy, the multi-year period of near-zero short-term rates, and the protracted period of subnormal prosperity. A major difference between then and now is that monetary authorities in the recent situation actively pursued an unconventional policy with massive purchases of long-term securities. Keynes couldn’t convince authorities of his era to pursue such a plan, but it was precisely the monetary policy he advocated for a depressed economy stuck at the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.

scholarly journals Journal of the History of Economic Thought Preprints - READING KEYNES AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE LIQUIDITY TRAP, AND UNCONVENTIONAL POLICY

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Sutch
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Lower Bound ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Great Depression ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Zero Lower Bound ◽  
Liquidity Trap ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
Nominal Interest Rates ◽  
History Of

John Maynard Keynes’s analysis of the Great Depression has strong parallels to recent theorizing about the post-2008 Great Recession. There are also remarkable similarities between the two historical episodes: the collapse of demand for new fixed investment, the role of the zero-lower-bound liquidity trap in hampering conventional monetary policy, the multi-year period of near-zero short-term rates, and the protracted period of subnormal prosperity. A major difference between then and now that monetary authorities in the recent situation actively pursued an unconventional policy with massive purchases of long-term securities. Keynes couldn’t convince authorities of his era to pursue such a plan, but it was precisely the monetary policy he advocated for a depressed economy stuck at the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.

Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach*

2012 ◽  
Vol 127 (3) ◽  
pp. 1469-1513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gauti B. Eggertsson ◽  
Paul Krugman
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Great Depression ◽  
Aggregate Demand ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Liquidity Trap ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
Lost Decade ◽  
Debt Deflation

Abstract In this article we present a simple new Keynesian–style model of debt-driven slumps—that is, situations in which an overhang of debt on the part of some agents, who are forced into rapid deleveraging, is depressing aggregate demand. Making some agents debt-constrained is a surprisingly powerful assumption. Fisherian debt deflation, the possibility of a liquidity trap, the paradox of thrift and toil, a Keynesian-type multiplier, and a rationale for expansionary fiscal policy all emerge naturally from the model. We argue that this approach sheds considerable light both on current economic difficulties and on historical episodes, including Japan’s lost decade (now in its 18th year) and the Great Depression itself.

Bubbly Recessions

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 33-70
Author(s):  
Siddhartha Biswas ◽  
Andrew Hanson ◽  
Toan Phan
Keyword(s):  
Lower Bound ◽  
Wage Rigidity ◽  
Nominal Wage ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Financial Friction ◽  
Secular Stagnation ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Rigidity Constraint ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Nominal Wage Rigidity

We develop a tractable bubbles model with financial friction and downward wage rigidity. Competitive speculation in risky bubbles can result in excessive investment booms that precede inefficient busts, where post-bubble aggregate economic activities collapse below the pre-bubble trend. Risky bubbles can reduce ex ante social welfare, and leaning-against-the-bubble policies that balance the boom-bust trade-off can be warranted. We further show that the collapse of a bubble can push the economy into a “secular stagnation” equilibrium, where the zero lower bound and the nominal wage rigidity constraint bind, leading to a persistent recession, such as the Japanese “lost decades.” (JEL E22, E24, E32, E44, L26)

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