Secular stagnation and Google Trends – can we find out what people think?

The main aim of the study was to verify the thesis that the US economy is measured against the spectre of secular stagnation by determining the mood of American society using Google Trends. While performing the analysis, the authors used data on the American market for the years 2004-2018. The study comprised 42 entries, including 19 entries from the category “social” and 23 entries from the category “financial”. The analyses do not allow for a clear statement that the US economy is facing the spectre of secular stagnation, but they allow us to formulate the observation that the mood of the society is moderately pessimistic, which undoubtedly translates into economic activity and may be the cause of the persisting economic stagnation.

The Case against the New "Secular Stagnation Hypothesis"

The new “secular stagnation hypothesis” developed by Lawrence H. Summers attempts to justify why the demand stimulus applied in the aftermath of the global financial crisis failed to revive growth in a satisfactory manner. Building on previous ideas of Keynes, Hansen, and Bernanke, Summers claims that excess savings together with feeble investment drove the natural rate of interest down to zero and advanced economies into stagnation. As the US monetary policy rate is not allowed to fall below the zero bound, Summers calls for “quantitative easing” and more expansionary fiscal policy to spur investment demand. This paper refutes Summers’s hypothesis by revealing its internal inconsistencies and presenting both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the long-term evolution of savings, investment, productivity, and capital stock. It also estimates the natural rate of interest following the approach of Salerno (2020), which is further refined based on Rothbard’s “pure interest rate” theory. The calculation shows that the natural interest rate did not drop to zero after the global financial crisis, but has actually remained consistently and significantly above the federal funds rate and the bank loan prime rate. This not only invalidates Summers’s central claim, but confirms once more the explanatory power of the Austrian business cycle theory in relation to the main trigger of the global financial crisis and its subsequent unfinished recovery.

Encoded Weakening of the European Integration – The EU-specific Vectors of Disorientegration

The paper attempts to contribute to the better understanding of how the centrifugal force towards weakening European integration has developed by identifying the EU-specific vectors of such gradient. We argue that disorientegration is an echo effect of a complex amalgam of mutually intertwined and interrelated mechanisms embedded secularly into our European integration process. The paper also addresses whether secular stagnation adds to that centrifugal force. The paper finally outlines at least six potential principles of reversing the European disorientegration by cultivating contingency governance.

Is zero the safe real rate?

The current economic debate with regards to the secular trend of ever lower, even negative, safe real interest rates is dominated by Keynesian, neoclassical and Austrian explanations. The former (two) argue that the interdependence phenomena of a global savings glut and a secular stagnation cause an oversupply of savings and thus drive down rates. From this position, central bank merely react to market forces. The latter dissent and argue that it was rather the other way around and an asymmetric central bank policy aimed at propping up equity prices led to the secular stagnation now quoted for its justification. In contrast, from the perspective of a critique of ideology, safe real rates where neither driven down by market forces nor central banks but by the weight of being not reasonably safe but riskless. Specifically, I argue that by equating the riskless return with the short-term interest rate, Black and Scholes (1973) state a tautology and imply that both rates shall be zero. In the subsequent inquiry, I show that this argument allows for a neat narration of the economic history of the neoliberal age. Furthermore, I explain why under current conditions ultra low interest rates fail to translate into inflation.